S. HRG. 103–318

U.S. PARTICIPATION IN SOMALIA PEACEKEEPING

. F 76/2: S. HRG. 103-318

Participation in Somalia Peace...

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 19 AND 20, 1993

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

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U.S. PARTICIPATION IN SOMALIA PEACEKEEPING

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1993

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in room SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pell, Sarbanes, Kerry, Simon, Feingold, Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, Pressler, Murkowski, Brown, Coverdell, and Gregg.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We are holding this hearing today to look into the U.S. involvement in Somalia. I am very pleased to welcome Under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff and Under Secretary of Defense Walter Slocombe to our committee to provide a detailed account of the administration's policy on this issue.

American forces have played a leading role in the successful U.N. effort to provide humanitarian relief to Somalia. However, U.S. involvement in UNOSOM II has been criticized for its emphasis on military action instead of diplomacy in attempting to establish a secure environment to ensure that starvation is not used once again as a weapon in the clan rivalries.

Unnecessary confrontations with General Aideed cost the lives of many U.N. peacekeepers, including over 25 Americans. As we know, last week there was an extensive debate on this issue culminating in a Senate vote to withdraw our combat troops from Somalia by March 31, 1994, the date proposed by the President. Congress has demonstrated its grave concern about our involvement. Many questions remain concerning the perceived inconsistencies of our mission there and the events leading up to and including the October 3, 1993, raid which cost so many lives.

I believe it is the responsibility of this committee to continue its public examination of this issue. There will be a hearing tomorrow with Madeleine Albright, our Ambassador to the U.N., and Ambassador Robert Oakley will be briefing our committee tomorrow afternoon as well. Actually, it will be this afternoon that he will be with us.

I certainly look forward to hearing Mr. Tarnoff and Mr. Slocombe address these issues, and I would now turn to the ranking minority member.

Senator HELMS. And how are you this morning?

The CHAIRMAN. Fine.

Senator HELMS. Good. Good morning. Mr. Slocombe, we must stop meeting like this.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. That is right.

Senator HELMS. People will begin to talk.

Mr. Tarnoff, I am not certain that any of us on this committee, and certainly not this Senator, have any reason to be self-assured about any statement we may make or any question we may ask regarding the tragic events in Somalia. And let me tell you why. Before any finger-pointing starts, members of this Foreign Relations Committee would do well to engage in some genuine self-assessment.

We muffed our chance and we muffed it badly back in the summer. When you appeared right there before the committee, we could have taken you on then, and should have, but we did not. Because it was on July 29 that you testified as follows: "UNOSOM II," that is the U.N. operation in Somalia, "is a model worth cultivating. We should welcome the opportunity to advance our humanitarian values with limited U.S. military involvement."

Now, I heard the buzz words, military involvement, but none of us, including me, picked up on them. I do recall—if this is any comfort to me and it is not, I do recall thinking "what if." But the consciousness of the people who are supposed to be the leaders of the American people scarcely ever give a thought to what the U.S. Constitution says and means about who can declare war and who cannot, even if we decide what is a declaration of war, and there is a lot of trouble with that this very day in this town.

Now, a lot of things that have happened in recent years have bothered me. Somalia has bothered me from the very beginning, and I am sure it has bothered you. On the other hand, our television screens were filled night after night with scenes of pitiful, emaciated people in Somalia, especially women and little children with their bloated bellies and their empty, staring eyes.

And, of course, it suited all of us. We thought it was great for America to send food over there, even though as a member for some years of this committee I knew that the very same pitiful people and things are going on in dozens of countries around the world, including in our own hemisphere. Did we select Somalia as a place where we could ease our consciences because Somalia just happens to be a country with access from the sea? I am afraid the answer to that is really yes. I do not know, but I think it is.

In any case, all of us should have heard the firebell ringing when we convened this committee in July, but we did not. We were bound to be aware that the Security Council's resolution authorizing UNOSOM II is impossibly broad and dangerously vague, but there it came and we let it float by like a ship passing in the night.

Its scope includes "building a nation," whatever that means in practical terms. It envisions the reconciliation of people who have been engaged in furious wars against each other for centuries. It specifies the disarming of a population that has been in chaos for at least 2 years, and it proposes to create a viable judicial and law enforcement system out of thin air.

The problem with your colorful endorsement of UNOSOM II on July 29 as a model worth advocating, Mr. Tarnoff, is that UNOSOM II was already then beginning to unravel.

History is replete with leaders who preferred slogans and promises to sensible assessments, and I am old enough to remember Neville Chamberlain's fatuous observation that peace in our time was going to happen. That ought to ring in our ears down through the generations.

What I have learned from this, Mr. Tarnoff—and I do not criticize you because we are equally remiss in our responsibility. All of us in Congress need to ask harder questions, and some of you need to tighten up your answers so that they will amount to more than comfortable conversation.

It is not enough for the Secretary of State to say, as he did to the Washington Post this past weekend, that the highest levels of the administration were not focused on Somalia. My Lord, what an understatement. Any time U.S. soldiers are taking fire and are casualties in a far off land, day after day, night after night in an undeclared war, I would think the State Department and the whole administration would want to be focused on that situation.

Even now a hearing on Somalia by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations apparently is not important enough for the Secretary of State to attend, because he has flown off somewhere. A Member of the House of Representatives had it about right when he asked Les Aspin: "How can I tell the mother of one of those young men that he died protecting the vital interests of this country."

And maybe you can offer a suggestion about that sort of dialog, but those questions should be asked before the tragedies occur and before the undeclared wars begin. And you and your superiors, I think, are obliged to respond somewhat more thoughtfully, always bearing in mind what the U.S. Constitution says about who can declare war and who cannot. And I look forward to your explanations and your answers, sir.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Tarnoff, we are glad to hear your statement and any part of it you do not read will be inserted in the record as if read.

STATEMENT OF HON. PETER TARNOFF, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Mr. TARNOFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. Good morning to the members of this committee.

I would like to thank you and the other members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for the opportunity to come before you today to discuss U.S. policy in Somalia. This committee, this Congress, and the American people require a clear explanation of the administration's goals and missions in Somalia, how our efforts relate to the U.N.'s role, and why we believe our strategy is sound.

I would like to provide you with this explanation and answer your questions. My colleague, Walter Slocombe, from the Defense Department, will speak to questions about the nature, size, and plan for the return of our military forces in Somalia, as well as their current activities.

Our goals in Somalia are humanitarian. We seek to support UNOSOM in its efforts to help the Somali people help themselves

in fashioning a political solution to their civil conflict and produce a secure environment to enable the free flow of humanitarian aid.

We believe firmly that these goals are worthy and that they serve America's interests. Our commitment to achieve these goals is firm, but it is not open-ended. Despite the intense focus on south Mogadishu, remarkable progress toward ending the famine and fostering political development at the district level has been made. We believe that the reinvigoration of the political process outlined by the President and reported to the Congress on October 13 will preserve these gains and fulfill U.S. objectives by March 31, 1994.

In determining our goals and missions, we have described both the mission of the U.N. and the mission of the U.S. forces. The U.N., supported by the U.N. Security Council and by the 27 governments with forces in Somalia, has taken on a broad mission in UNOSOM II; to help Somalia develop basic political institutions and to assist in establishing a judiciary and police force so Somalis can keep order in their country and prevent a return to the chaos and famine which caused the international community to intervene last year.

Having led the first phase of the U.N. mission by providing the vast majority of the forces for the UNITAF operation, the American contribution to UNOSOM II is now much more limited. We are providing military logistical support to U.N. forces so they can maintain order in Somalia. Logistical troops are under the operational control of the U.N. force command.

We are providing an interim force protection supplement, a quick reaction force, to U.N. forces to deal with emergencies. All U.S. combat forces are under U.S. operational control and all U.S. forces are under U.S. command.

We are helping accelerate the process of political reconciliation, which will come from African leaders such as Presidents Meles of Ethiopia and Issaias Eritrea working with Somali leaders, by dispatching Ambassador Robert Oakley to the region to help the U.N. encourage this process. We will maintain our military presence until March 31, 1994, after which we will leave several hundred noncombat advisers in Somalia.

In essence, Mr. Chairman, we are providing the U.N. with support for a transition to civilian contractors and non-U.S. forces, and assistance in accelerating political reconciliation. We believe that we can accomplish these goals by March 31, 1994. This timeframe is necessary to allow for a smooth turnover of responsibility, an adequate signal to the Somalis that their opportunity to take the process of reconciliation into their own hands while enjoying the physical and financial support of the international community is finite.

We believe our strategy is sound because it protects our people, protects the gains of the mission so far and, frankly, protects our interests as a world leader. It has two primary components. First, temporarily strengthening our military posture so we fulfill our transition role from a position of strength and, second, refocusing UNOSOM's efforts onto political reconciliation.

The President recently ordered additional Army combat personnel and additional armored vehicles to Somalia. This will allow us to complete our mission in Somalia from a position of strength and

safety. Our troops will be supported offshore by an aircraft carrier and two marine amphibious groups, all under American command.

Their mission is, first and foremost, to protect American troops in Somalia. Second, they are to keep open and secure the roads, the port, the lines of communication that are essential for the U.N. and relief workers to keep the flow of food, supplies, and people moving freely throughout the entire country. Third, they are to keep the pressure on those who threaten to cut off relief assistance and attack our people. Fourth, our troops, along with forces from 30 other countries, will help to restore order and make it possible for Somalis to work together to resolve their own problems.

They will protect our forces, but also protect the accomplishments of our presence in Somalia. We must recall that thanks to the U.S.-led relief effort, starvation in Somalia has virtually ceased. Life is returning to normal in many areas, although millions of Somalis still depend on relief supplies to survive. Crops are growing, tens-of-thousands of children being inoculated, and markets are opening in most of the country.

Mr. Chairman, we believe that the only lasting solution to Somalia's problems is a political one. We understood when we supported the organization of the first Addis Ababa conference, there must be a political process that allows Somalis to reconcile their differences and to begin to rebuild their country. This emphasis was neglected during the military effort to respond to the brutal attack on the Pakistani peacekeepers last June. The President's course correction is designed to put this effort front and center. The U.N. understands our views and supports our position.

The course of reviving the process of political reconciliation began last week. Ambassador Robert Oakley, who served as the special envoy to Somalia from December 1992 until May 1993, has traveled to the region and consulted with regional leaders. During the October 10–14 period, Ambassador Oakley spoke to President Issaias of Eritrea, OAU Secretary General Salim Salim, Ethiopian President Meles, and held discussions with UNOSOM officials and Somalis representing the Aideed and Ali Mahdi factions, and others, in Mogadishu.

Presidents Meles and Issaias and the Organization of African Unity are willing to assume an active role in bringing together the different Somali factions, and other regional leaders to support this effort. We have already begun to see this emphasis bear fruit.

Regional African leaders are fully engaged in efforts to keep the peace and encourage political reconciliation in Somalia. An informal cease-fire has held up in Mogadishu for more than a week. General Aideed's militia have removed a number of the barricades on roads in southern Mogadishu. Most important, Aideed's forces released unconditionally the two UNOSOM detainees they were holding, American Chief Warrant Officer Durant and Nigerian Private Shankali.

Mr. Chairman, we will also ensure that the interests of justice for the murdered peacekeepers are served as well, working with UNOSOM, through Ambassador Oakley, to look for ways to complete the necessary inquiries into the events of June 5, 1993, in a manner consistent with the U.N. resolutions. However, UNOSOM

is responsible for ensuring that justice is done. It is not the mission of U.S. forces to act as a police force in Somalia.

There are some Americans who believe that we should withdraw from Somalia immediately. We are convinced that this would be wrong: wrong for American interests and wrong for American values. We believe that our plan is the right one, because it protects our people, preserves the humanitarian gains of two administrations, and projects American leadership as it should, America acting as a reliable and responsible leader and partner. We believe the Senate's vote is an essential part of the President's plan.

Our plan protects U.S. forces through our enhanced deployment. By allowing a reasonable time for a political and military transition, we can fulfill our mission and preserve the humanitarian gains of two administrations. A precipitous withdrawal would likely have caused the collapse of the UNOSOM mission and devalue the brave efforts of the civilian and military personnel in Somalia to date.

Our responsibilities as a world leader, as a power with forces deployed in many parts of the world, as a proponent of the view that other nations must share the burdens of relieving humanitarian distress are protected as well.

First, because we keep our word to those allies who came to Somalia because we asked them to join us. If we abandon those who trusted us, we would raise serious doubts in the minds of friends and allies around the world.

Second, by maintaining the credibility of America's commitment as a deterrent to those who oppose our policies. By bolstering our military presence to protect our troops we show the aggressors and terrorists of the world that, as the President stated, you cannot change our policy by killing our people.

Third, by playing a responsible, albeit limited, role in UNOSOM's mission, we show the international community that we will play our part in collective efforts to relieve humanitarian distress and others to do the same, but that our commitments and our contributions are not open-ended.

Mr. Chairman, we started this mission, as the President has said, for the right reasons, and intend to finish it the right way. This is a commitment to finish our mission responsibly and to bring our troops home safely and on time.

In order for our policy and our soldiers to succeed, we need your support and that of the American people. Let us, this Congress and this administration, work together to bring our troops home in a way that honors our commitments and accomplishes our important mission. With your support we can remove all of our combat troops by March 31, and leave behind a Somalia where starvation has ended and political reconciliation can be well advanced.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tarnoff follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. TARNOFF

I. INTRODUCTION

Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank you and the other members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for the opportunity to come before you today to discuss U.S. policy in Somalia.

This committee, this Congress, and the American people require a clear explanation of the administration's goals and missions in Somalia, how our efforts relate to the U.N.'s role, and why we believe our strategy is sound.

I want to provide you with this explanation and answer your questions. My colleague, Walter Slocombe from the Defense Department can address your questions about the nature, size and plan for return of our military forces from Somalia.

II. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

Our goals in Somalia are humanitarian. We seek to support UNOSOM in its efforts to help the Somali people help themselves in fashioning a lasting political solution to their civil conflict, and to produce a secure environment to enable the free flow of humanitarian aid.

We believe firmly that these goals are worthy, and that they serve America's interests. Our commitment to achieve these goals is firm, but it is not open ended. Despite the intense focus on south Mogadishu, remarkable progress towards ending the famine and fostering political development at the district level has been made. We believe that the reinvigoration of the political process outlined by the President, and reported to Congress on October 13, will preserve these gains and fulfill U.S. objectives by March 31, 1994.

III. THE U.S. ROLE/THE U.N. MISSION

In determining our goals and missions, we have described both the mission of the United Nations and the mission of United States forces. The United Nations supported by the U.N. Security Council and by the 27 governments with forces in Somalia, has taken on a broad mission in UNOSOM II—to help Somalia develop basic political institutions and to assist in establishing a judiciary and police force so Somalis can keep order in their country and prevent a return to the chaos and famine which caused the international community to intervene last year.

Having led the first phase of the U.N. mission by providing the vast majority of the forces for the UNITAF operation, the American contribution to UNOSOM II now is more limited.

- We are providing military logistical support to U.N. forces so they can maintain order in Somalia. These logistical troops are under the operational control of the U.N. force command.
- We are providing an interim force protection supplement, the quick reaction force, to U.N. forces to deal with emergencies. All U.S. combat forces are under U.S. operational control and all U.S. forces are under U.S. command.
- We are helping accelerate the process of political reconciliation—which will come from African leaders such as Presidents Meles of Ethiopia and Issaias of Eritrea working with Somali leaders—by dispatching Ambassador Robert Oakley to the region to help the U.N. encourage this process.
- We will maintain our military presence until March 31, 1994 after which we will leave several hundred non-combat advisers in Somalia.

In essence, Mr. Chairman, we are providing the U.N. with support for a transition to civilian contractors and non-U.S. forces and assistance in accelerating political reconciliation. We believe that we can accomplish these goals by March 31, 1994. This timeframe is necessary to allow for a smooth turnover of responsibility and adequate to signal to the Somalis that their opportunity to take the process of reconciliation into their own hands—while enjoying the physical and financial support of the international community—is finite.

IV. THE AMERICAN STRATEGY

We believe our strategy is sound because it protects our people, protects the gains of the mission so far and, frankly, protects our interests as a world leader.

It has two primary components: First, temporarily strengthening our military posture so we fulfill our transition role from a position of strength; and second, refocusing UNOSOM's efforts on political reconciliation.

A Position of Strength

The President recently ordered additional Army combat personnel and additional armored vehicles to Somalia. This will allow us to complete our mission in Somalia from a position of *strength* and *safety*. Our troops will be supported offshore by an aircraft carrier and two marine amphibious groups, all under American command.

Their mission is first and foremost to protect American troops in Somalia.

Second, they are to keep open and secure the roads, the port, and lines of communication that are essential for the U.N. and relief workers to keep the flow of food, supplies, and people moving freely throughout the entire country.

Third, they are to keep up the pressure on those who threaten to cut off relief assistance and attack our people.

Fourth, our troops, along with forces from 30 other countries, will help to restore order and make it possible for Somalis to work together to resolve their own problems.

They will protect our forces, but also protect the accomplishments of our presence in Somalia. We must recall that thanks to the U.S.-led relief effort, starvation in Somalia has virtually ceased and life is returning to normal in many areas although millions of Somalis still depend on relief supplies to survive. Crops are growing, tens-of-thousands of children are being inoculated, and markets are opening in most of the country.

Refocusing on Political Reconciliation

Mr. Chairman, we believe that the only lasting solution to Somalia's problems is a political one. As we understood when we supported the organization of the first Addis Ababa Conference, there must be a political process that allows Somalis to reconcile their differences and to begin to rebuild their country. This emphasis was neglected during the military effort to respond to the brutal attack on the Pakistani peacekeepers last June but the President's course correction is designed to put this effort front and center. The U.N. understands our views and supports our position.

The process of reviving the process of political reconciliation began last week. Ambassador Robert Oakley, who served as the special envoy to Somalia from December 1992 until May 1993, has travelled to the region and consulted with regional leaders. During the October 10–14 period, Ambassador Oakley spoke to President Issaias of Eritrea, OAU Secretary General Salim Salim, Ethiopian President Meles, and held discussions with UNOSOM officials and Somalis representing the Aideed and Ali Mahdi factions in Mogadishu.

Presidents Meles and Issaias and the Organization of African Unity are willing to assume an active role in bringing together the different Somali factions and other regional leaders to support this effort.

We have already begun to see this emphasis bear fruit.

- Regional African leaders are fully engaged in efforts to keep the peace and encourage political reconciliation in Somalia.
- The informal cease fire has help up in Mogadishu for more than a week.
- General Aideed's militia have removed a number of the barricades on roads in south Mogadishu. Most important, Aideed's forces released unconditionally the two UNOSOM detainees they were holding—American Chief Warrant Officer Durant and Nigerian Private Shankali.

Mr. Chairman, we will also ensure that the interests of justice for the murdered peacekeepers are served as well. We are working with UNOSOM, through Ambassador Oakley, to look for ways to complete the necessary inquiries into the events of June 5, 1993 in a manner consistent with U.N. resolutions. However, UNOSOM is responsible for ensuring that justice is done. It is not the mission of U.S. forces to act as a police force in Somalia.

V. A SOUND STRATEGY

There are some Americans who believe that we should withdraw from Somalia immediately. We are convinced this would be wrong—wrong for American interests and wrong for American values. We believe our plan is the right one—because it protects our people, preserves the humanitarian gains of two administrations and projects American leadership as it should—with America acting as a reliable and responsible leader and partner. We believe the Senate's vote is an essential part of the President's plan.

- Our plan protects U.S. forces through our enhanced deployment.
- By allowing a reasonable time for a political and military transition, we can fulfill our mission and preserve the humanitarian gains of two administrations. A precipitous withdrawal would likely cause the collapse of the UNOSOM mission and devalue the brave efforts of the civilian and military personnel in Somalia to date.
- Our responsibilities as a world leader, as a power with forces deployed in many parts of the world, and as a proponent of the view that other nations must share the burdens of relieving humanitarian distress are protected as well:
  - —First, because we keep our word to those allies who came to Somalia because we asked them to join us. If we abandon those who trusted us, we would raise serious doubts in the minds of friends and allies around the world.
  - —Second, by maintaining the credibility of America's commitment as a deterrent to those who oppose our policies. By bolstering our military presence to

protect our troops we show the aggressors and terrorists of the world that, as the President stated, you cannot change our policy by killing our people.

—Third, by playing a responsible, albeit limited, role in UNOSOM's mission, we show the international community that we will play our part in collective efforts to relieve humanitarian distress, and help others to do the same, but that our commitments and our contributions are not open ended.

VI. CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, we started this mission, as the President said, "for the right reasons, and we intend to finish it in the right way." This is a commitment to finish our mission responsibly and to bring our troops home safely and on time.

In order for our policy and our soldiers to succeed we need your support and that of the American people.

Let us—the Congress and the administration—work together to bring our troops home in a way that honors our commitments and accomplishes our important mission. With your support we can remove all of our combat troops by March 31 and leave behind a Somalia where starvation has ended and political reconciliation can be well advanced.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much indeed. I think now we will have a series of questions. I would suggest that we limit ourselves now to 9 minutes so that everybody gets a chance. I will start out.

I believe it is correct to say that President Clinton's announcement of the March 31 deadline for withdrawing U.S. combat troops will make our interim role there a lame duck exercise, since Aideed and the other factional leaders will hide their weapons, bide their time until our forces depart, and then resume. What is your own reaction to this view?

Mr. TARNOFF. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that we will have a lame duck presence in Somalia and in the region between now and March 31 for several reasons. First of all, we will be enhancing our military presence so as to protect American forces and make sure that the U.N. humanitarian activities continue. Second, because starting with the efforts of Ambassador Oakley last week, we are playing an active role in the political process both within Somalia and in the region.

As I reported in my opening statement, we have some encouraging results from Ambassador Oakley's initial mission and, finally, I think that we have received reports from the other troop-contributing countries that while some may ask themselves whether or not they will remain in Somalia after March 31, we have no indication that these forces are coming out before that time unless they had previously decided to do so.

There are some governments that announced their intention to withdraw forces at the end of this year or early next year. They will probably withdraw those forces, but additional forces are, of course, on the way from Egypt, from India, from Pakistan, and we think that it is because of the President's commitment, endorsed by Congress, to keep our forces there until March 31, that the U.N. and U.S. presence will be significant during that period of time.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you repeat, just for me to absorb, what are the other countries that will be sending troops in?

Mr. TARNOFF. Other countries with troops on the way, and I would like to ask Mr. Slocombe to supplement that, but which have forces currently on the way to Somalia, and which are expected to

deploy in the coming weeks, are Egypt, India, and Pakistan. There may be others.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Slocombe.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Nepal will be sending additional forces. As you know, there are some very considerable number of countries, something like 20, who have forces in Somalia at present. The list which Peter Tarnoff has just given is a list of those who are now in the process of increasing their forces.

The CHAIRMAN. And then what troops will be taken out to balance them? In other words, what countries will be withdrawing when we withdraw?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. As Secretary Tarnoff has said, there are a number of countries who, prior to recent events, had announced that they plan to remove their forces at various dates. That includes the French and the Belgians.

The CHAIRMAN. Where do the Italians stand?

Mr. TARNOFF. My recollection is that the Italians have not set a definite date for pulling their forces out.

The CHAIRMAN. The assumption that many people make is that when we withdraw, as sort of the strongest element there, it will be very hard for the others to continue their presence. Would you concur with that statement, or is that an incorrect statement?

Mr. TARNOFF. I think, Mr. Chairman, that would be a premature judgment. We have received indications from many of the countries with troops in Somalia that they will wait and see. They will wait and see whether this process of political reconciliation is effective, whether the reduced level of violence is sustained, whether the U.N. itself is able to take on increased responsibilities, or some of the logistical and other duties, and that they have at least deferred their decisions on a firm withdrawal date until the situation on the ground is clearer.

So in answer to your question, I think it is too early to tell what the other troop-contributing countries may want to do after March 31.

The CHAIRMAN. While I was there a little while back, I was struck by the number of weapons. They were very visible. Would that be the case now?

Mr. TARNOFF. Again, in Mogadishu itself, in parts of Mogadishu, south Mogadishu primarily, where most of the fighting has been going on, there has been quite a bit of restraint on the part of the clans, especially General Aideed's clan, in the last 10-day period. We do not claim that these weapons have been put away forever, but they are certainly not being used hostile fashion as had been the case in the preceding months.

The CHAIRMAN. Why was an attempt made to seize the various Aideed lieutenants on October 4, after President Clinton had been stressing the need to de-emphasize the military confrontation with Aideed and focus on a political resolution?

Mr. TARNOFF. The mandate of the U.N. has been since early June to make a determined effort to apprehend those individuals responsible for that tragic event on June 5 in which, as all of you know, of course, 24 Pakistani peacekeepers were killed, and as part of that overall mission the U.N., occasionally assisted by the United States, has been pursuing leads, when it seemed possible to ap-

prehend some of the individuals responsible, and some, in the course of the last 3 or 4 months, have been detained.

Since that time, Mr. Chairman, we have been in close touch with the U.N. about such missions, and the U.N. now understands that the United States will not be party to attempts to apprehend either General Aideed or those responsible, because we feel that it is important to give the political reconciliation a chance. This, of course, must involve the leaders of the Aideed faction and probably General Aideed himself, so I think the mission that you were referring to is part of a continuation of the previous strategy.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of Aideed's success in eliminating Barre and the previous regime, is he not he looked on as sort of like George Washington over there by his own compatriots?

Mr. TARNOFF. I do not believe so, Mr. Chairman. He is one of 15 clan leaders. He is certainly in many ways the most single powerful leader politically and militarily, and he does have a strong hold in southern Mogadishu, but much of the violence in Somalia over the last year or so has been among the Somali factions itself, and I think it is too much to say that General Aideed is regarded as the most popular leader in his own country by a majority of his own countrymen.

The CHAIRMAN. But he was mainly responsible for throwing out the previous corrupt and unfortunate regime, is that not correct?

Mr. TARNOFF. He was one of the several people most responsible for that, but nonetheless, given the clan loyalties in Somalia, I think it is fair to say the vast majority of the Somali people do not necessarily favor him as a national leader.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you very much indeed. Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Tarnoff, the news reports over the weekend, one of which I will insert for the record, told us that Secretary Christopher, Secretary Aspin, and the President of the United States all were unaware that the U.N. policy in Somalia continued to be one of hunting down General Aideed to the exclusion of the concerted effort of political reconciliation.

Now, what I have just said is a fair assessment of what Secretary Christopher himself said. Now, how is it possible that the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, not to mention the President of the United States, were not aware of a U.N. policy that depends almost entirely on U.S. armed forces for its execution?

Mr. TARNOFF. Senator, I discussed this issue with Secretary Christopher after those reports came out. Let me tell you what he authorized me to say, and I can only speak for Secretary Christopher in this regard.

Secretary Christopher confirms that he was aware of policy as it evolved. He was not necessarily following it in every detail on an everyday basis, but at key decision points, including the point in early June when the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution authorizing U.N. forces in Somalia to pursue those responsible for the June 5 attack on the Pakistani forces, Secretary Christopher was fully aware of that development.

Senator HELMS. But what prompted him to say that in an article titled "Inattention Led to U.S. Deaths," if he said, oh, by the way, I was aware?

[The article referred to may be found in committee files.]

Mr. TARNOFF. Well, again, I do not have, Senator, the exact quotations that you may have in front of you.

Senator HELMS. Has anybody heard from Les Aspin that he said he knew or did not know?

Mr. TARNOFF. I cannot speak for the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Senator, I can answer that question. Secretary Aspin was certainly aware, of course, of both military and political policies in Somalia throughout this period of time. There was a very strong concern on the part of the administration that the political process, the effort to build a political settlement, would allow for us to get our forces out and was not being given the emphasis that it required.

Senator HELMS. Well, why did he not say, look, I do not know what Warren is talking about, but I knew? Was anything like that said?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Said when?

Senator HELMS. You know what I said.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Said when? Do you mean in response to this press story?

Senator HELMS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I have no idea whether he discussed it with Secretary Christopher or not.

Senator HELMS. No, no, I am talking about the Defense Department ought to have said, wait a minute, the Secretary of Defense did know.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I just said that.

Senator HELMS. When did he say it?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I just said it. I do not know that the question has been put to Secretary Aspin.

Senator HELMS. Well, it is a long time since this past weekend to be hanging on a limb on this thing, Mr. Secretary. Well, I hope you folks will get your acts together. When you have a Secretary of State making a statement like that, and then I do not care when he says, oh, by the way, I did know, after all, it worries me, and I think it worries a lot of people in the Congress, and I expect it worries a lot of people among the American people.

Well, let me move on to something else. One of the fundamental concerns that I have had, and I think many other Senators and Members of the House have had with participation in these U.N. military exercises, is that the differing national agendas of the countries represented could very well put our own troops in life-threatening positions.

Now, it has been reported that one reason that General Aideed has such a bountiful and steady supply of weaponry is because the Italian contingent allowed trucks coming from the Aideed stronghold north of Mogadishu to pass through their checkpoints without inspection. Now, it is believed that those trucks carried weapons, mines, ammunition, and so forth.

Mr. Tarnoff, in earlier testimony I think I am correct in saying that I recall that you assured us that the Italian contingent in So-

malia, despite many reports to the contrary, were cooperating fully with the United States and with UNOSOM, but the President's own report, which he submitted to Congress on October 13—that is last week—the President stated that, "nations arriving with differing opinions of how their forces would relate to the United Nations force commander and their national capitals," and the delays in following UNOSOM orders, resulted in what the President called "mutual recrimination."

All right. To whom was the President referring if he was not referring to the Italian contingent?

Mr. TARNOFF. Senator, let me try to answer that in two ways. First of all, with respect to the Italians I would say today what I said on July 29. We have absolutely no evidence that there was a deliberate or even occasional attempt by the Italians to collaborate with General Aideed and with his forces. Again, I would like to reiterate that statement that I made before.

I think with respect to what is in the President's report to the Congress, he was referring to the fact that many of these countries were getting used to a command and control arrangement with the U.N. for the first time. This was a very different operation than anything the U.N. had undertaken.

It was, as you know, Senator, the first chapter 7 on-the-ground operation managed by the U.N. This involved a good deal of dialog between individual governments, the individual commanders, and the U.N. command both in the field and in New York with respect to exactly what their obligations and responsibilities were.

It is a very difficult affair to manage, with some 25 countries, with contingents with different experiences, different roles, different capacities on the ground, and I think this is the primary reason that there was the kind of confusion that the President referred to in his report.

Senator HELMS. Well, it is confusing here to me. I am not sure what the President was saying. Can you say in open session where you think Aideed got his weaponry?

Mr. TARNOFF. Yes. We think that he got them primarily through purchasing—he has supporters outside Somalia in his clan.

Senator HELMS. What nationality?

Mr. TARNOFF. Somali. There is a very large Somali community outside of the country itself.

Senator HELMS. Did he get any of the weapons from the United States, Mr. Slocombe?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I would not be surprised if he had some American weapons that have been captured and left over from various previous regimes and incidents, but we have no——

Senator HELMS. Well, can the CIA, the FBI, or anybody working on this——

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I am trying to answer your question. I have no reason to believe—we have no reason to believe that he has currently or is currently receiving any weapons supplied from the United States. Somalia is a country which is awash in weapons as a result of a long history of civil war supplies by various countries, by the Russians, by us.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you hold the microphone a little closer?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. There is, as the committee is certainly aware, a very extensive international black market in arms, and Aideed is one of the purchasers in that market.

Senator HELMS. I tell you, I am going to have to follow this up with some written questions which I would hope that you would be able to be a little more precise than you are in public, and I am not being critical of you. This is an important point, at least to me. It may not be to anybody else on this committee.

I do not know how much more time I have, Mr. Chairman, but back in the latter part of September, I think it was September 29, this committee received official communication from the administration that the President intended to draw down up to $25 million into DOD commodities and services to support UNOSOM II to build a Somali police force.

It also said that the President intended to authorize $2 million in economic support funds to be made available to UNOSOM to pay the salaries of the Somali police forces, and the memorandum of justification said—and I have it in my file if you do not have it—"UNOSOM II is a landmark operation. In a world rife with humanitarian crises caused by armed conflict, it is indeed important to U.S. national interests to support multinational efforts that help us by achieving a more equitable sharing of the responsibility for crisis management and relief."

Now, the obvious question to me in all of this, with all due respect, since the American taxpayers seem to be paying for most of these police-building, not to mention the $1 billion-plus we paid so far, how do you see this as an example of more equitable sharing of responsibility, and ancillary to that is, did the President know what he was signing when he said that?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I am sure the President knew what he was signing. The reason that we made the request was that we need to transfer the responsibility for maintaining a kind of basic level of order in that country to allow relief to go forward. It is obviously better to do that through a local police force.

That is the reason we made that request, and is the reason we continue to think it was a constructive step, precisely because it transfers the responsibility for keeping order from American and other foreign forces to locally recruited police forces.

Senator HELMS. Do you think it is more equitable for the American taxpayers?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. It is more equitable for the American taxpayer and the American military that it be Somalis who keep order in Somalia than Americans. Yes, it is more equitable.

Senator HELMS. Let me ask one more ancillary question. More equitable compared to whom?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Compared to our doing it ourselves. It is also important to observe that other countries are supporting the effort to build a police force in Somalia.

Senator HELMS. But not to the degree that we are.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling these hearings. I am afraid continued public discussion about our mission in Somalia and about U.N. peacekeeping in gen-

eral is essential as we struggle and experiment with a post-Soviet U.S. foreign policy.

I have to say that I have had reservations about this operation ever since I came to office 9 months ago. I have heard consistent criticism of it back home in Wisconsin. For that reason, I did not cosponsor Senate joint resolution 45 because I thought such a broad mission could be a recipe for a quagmire.

Last month I was one of seven Senators to vote against a first attempt to limit the action. I voted against it because I thought it was too weak, and since that time we lost a young man in Wisconsin who lives just 45 minutes from my home.

Last week I voted against a resolution which authorized increased U.S. forces to remain in Somalia until March 31. I do not question the intentions of the administration or the people who are pursuing that course, but I just believe it is too long.

I am not convinced that we will be able to accomplish more by staying there until March 31, and my opposition is really twofold. First, it is procedural, if you will. I think it is more than something procedural. I still believe that the war powers resolution has some meaning, and that its procedures and requirements have not been followed.

I believe under that resolution that our troops should have been withdrawn within 90 days, or there should have been congressional authorization. There has been no congressional authorization. Senate joint resolution 45 has never come out of conference, and the item that was passed last week has not gone through, so I believe that procedure has not been followed.

But second, I oppose this action on the merits. I think it is a drawn-out mission. I think we should withdraw immediately. It started, without a doubt, as a noble and compassionate humanitarian effort, but it has gone awry, and I think it has become a dangerous, muddled adventure that to some resembles trying to colonialize a poor east African nation.

I am very wary to support an action where the U.S. military supposedly tries to build a nation in a warring country where we may not even be welcome.

May I say, though, in wanting to be as conciliatory as possible, that certainly I do not believe there is no role for U.N. peacekeeping. Many have said that the recent activities and efforts in Cambodia were successful, so I do not want to have my remarks taken as isolationist or certainly as against the U.N., but I simply think this action does not make sense, and we should get out now.

In that spirit, let me ask, why did the United States choose to become involved in combat operations in Somalia only after the bulk of our U.S. combat forces had been withdrawn?

Mr. TARNOFF. There had, Senator, of course, been much larger U.S. combat forces in Somalia from the end of last year when the UNITAF operation under U.S. leadership was launched. It so happens that possibly because of the very large presence of U.S. combat units, possibly because of the degree of need of the people and the degree of deprivation in the people welcoming the relief supplies at that point, there was not sustained opposition to those forces at that time. There was some opposition, but it was not anything like what happened half a year later.

In terms of why the violence increased, there were a couple of reasons why this may have been the case. One is that as the U.S. forces left, some of those who felt that their own power base in Somalia was being eroded took advantage of the fact that as U.S. forces were leaving, other forces were coming in a bit more slowly, not necessarily in every case as well-equipped and well-trained as U.S. forces.

Also, it may be that some of these leaders, General Aideed in particular, saw that the political process which had started in March of this year at Addis Ababa resulting in agreements among the leaders, including General Aideed himself to disarm, would have the effect of reducing their power base. I think that at least is a fair analysis of why the violence may have increased at that time.

Senator FEINGOLD. And why we then responded.

Well, let me ask specifically, why was there an attempt to seize Aideed and his lieutenants on October 4, after we stated there was a need to focus on a political and not military solution?

Mr. TARNOFF. We had felt, from early September, and made our views known to our allies and to the U.N., that it was necessary to begin to focus greater attention on the political reconciliation process, which had been, quite frankly, neglected since the events of early June.

However, at no time was there a decision reached between ourselves, the U.N., and the other troop-contributing countries, that pressure would not continue to be exercised on those who were challenging, militarily, U.N. forces. This was only a day or so after the events in which significant U.S. losses occurred; and we were still in the process of deliberating with our allies and with the U.N. at that point, exactly what the modification should be on our own procedures, so that the forces in the field were operating on previous instructions.

Senator FEINGOLD. Which were to pursue Aideed?

Mr. TARNOFF. That is correct.

Senator FEINGOLD. In the October 13 report to Congress from the administration, it stated, "At no time have U.S. forces been tasked with such missions as nation-building." But in your testimony of July 29, it stated, "Maintaining a secure environment in a country where a 2-year civil war has destroyed nearly all civilian institutions and services, is a formidable task. Unfortunately, this cannot be accomplished either quickly or bloodlessly. The process of nation-building will take time."

Please explain where the U.S. policy on nation-building stands today, with regard to Somalia, both today and for the foreseeable future.

Mr. TARNOFF. I think it is important to distinguish, Senator, between what the U.N. objectives have been since earlier this year, and what U.S. objectives have been. The so-called nation-building task, which is really a task regarding the reconstruction of Somalia, economically and politically, was a task that the Somali leaders themselves agreed to in March in Addis Ababa.

That was reinforced when the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 814, after the meeting in Addis Ababa, in maintaining that

it was in the interests of the U.N. Security Council to assist the Somalis in these efforts.

So when I referred at that time to our interest in the reconstruction of Somalia, I was talking specifically about our support to the U.N. effort that was going on at that time, with the agreement of the principal Somali leaders. I think that will continue to be the case.

It was a U.N. effort over time, to help in the reconstruction of Somalia, and to help political reconciliation. The United States will support that in appropriate ways. That is very different from the specific U.N. military mission, to which we are now committed until March 31.

Senator FEINGOLD. So, nation-building has never been our goal?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Nation-building has never been part of the American military mission. It has been, in a broad sense, a part of the U.N. program for Somalia, and we support that program. But it has not been part of the mission of the U.S. forces in country.

Senator FEINGOLD. Has not the military effort been used, in part, to assist in nation-building?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The U.S. military effort, at least since the end of the UNITAF period at the beginning of May, has been devoted to really three kinds of operations: One, to provide security under the quick reaction force concept; to provide security and backup, as necessary, for the U.N. forces, which constitute the vast majority of the forces in Mogadishu; and second, to provide logistic support for the U.N. forces; and third, for the period of time that we have been discussing, to try with special forces to capture Aideed and his senior lieutenants.

None of those missions are nation-building. Nation-building would involve being out in the countryside, doing civic action and that sort of thing; and we have not been involved in that extensively, since the UNOSOM II operation was stood up, in early May.

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me ask you a question about the costs. Senator Helms began this. But is the Department of Defense going to receive any kind of reimbursement from the U.N.?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. For the operation as a whole?

Senator FEINGOLD. For our contribution of more than $1 billion.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. My understanding is, this is an assessed operation.

Senator FEINGOLD. Did we receive any reimbursement?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. We have not received any yet. The main reason for everybody being in arrears on the reimbursements is the delay of the United States paying its own contribution. But I will check, and get you the numbers on the reimbursements.

[The information referred to follows:]

The Department of Defense has received $27.5 million in reimbursements from the U.N. This was the total amount billed to the U.N. for support provided to eligible nations during the U.S.-led Operation Restore Hope. The Department has billed the U.N. an additional $52.1 million for costs incurred in support of UNOSOM II (also known as Operation Continue Hope). Most of the $1 billion in costs to the U.S. will not be eligible for reimbursement from the U.N., as the efforts involved were voluntary rather than requested by the U.N.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. There is no question that we will bear the great bulk of the cost.

Senator FEINGOLD. And what is the figure that you would expect would be involved?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I would not quarrel with $1 billion. However, I can get you that number.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Lugar?

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In fact, our staff points out in a memorandum that the cost of UNOSOM II through September 30 of this year has been more than $1 billion, and that 30.4 percent will be assessed to us. And the meter is still running on both of those.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

Senator LUGAR. So apparently, we have that much invested. What I was struck by was the comment you made, Secretary Tarnoff, that there has been remarkable progress toward ending the famine and fostering political development at the district level. That may be true. I have tried to clip from the press every bit of data about both of those; and there apparently are village councils or district councils forming in as many as 40 regions as I recall; and there is evidence, as you have mentioned, that crops are coming in, and there is some self-sufficiency.

But just for the record, could it be possible for the Department to produce the data you have from private voluntary people, as well as officials of UNOSOM, on how many people have been saved or fed, or the sufficiency of crops? These data seem to be very sparse. Of necessity, perhaps, most of the reporting is in south Mogadishu.

If there is to be a claim made for this entire mission of two administrations, it has to be in terms of the nutrition that has changed substantially. And we do not know much about that. I think it is a case that needs to be made, or at least fleshed out.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. We can get you the most precise information. The most dramatic statistic that I know in this connection is that the private voluntary organizations have, essentially, stopped the general relief, the general supply of food to the population. Now, there remains a very large number, like a million people, who live in camps and who do depend on outside relief supplies.

But in general, it has been possible, as a result of the U.N. effort, in which the United States made a very dominant contribution, it has been possible to dispense with general relief supplies for the population. That is a very substantial accomplishment. The evidence is, it has saved literally hundreds of thousands of lives.

Senator LUGAR. And that was, of course, the purpose of our original mission.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes, and the purpose of staying until March 31, is to maximize the chance that it does not go back to the same situation we were in when President Bush made the decision to send in the forces, with the support of then President-elect Clinton.

Senator LUGAR. I would like to follow up on some of the reasoning of Senator Feingold. He raised the question of why our military operations commenced at a time when the overall strength that we had in Somalia was relatively low. As you pointed out in your responses, initially we had over 20,000 troops; and one reason, I suspect, that there was little opposition, was that we had overwhelming strength at that point.

It is reasonable, as you suggested, Secretary Tarnoff, as our troops left, that if there were those who were unhappy about our being there to begin with, that they would begin to surface. And they did; and, of course, they killed the 24 Pakistani peacekeepers in May, which precipitated one of the resolutions.

Let me just say, however, it appears that, in our decision to use force in trying to capture Aideed or other perpetrators of the acts against the Pakistanis and the ambush of our own four people shortly thereafter, we operated at a time in which we did not have many people there. Perhaps the strategy was that special forces would do special missions, without having overwhelming strength.

Was it not logical then, with so very few persons there of our military, that we were likely to encounter problems, that we no longer had overwhelming force or respect; or no longer intimidated General Aideed or others, at that point?

And, the disconnect between the time of overwhelming force and then, the application of force, is peculiar in this situation. When we had the overwhelming force, the orders were not to do general disarming, or to go after Aideed or others. Indeed, that was precisely what we were not supposed to do.

Now, how did things shift to a point where we used military force, when we really did not have much force to use?

Mr. TARNOFF. Senator, let me try to answer that, from a political perspective. There were two or three things that we were trying to achieve in early June, after the attack on the Pakistani forces which, of course, as you've correctly cited, was followed by the U.N. Security resolutions, authorizing UNOSOM to seek out those responsible for those attacks.

The first was, to get a higher degree of involvement on the part of those other forces arriving in Somalia at that time. We felt, at the time of the handover from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, that it was very important that those forces be more active; that they accept more responsibility. The whole philosophy of the handoff was for the UNOSOM forces themselves to be more aggressive; and therefore, we hoped at that time that the same forces would have the capacity to be more robust when it came to military operations in general, and the pursuit of the people responsible for the other operations in particular.

With respect to our own forces, I will let Secretary Slocombe comment on that, specifically. But, as you can well imagine, in a case like this, there is always a tendency on the part of the U.N. to want the United States to come back and forth, to do a job that was not being carried out as well by the successive forces. We were resisting that, with a view toward reinforcing the U.N.'s own capacities in this regard; and it was very much in our minds at this time.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I would only add that that is exactly right; that, during this period of time, we were trying to get additional third-country forces in, and very substantial third-country forces did come in, and are pledged and are on their way in now.

The mission of the U.S. quick reaction force was, from the very beginning, to provide assistance to those other U.N. forces, when they were in situations they could not handle; and that was the reason why we began being more active in patrolling and in provid-

ing escort and support. In addition, for the reasons Secretary Tarnoff has explained, during this period we adopted the objective of trying to apprehend Aideed and his principal lieutenants, in order to pursue the question of their accountability for the attack on the Pakistani forces in early June.

Senator LUGAR. So, to underline the point you are making, we were prepared to take military action, even though we had very few people and to encourage other nations to take military action? Is that, essentially, the point?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. We were, and indeed still are, trying to provide a U.N. structure in which the U.S. force is a relatively small part of the engaged ground forces, because of the logistics, and the people at sea are not being engaged in anything like the same sense.

It was clear when we were trying to stand up that very large multinational force, that those countries were vastly more willing to make contributions if they knew that there was the highly mobile, high tech, highly sophisticated American force available to back them up if they got into trouble. That was, essentially, the mission we were carrying out.

Senator LUGAR. Let me just saw that in your statement, Secretary Tarnoff, you mentioned, among our missions now, are to keep open and secure the roads, and to keep up the pressure on those who threaten to cut off relief assistance, and help restore order.

But the accounts, at least in the press—and you may have more information on this—are that our troops in south Mogadishu are in the compound; that, essentially, the only people out and active are in helicopters who are surveying the roads. And that those who were arguing last week, for instance—and I was not among them—that, if that is our purpose, why should we not be out of Somalia?

In other words, what I am curious about is: How much work is being done by our forces, to do the relief assistance, open up the roads, and keep them open?

The evidence does not seem to be that there is great activity by our troops, in any of these regards. Now, can you illuminate what they are doing?

Mr. TARNOFF. Well, in that respect, I think the press accounts are inaccurate, Senator. Our troops are out of the compound; partly because they are arriving in greater numbers; and partly, quite frankly, because there has been some restraint shown on the part of the Aideed forces.

These convoys are now functioning fairly normally throughout southern Mogadishu. Those supply lines are restored. And it is simply not the case that our forces are hunkered down in the compound, anywhere near close to the situation of 2 or 3 weeks ago.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. That is absolutely right. We are not using our forces for offensive missions, so long as the current calm holds. We do continue to maintain a high state of readiness, to observe and to move around, to maintain lines of communication. We are making clear that we will retaliate if attacked, and will defend ourselves if our forces are in threat situations.

I agree with you, it would be easy to gather from the press, although there were some stories to the contrary today, that our

forces are simply locked into their compounds. It is not true. They are not going out and aggressively launching sweep operations; but there is a big difference between that and being hunkered down in the compounds.

Senator LUGAR. Well, the impression of these press stories is that there are two convoys going to the airport a day. The U.N. people say they would not dare go out, aside from being in one of the convoys; that roadblocks occur, and that our troops are trying to negotiate their way with whomever is stopping the traffic. In other words, there seems to be an overwhelming number of anecdotal stories of this sort.

Are you saying, in essence, our troops are out all over the place?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. No, they are not out all over the place. That would constitute an effort to sweep through the slums of Mogadishu and round up weapons and round up people. We could do that, if we thought that was a good idea; but it would involve risks, and would not be an appropriate strategy, at this point.

What we are doing—I cannot confirm the number of two convoys. There are different counts. It is not the number that I believe is the correct one. It may depend on what somebody is counting as a convoy.

As you probably know, the U.S. and U.N. forces are located at various places all over the city; both in order to avoid this "hunkered down in the compound" mentality, and simply to maintain communications. There are regular convoys, as I say, I am puzzled at the two a day figure; it is not what I have been told, and not what I believe to be the case. There are regular convoys that move along on the main roads.

One of the issues that we are working with the SNA now, on which some progress has been made, has been precisely to get the roadblocks removed, so that you do not have to face the question of a confrontation at roadblocks, which would be contrary to what we want to have happen. We want to get the supplies through; we do not want to fight around the convoys.

Because of this activity, relief supplies and other regular commercial supplies move through the city. The situation is vastly calmer than it was a few weeks ago.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Secretary Slocombe, there have been a number of press reports that suggest Iran may have been supplying arms to General Aideed. Can you comment on that?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Not in public session. I would be glad to go into it in detail, on a classified basis.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, there have been press reports. Do you suggest that there is any merit to those press reports?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. There are press reports to a lot of effect, and I would be glad to go into it. You cannot have a policy of saying, I will confirm all the true press reports and denounce all the false ones, and still keep any secrets.

Senator KASSEBAUM. That is very true; and I can appreciate that. But I would value being able to have some guidance.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I would be delighted to arrange a briefing, either for you or subject to whatever the committee's procedures are, for

the committee, on a classified basis, on our information about where we believe Aideed is getting his military supplies. I will say, he gets an awful lot of them in-country. It is a country full of arms. This is not the Yom Kippur War; this is low tech.

Senator KASSEBAUM. They seem to just keep getting more and more technical, with greater proficiency as it goes along.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes. And as I say, I will be happy to provide the information; but I cannot do it in open session.

Senator KASSEBAUM. When the President stated that all forces would be home by March 31, obviously, everyone would hope they would be home before then; but I think many of us had severe reservations about ever specifically setting a deadline whenever our forces are engaged, wherever they may be; in Somalia, or anywhere else.

I would like for either of you to comment—perhaps Secretary Tarnoff, first?—on the effect this has on possible negotiations. And then, Secretary Slocombe, how you view this, from a military standpoint?

I think, when you put down that kind of marker, you immediately put up some parameters that make it difficult, from both the political and the military side.

Mr. TARNOFF. Senator, we will know closer to the time, clearer than we can tell you today, exactly what the effect is.

But going back to what I said, with respect to the handoff between UNITAF and UNOSOM II, I think that it is understood in the region, including among Somalis—the vast majority of Somalis who support the presence of UNOSOM and the United States in Somalia—it is assumed, I think, by them that ultimately the responsibility for peace and reconstruction of Somalia is in the hands of the Somali people.

For some in the region, there will never be a perfect time for that. And I must say that we should not imagine that the so-called nation-building exercise will be an easy one that can take place in a very few years.

But, insofar as we have indicated that there is a time limit on our own commitment with respect to the forces on the ground, I think that we have given the Somalis themselves, above all, an incentive which they may not have had: To accelerate the political reconciliation process, something that Bob Oakley is promoting. We have certainly gotten many of the contributing countries of troops, and of goods and of money, to frontload their effort.

And it is our hope that this concentration of diplomatic effort, as well as the continued presence of substantial forces in the area, will, by March 31, lead to an improvement in the situation. But I cannot tell you, at this point, what the effect of that date will be, until we are closer to the time.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Obviously, from a strictly military point of view, it would be better not to have a deadline; there is no question about that.

On the other hand, the U.S. commitment is not indefinite. And, as Peter Tarnoff says, to some degree—leaving even aside the domestic politics of the problem, which is the question from Senator Feingold; and it would suggest that the other people would take a different view—even leaving that aside, one gets to a point where,

if you mean not to have an indefinite commitment, you have to say that it has a definite end. Then, we believe that the March 31 deadline gives us the reasonable chance.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, that is true; and we could all wish it would be December.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Or October.

Senator KASSEBAUM. But once you set that date down, everything really goes to that date. And I think, from a political standpoint, it could well be that everyone will sit there in Somalia, potentially; which would lead me to ask further: You have mentioned several times the agreement in March in Addis Ababa.

Are the other leaders of the clans participating, at this point, actively, in negotiations? Have the other war lords laid down and turned in their arms, as was agreed to in the March agreements? It is my understanding that, indeed, many did; General Aideed never did. Could you clarify that, and where it stands now, as far as reaching some of the points that were agreed to at that March meeting, which General Aideed attended?

Mr. TARNOFF. Senator, in his meeting in Mogadishu last week, Ambassador Oakley did meet the leaders of all principal factions, including the leaders of the Ali Mahdi faction, which is probably the most second most important in the country.

Since Ambassador Oakley returned, there have been contacts by U.N. people and others with the clan leaders, and there is still a degree of contact among them.

But with respect to the agreements in March in Addis Ababa, where you correctly stated that the leaders themselves agreed to lay down their arms or, in fact, to disarm themselves, these were not carried out partly because the clans themselves did not trust each other. And it is our view that unless the process of political reconciliation advances more rapidly, it is not likely that they would lay down their arms or give their arms up to the U.N. to control.

And that is the reason that we have initiated, on an accelerated basis, the conversations with the east African leaders themselves. It is certainly the intention of President Meles and President Issaias, and others of the east African community who have become seized again with this issue, to look for ways to implement as soon as possible many of the provisions of the Addis Ababa agreement in March.

And they are working on this with the Somalis themselves, and they may want to be convening meetings of the Somali groups in order to achieve this purpose.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, given the success General Aideed has seem to have, I am sure that does not send a very good signal to the others as far as wanting to try to comply with this agreement. And it seems to me the other clan leaders, and they have significant power, have not stepped forward and taken much of a leadership position in trying to begin to pull things together. No one has seemed to raise in the last several months a very strong voice in Somali affairs.

Mr. TARNOFF. I think that is a fair statement. I think part of the reason is that, although not a dominant figure in the country by any means, Aideed reached a position where he had a very strong

position of strength in Mogadishu which of course is the capital, the principal focus of governmental and U.N. activity.

This served to intimidate many of the other leaders, and it is partly for that reason, Senator, that we feel that the political process the east Africans themselves are leading is especially important in order to draw the leaders of other factions, as well as the Aideed people themselves, into a political process and make the case as strongly as possible that African leaders themselves in the region have a high stake in some sort of accommodation.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Maybe just to clarify at the end my own thinking on this, and what has been muddled a bit, it seems to me the question is of logistical support versus nation building and what we were doing there.

As I recall, General Powell as well as President Bush, but particularly General Powell, in laying out the mission said that troops—some troops would remain when the main body was withdrawn to provide logistical support. This as you point out, Secretary Slocombe, was not nation building and we were never intended to be a part of that effort.

Unfortunately, our logistical support got caught somewhat in June when General Aideed attacked Pakistani forces, and became involved in trying to resolve it in what we assumed would be a very short time. Is that correct?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. It was not so much logistical support, which I should explain. You know and I know, but I want to make sure it is clear for the record.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Fine, but some of those were serving as police personnel from Fort Riley.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Just for the record, though, it is important to make clear that the logistical support is not for the country as whole. It is logistical support for military forces that are there.

Senator KASSEBAUM. That is right. And our quick reaction support, which was always there as a backup, is under our command and control.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Exactly.

Senator KASSEBAUM. And always has been as well as, of course, the Rangers that we sent in just recently. But there has been a lot of confusion about command and control. And I think that it is important to clarify that the quick reaction forces that were there for support for the logistical groups were always under our command and control.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Absolutely, as were the Rangers.

Senator KASSEBAUM. As were the Rangers, yes.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. In that connection, so that the committee is fully informed, this is probably an appropriate point to let you know about the arrival of the two Marine units that President Clinton ordered to go. These include about 3,600 Marines and helicopters and armored vehicles offshore. They also include a special operations capability.

With these forces present, President Clinton has approved the recommendation of Secretary Aspin that the U.S. Army special command elements, that is the Rangers, be returned to the United States within the next few days. This rotation is part of the overall

deployment that was originally approved, so the Rangers will be out in a few days.

Senator KASSEBAUM. My time is up, but I would just like to second what Senator Lugar said, that I think that it is important that somehow we have clarification of exactly what we are doing right now in Mogadishu. I think it is a disservice to our Armed Forces to somehow believe they are hunkered down behind barricades, and that is indeed diminishing of the important role that they have played there, to somehow have that conveyed. I think it is important to know exactly what they are doing.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I appreciate that. We are trying to maintain a posture in which it is clear that the forces are ready and able to defend themselves, will do so, are out doing necessary observation, helping keep the lines of communication open, but not conducting offensive operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have not been able to be here because we have had another meeting on other areas of foreign policy concern, but no doubt questions have pointedly made some of the criticism that you have heard in recent weeks. And I think in fairness one has to acknowledge in bipartisanship that there is a strong sense on both sides of the aisle here that at least the communication process, if not the actual implementation of policy, has been wanting to a certain degree so that a lot of questions have loomed larger perhaps than some of them maybe ought to have been. And certainly in some cases, appropriately they loomed large.

I do not want to go backward. I mean, there are others here who may want to do that. I do not think it serves us now. We seem to know where we are going, but I want to make certain of that, and I would like to just ask some questions about where we are today and where we seem to be heading.

Is there any dissention or difference of opinion between us now and the U.N. as to what the definition of this mission is?

Mr. TARNOFF. No, there really is not, Senator. It has been, of course, an important time for the United States and the U.N. Both the Secretary General of the U.N. and the members of the Security Council of the U.N. as well as the troop-contributing countries, those 30 governments which have men and women on the ground in Somalia, are to be in touch closely, inform each other of our assessment of the situation, what our plans are, and I think that I can answer an unqualified yes to your question. There is total agreement on all of these elements with respect to future missions involved.

Senator KERRY. Is the United States committed to the continuation of the U.N. mission as defined in the resolution in future months with other forces participating?

Mr. TARNOFF. The UNOSOM mission itself is up for review at the end of this month. We will certainly favor the continuation of a UNOSOM effort, but we are considering ourselves, and in consultation with others, and beginning to form a judgment on whether there should be some modification on the UNOSOM resolution as such.

But I expect that we will be in favor of it. I cannot tell you at this time whether it will be in its present form.

Senator KERRY. In July of this year you testified before the committee saying, "it is an important accomplishment that the U.N. Security Council organized UNOSOM II as a peace enforcement mission with teeth. The authorization of such a force is a landmark accomplishment which it is in our interest to cultivate. UNOSOM II is a model worth promoting."

Do we approach this review with the sense that that is still true, that it is still a model worth promoting?

Mr. TARNOFF. I think, Senator, that certain aspects of the operation of the UNOSOM activity are worth promoting. The humanitarian side—the ability of the U.N. as well as others, private organizations, to sponsor the development of the country, opening schools, et cetera, throughout the country.

But clearly there are parts of the operation which we have been reviewing in past days. We would certainly reflect those lessons in future U.S. policies with respect to peacekeeping or peace enforcement resolutions, and we expect that there are lessons to be learned for the U.N. as well, and the troop-contributing countries.

Senator KERRY. In recent days we had a very healthy debate here. I think the more we debate these issues the more important it is. I might add, I think there is an enormous amount of misunderstanding in the country about the nature of conflict and what we are going to face as we go down the road here in the future.

I mean, these really are the first events, the first conflicts of the post-cold war period. And for years it was very easy for us to say, Grenada is a beachhead of communism and we have got to stamp it out, or Panama, instant disorder, boom, we go in, and there seemed to be an acceptance of those definitions.

Now, with the fall of the Wall and the fall of the former Soviet Union and, I might add, with enormous tension in our workplace I think that is playing into all of this, it is much harder for Americans to quickly find the handle to get a hold of the interest, if you will.

Now, some on the floor have been articulating that interest in various ways, particularly in the context of a $300 billion a year annual defense budgets which we were spending to build a certain architecture for the world, if you will, and part of that architecture was the U.N.

I would like to ask you, speaking for the administration, to help give Americans that handle to the degree it may or may not exist in Somalia, and perhaps define for us in the wake of this turmoil of the last few weeks what are the interests of the United States, and what are the limits, if you see any, of our ability to advance that interest?

Mr. TARNOFF. Senator, in the case of Somalia——

Senator KERRY. But most specifically, what does it mean to the average tax-paying citizen?

Mr. TARNOFF. In Somalia, I think the interest of the United States, starting almost a year ago, has been constant. More importantly, the President-elect approved the mission undertaken by President Bush in the late months of last year and continued under

our administration. And that was essentially a humanitarian mission.

I think that it is in the U.S. interest to participate on a case-by-case basis in humanitarian missions around the world. I think what we are learning in Somalia is we have to help the international community, beginning with the United States, to accept these missions and assume these missions more easily than they have been able to.

Part of the reason is, as you correctly indicated, that the U.N. is being called on to organize efforts the likes of which they have never had to assume in the history of the world organization. There have simply not been these kinds of challenges. There have not the kinds of efforts that the U.N. is now being called upon to manage.

Therefore, as we go ahead deciding on a case-by-case basis exactly what the U.S. interests are, what it is appropriate for us to do unilaterally or in conjunction with other governments and with the U.N., I think it is terribly important for us to be mindful of the fact that over time the U.N. itself has to be strengthened in ways that will allow not only the United States but the international community to have greater confidence in an organization which will be entrusted with missions of this sort.

To go back, I think our interest has always been primarily humanitarian in Somalia.

Senator KERRY. Would you say that the humanitarian mission is in fact complete or was complete at the time that we were chasing around after Aideed?

Mr. TARNOFF. I think, Senator, certain aspects of the humanitarian mission were satisfied. There was, to the best of our knowledge, no more starvation in the country. There were not somewhere between 1,000 and 3,000 Somalis dying every day as had been the case before.

It was not complete because some 700,000 Somalis were displaced in their own country, some 550,000 Somalis are in refugee camps outside that country, and as Mr. Slocombe mentioned before you arrived, while we can take comfort from the fact that there does not appear to be any need for the Somalis living in their home areas to be fed by relief organizations, this is a fragile situation. And despite the improvements there is going to have to be continued attention for some time.

Senator KERRY. Well, my light is on, and we cannot go into all the implications here. I must say to you that I think there are compelling reasons that you have not articulated, and I think that may be part of the problem today.

I mean, I think there are a host of reasons that deserve more forceful advocacy. To me it is important that the United States does not just care about Caucasian nations, and we ought to assert that. It is also important that the international community's efforts in this post-cold war really have an architecture around which to coalesce. And I do not feel the forcefulness of the need for that.

We have seen what happens when we leave the world to despots, and pretend these things are not going on. And we have a museum here in this city that honors the memory of those in that period.

I am not saying we can involve ourselves everywhere. We cannot. But when and where we do, we had better make sure that we are

more compelling about why we are, because I am not sure that everybody understands the full breadth of the humanitarian—the limitations that we ran into here. And I think there is more at stake, but my light is on and we must move on.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Murkowski?

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to commend you gentlemen for what has been, under the circumstances, a rather complete narrative on what those of us who attended the briefing by Secretary Aspin as well as Secretary Christopher thought was clearly an ill-prepared briefing on their part. And as a consequence, I think there has been an effort to do damage control here, and the explanations which you have offered have been well thought out.

It is too bad that there was not appropriate forethought given prior to the briefings that were given to Members of the House and Senate together approximately 2 weeks ago.

I would rather not dwell on the past, there is one area that I think deserves perhaps a little rehashing. In February 1993, this year, I cosponsored a Senate resolution authorizing U.S. forces to assist in the humanitarian relief operations. That was the last time that I felt that Congress had anything to say in the Somalia operation. Senator Brown has made a number of requests for hearings previous to this, but I trust he will go into that in his questions.

But it seems like the foresight that was promulgated by some Members of Congress and some of us on this committee for the most part was ignored. I am curious to know why.

Mr. TARNOFF. Senator, on the question on the requests from the committee or other committees for hearings or access to administration officials, I would have to look at the record.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Would you provide that for the record as to why the requests were ignored by the administration?

Mr. TARNOFF. Yes.

[The information referred to follows:]

The Department of State has no record of a letter from Senator Brown requesting a witness for a hearing on Somalia. The letters you have mentioned may be letters to the Committee Chairman or the Chairman of the Africa Subcommittee, who normally would have made requests to the Department to provide a witness for hearings on Somalian issues.

The Department's files indicate that there was a written request for a hearing on Somalia from Senators Pell and Simon dated December 4. My understanding is that because a military operation was ongoing, the Bush Administration preferred to conduct a closed briefing rather than testify in open session. In any case, this was a decision made during the past Administration.

As far as requests for hearings on Somalia in this Administration, we are aware of two requests to testify before this Committee. With regards to these two requests, I was honored to represent the Administration and Secretary Christopher and testify on our Somalian policies before this Committee on July 29 and October 19.

Senator MURKOWSKI. So, you have no explanation, either one of you gentlemen?

Mr. TARNOFF. I would like to, at least for the Department of State, see what the record of request was and what the nature of our response was.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Well, I am sure Senator Brown will be more articulate than myself. Mr. Secretary?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I would do the same. I am aware of various consultations and discussions with members through the year, but as

far as requests for presentations being turned down, I do not know and I will have to find out.

[The information referred to follows:]

We are not aware of any congressional requests for presentations on Somalia which were denied or ignored. DOD has given numerous informal consultations and briefings to Congressmen and their staffs. A list of briefings and testimony given is as follows:

25 March 93	SASC	U.S. Operations in Somalia	Joint staff.
29 March 93	HFAC	Transition to UNOSOM	Interagency.
28 April 93	HASC	Funding of operations	MGen Wilhelm.
17 June 93	Separate member briefings	Recent events in Somalia	OSD Joint staff.
25 August 93	SASC staffers	Ranger deployment	OSD Joint staff.
2 September 93	HASC HFAC	Ranger deployment	Joint staff.

Senator MURKOWSKI. It seems we are all in agreement that we moved from a humanitarian mission that everybody agrees was largely successful into a rather ill-defined, poorly executed, and open-ended effort which was—you can use any term you want—"political agenda," "nation-building" under the U.N. And, of course, at the same time we were in pursuit of Aideed.

I do not recall one instance of the administration coming before this committee and asking us to support a combat mission with U.S. troops under the U.N. And my question is specific. Does the administration believe that consultation with Congress was adequate?

Mr. TARNOFF. Well, on the mission I will let Mr. Slocombe comment on it more specifically. I might say that the combat forces that have been in Mogadishu and in the region have never been under U.N. command. I would like to make that particular point that Mr. Slocombe can amplify.

With respect to your first point, again, I will have to look at the record of consultation after June 5. I think, as you certainly know, after June 5 and passage of Resolution 837, that the U.N. Security Council mandated the forces in country take a much more active profile primarily to bring to justice, to apprehend those responsible for the killing of the 24 Pakistanis.

So, at that point the nature of the mission changed to the extent that the U.N. Security Council voted a resolution which specifically asked the forces in country to assume that mission.

Senator MURKOWSKI. But the point is, we used U.S. troops in a combat mission and there was no notification, not that there had to be, but it would seem that since we moved our mission from a humanitarian mission, it might have been more prudent had the administration sought some consultation with Congress. Would you agree or disagree?

Mr. TARNOFF. Again, Senator, I would like to go back to the record to see whether there was an effort to consult, whether there was any communication. I just do not have the information.

[The information referred to follows:]

We are strongly committed to ensuring that Congress is fully consulted on Somalia and other important foreign policy issues which we face.

We believed that we were making a good effort to keep Congress informed and consulted on our Somalia policy, but obviously the fact that you are raising the question with me indicates we could have done more.

I would only note, however, that the State Department's Coordinator for Somalia and the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs participated in more than forty meetings and briefings on Somalia with Members of Congress or their staffs from March through October.

I also testified in open session before this Committee on July 29 and October 19.

Finally, President Clinton has sent two letters to Congress (June 10, 1993 and July 1, 1993), consistent with the War Powers Resolution, which reported on the activities of our troops in Somalia.

Let me assure you that in the months ahead we will redouble our efforts to stay in closer touch with Congress.

Meetings and Hearing on Somalia Issues—Department of State

[March 1–October 30, 1993]

March:	
8	US Coordinator David Shinn met with HFAC Staffers.
22	US Coordinator Shinn and Representative from Bureau of International Organizations met with HFAC Majority staffers to discuss UNITAF/UNOSOM II Operation in Somalia.
25	US Coordinator Shinn joined DOD Representatives to testify before the Senate Armed Service Committee on Somalia. Senators Nunn, Lieberman, Levin, Thurmond and Warner participated in the hearing.
29	US Coordinator Shinn joined DOD Representatives to brief the House Armed Services Committee on Somalia. Chairman Dellums and 10 Members were present for most of the hour and a half session.
30	US Coordinator Shinn and Representatives from DOD and AID briefed Chairman Hamilton, Congressman Payne and Congressman Hastings on UNITAF/UNOSOM transition and other Somalia issues.
April:	
22	State Department Representatives participate in HFAC Africa Subcommittee Mark Up of S.J. Res. 45.
27	State Department Representatives participate in HFAC International Security Subcommittee Mark Up of S.J. Res. 45.
28	Assistant Secretary Moose met with Senator DeConcini to discuss US policies toward Somalia.
May:	
3	US Coordinator Shinn and Representatives from DOD and JCS briefed bipartisan group of staffers from HFAC and HASC on the transition in Somalia from UNITAF to UNOSOM.
5	US Coordinator Shinn and Representatives from DOD and JCS met with a bipartisan group of about a dozen SFRC staffers for tour d'horizon discussion of Somalian issues.
5	State Department Representatives participate in full HFAC Mark Up of S.J. 45. More than 30 Members attended the two-hour Mark Up Hearing.
20	Assistant Secretary Moose met with Congressman Alycee Hastings to discuss US policies toward Somalia.
25	House passes S.J. Res. 45 by vote of 243–179.
June:	
17	Assistant Secretaries Moose and Oxman brief House Members on Somalia and Macedonia. Thirty Members attended the briefing.
17	Assistant Secretaries Moose and Oxman brief Senators on Somalia and Macedonia. Seven Senators attended the briefing.
22	Assistant Secretary Moose met with Congressman Albert Wynn to discuss US policies toward Somalia.
24	US Coordinator Shinn briefs members of Congressional Delegation to Somalia led by Congressman Johnston.
July:	
13	Assistant Secretary Moose met with Congressman Robert Torricelli to discuss US policies toward Somalia.
14	Assistant Secretary Moose met with Chairman Hamilton. Ranking Member Burton and Congressmen Lantos, Payne, Hastings and Burton to discuss the findings of the Johnston Codel to Somalia and to discuss US policies toward Somalia.

29 ..... Assistant Secretary Moose and Representative from JCS testified before the African Subcommittee of HFAC on US policies toward Somalia. Chairman Johnston and Congressmen Burton, Gilman, Payne, Hastings and Royce participated in the hearing.

29 ..... Under Secretary Tarnoff and Representative from JCS testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

August:

3 ..... US Coordinator Shinn briefed Chairman Hamilton, Chairman Dellums and about eight other Members of Congress on the findings of his visit to Somalia and US policies toward Somalia.

11 ..... US Coordinator Shinn briefed SFRC Staff Director and bipartisan group of eight SFRC staffers on the findings of his visit to Somalia and US policies toward Somalia.

11 ..... US Coordinator Shinn met with HFAC Counsel for Minority to discuss US policies toward Somalia.

12 ..... US Coordinator Shinn met with Chairman Hamilton to discuss US policies toward Somalia.

12 ..... US Coordinator Shinn met with HFAC African Subcommitee staffer to discuss US policies toward Somalia.

23 ..... US Coordinator Shinn met with HASC Committee staffer to discuss US policies toward Somalia.

September:

8 ..... Assistant Secretary Moose met with Congressman Dan Burton to discuss US policies toward Somalia. Assistant Secretary Ward and CIA Representative briefed Senate Intelligence Committee on developments in China and Somalia.

9 ..... Senate passes amendment to DOD Authorization Bill by vote of 90–7 requiring submission of a report on US policy towards Somalia.

15 ..... US Coordinator Shinn and Representative from AID briefed bipartisan group of HFAC staffers on US assistance package for Somalian Police and Judiciary.

17 ..... US Coordinator Shinn and Representative from AID briefed bipartisan group of staffers from House Appropriations Foreign Operations Subcommittee.

21 ..... UN Special Envoy Admiral Howe and US Coordinator Shinn met with Members of HFAC to discuss developments in Somalia.

21 ..... UN Special Envoy Admiral Howe and US Coordinator Shinn met with Members of HASC to discuss developments in Somalia.

21 ..... UN Special Envoy Admiral Howe and US Coordinator Shinn met with Senators to discuss developments in Somalia.

21 ..... UN Special Envoy Admiral Howe and US Coordinator Shinn met with Speaker Foley and House Leadership to discuss developments in Somalia.

21 ..... AID and State Representatives brief bipartisan group of staffers from SFRC on US assistance to the Somalian Police and Judiciary.

22 ..... US Coordinator Shinn and Representatives from JCS and CIA briefed House Intelligence Committee on developments in Somalia.

22 ..... Assistant Secretary Moose met with Congressman Jack Reed to discuss the findings of his Codel visit to Somalia.

22 ..... Assistant Secretary Moose met with Congressman Harry Johnston to discuss US policies toward Somalia.

28 ..... House passes amendment to DOD Authorization Bill by vote of 406–26 requiring submission of a report on US policy towards Somalia.

October:

4 ..... US Coordinator Shinn met with bipartisan group of staffers from SFRC to diacuss October 3rd battle and other developmenta in Somalia.

5 ..... Secretary Christopher and Secretary Aspin met with large bipartisan group of Members of House and Senate to discuss October 3rd battle and other developmenta in Somalia.

12 ..... US Coordinator Shinn briefed bipartisan group of staffers from House Appropriations Foreign Operations Subcommittee on US assistance to Somalian Police and Judiciary.

14 ..... US Coordinator Shinn briefed Chairman Obey and Members of House Appropriations Foreign Operations Subcommittee on US assistance to Somalian Police and Judiciary.

15 ..... US Coordinator Shinn briefed Congressman Karan English on recent developments in Somalia.

18 ..... US Coordinator Shinn makes presentations at Library of Congress Seminar on Somalia for Congressional Staffers.

19 ..... Under Secretary Tarnoff and DOD Under Secretary Slocum testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
19 ..... Special Envoy Oakley briefed Members of Senate Foreign Relations Committee on developments in Somalia. Nine Senators attended the briefing.
20 ..... Special Envoy Oakley briefed Speaker Foley and Chairmen and Ranking Members of HFAC, HASC, HPSCI, DOD Appropriations Subcommitee and Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommitee on developments in Somalia.
21 ..... Special Envoy Oakley briefed Senator Nunn on developments in Somalia.
28 ..... US Coordinator Shinn and Representatives from AID and DOD briefed bipartisan group of staffers from SFRC on US assistance to Somalian Police and Judiciary.
28 ..... US Coordinator Shinn and Representatives from AID and DOD briefed bipartisan group of staffers from Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee.
28 ..... US Coordinator Shinn and Representatives from AID and DOD briefed Majority and Minority staffers from African Subcommittee of HFAC.
28 ..... US Coordinator Shinn met with HASC staffer to discuss recent developments in Somalia and US policies toward Somalia.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Well, as a member of this committee I do not feel I had an opportunity to participate in any consultation. I think the point has been made and I will move to my second question.

I voted for Senator McCain's amendment because I feel that the U.S. mission is basically complete and successful, and that it is time to bring our troops home. But I am interested in having you give me the best estimate of what the situation in Somalia will be in 6 months from now due to the presence of our U.S. troops.

In other words, you gentlemen are policymakers involved in the determination of moves that are going to affect where we will be at the end of 6 months. Are we going to have a continuation of the U.S. presence there that is necessary to maintain our additional mission as humanitarian, or will we find secondary reasons to remain, to extend, or modify the missions as has happened already in Somalia whether under U.S. or U.N. control? Has the administration made a firm commitment that in 6 months we are going to be out?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Regardless of the humanitarian need?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Let me read a statement that is the authoritative statement on that subject from the President's report to the Congress on Somalia.

After March 31, 1994, there will be no U.S. military units in Somalia with the possible exception of approximately 200 or 300 military personnel providing assistance and protection to the U.S. liaison office, which is the equivalent of the Embassy. The drawdown of U.S. military personnel is not conditioned upon the successful completion of any steps by the Somali people or the U.N.

I do not think it would be possible to make a more definitive commitment.

Senator MURKOWSKI. No, but clearly there is an inconsistency there in the sense of the decision that has been on the terms for pulling out and the justification of going in in the first place, which was humanitarian, and then extending it to nation building or stability.

But I think that the administration's stance and the way they have handled it clearly speaks for itself. They have rallied to the reaction of the American people and determined that they are

going to pull out regardless of whether the mission is complete or incomplete.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I would like to try to get a better feel for the history of this involvement. Originally, the U.N. put some forces into Somalia; is that correct?

Mr. TARNOFF. Yes, that is true, Senator. I do not have the figures at hand, but in the UNOSOM I phase, before the U.S. forces arrived at the end of the year, there were, if my memory serves me correctly, several hundred Pakistani forces in Mogadishu. But they were unable to function. So there was a U.N. presence in Mogadishu before U.S. forces arrived there.

Senator SARBANES. Now, they were in there to monitor a cease-fire agreement, is that correct, which had been reached by the various factions?

Mr. TARNOFF. Yes, I believe that was their primary attention, although, again, they were not able to fulfill much of their mission.

Senator SARBANES. They were unsuccessful. And meanwhile, of course, people were starving and dying, correct? How many people died in Somalia last year?

Mr. TARNOFF. It is our estimate that in the year preceding the arrival of U.S. forces in December 1992, the figures were somewhere between 400,000 and 500,000 people had died in country. We cannot be sure of those estimates, but that is the approximate figure.

Senator SARBANES. 400,000 to 500,000?

Mr. TARNOFF. Yes.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. To underscore one of the reasons that we went in in the first place, the estimates that I have been given are that included half the children of the country.

Senator SARBANES. Now, we sent troops in December; is that correct?

Mr. TARNOFF. Yes.

Senator SARBANES. 28,000?

Mr. TARNOFF. Approximately, yes.

Senator SARBANES. And did troops go in from other countries as well?

Mr. TARNOFF. Yes, there were some troops from other countries coming in about that time.

Senator SARBANES. Do you have any idea how many?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I do not have the numbers. I have the number that eventually got in and are there now. We can provide it as of any date you pick I suspect. But I do not have it now.

Senator SARBANES. Well, how many other troops are in there now?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Something like 28,000.

Senator SARBANES. Not counting our troops?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Not counting ours. [Pause.]

I am sorry, as of October 19, which is today, 24,274.

Senator SARBANES. From other countries?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. From countries other than the United States.

Senator SARBANES. And how many countries are involved in that?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I have 22 on this chart.

Senator SARBANES. And which are the largest ones in terms of the number of troops and their numbers?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Pakistan and India.

Senator SARBANES. And what are the numbers?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Pakistan—I will give them in round numbers—5,000. And there are additional on the way. India, 4,600. Again, more are on the way. Italy, 2,300. Germany, 1,700.

Senator SARBANES. Now, when we handed this thing over to the U.N. in May and started—we then started taking our troops out; is that right?

Mr. TARNOFF. That is correct.

Senator SARBANES. And other countries had put their troops in or they started putting their troops in?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. There were some other country troops when we began the pullout, yes.

Senator SARBANES. How many?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I do not have the exact number.

Senator SARBANES. Were other countries putting their troops in on any understanding of whether there would be a continued American presence and what that American role would be?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Very definitely, yes.

Senator SARBANES. What was that understanding?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The understanding was that the United States would maintain forces with two purposes. One, to provide logistics support to third-country forces that were present in the UNOSOM II operation. And, second, that we would provide a quick reaction force that would be available as the name implies to respond rapidly if the other countries' forces needed assistance.

Senator SARBANES. Now, was it envisioned that over time we would no longer carry out those functions as well, that they would be carried out by forces from other countries?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Forces from other countries and, in the case of the logistics requirements, to a very considerable degree by contracting to private operations.

Senator SARBANES. And what was the timetable for that, if there was one?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. There was not a fixed timetable for, I think, more or less the reasons that Senator Kassebaum asked about earlier. But there was certainly an intention that it would not be an indefinite U.S. commitment.

Mr. TARNOFF. If I could add, Senator, we had hoped that it would be possible to reduce the logistical component from about 3,000 to about half that size in the first quarter of next year. There was not a firm commitment, as Mr. Slocombe indicated, but those were our rough projections about what might be possible.

Senator SARBANES. Well, now, if you were simply to take our forces out overnight, would that, in effect, undercut the understanding on the basis of which other countries put their forces in?

Mr. TARNOFF. Most definitely. I think that while they have understood I think quite well the rationale for the policy the President announced 10 days ago, if we were to have a precipitous with-

drawal several things would happen. In effect, virtually all of those forces would be out of country even before the U.S. forces withdrew, leading to the kind of chaos and famine of the status quo ante.

But they would feel, to a large measure, betrayed by the United States because, as Mr. Slocombe indicated, when they committed forces, often at the urging of the U.S. Government, it was understood that we would have the kind of presence that we described.

Senator SARBANES. Now, when the United States first went in, was it part of the plan that other countries were to put their forces in and assume the broader peacekeeping responsibilities and then we would come out? Was that part of the original plan?

Mr. TARNOFF. It was certainly part of the plan that we developed in the early weeks of the Clinton administration. Because we developed a strategy which would lead to what was called a handoff from UNITAF, 27,000 or so U.S. forces, to UNOSOM, where we would have only 4,000 U.S. forces, which took place in May. And the handoff would be to a UNOSOM force, a majority of which, an overwhelming majority of which of course was foreign, including combat units.

Senator SARBANES. Well, what was the strategy when the forces were first put in that would lead to being able to bring the forces out?

Mr. TARNOFF. The U.S. forces you are referring to?

Senator SARBANES. Yes.

Mr. TARNOFF. The intention was to have U.S. forces there in sufficient numbers during whatever period of time was necessary to stabilize the situation, to allow emergency relief to take place, given the situation that we described a moment ago, but then, even in the Bush administration but certainly in the Clinton administration, to look quite urgently to have those U.S. troop forces replaced in large measure as soon as possible.

Senator SARBANES. Well, it was my understanding at the time, when President Bush put the forces in, prompted of course by a desperate humanitarian situation which had riveted the Nation's attention, and where you had literally thousands and thousands of people dying daily, that the premise was that the troops would go in; they would be able to control that situation immediately in order to allow feeding to resume. But that still of course left you with the problem, well, how do you establish a situation where, when we come out, the feeding can continue so you do not simply revert back to the situation that led you to put the troops in in the first place?

I am not clear on my recollection, but I thought that part of President Bush's strategy at the time was that this would be transitioned over to a U.N. responsibility. In fact, I think at the time they thought that maybe then the cease-fires would stand and the negotiations going on amongst the various factions in Somalia would be such that a stable situation could be established.

But I do not recall that it was part of that strategy that we will establish stability, feeding will resume and then we will simply leave without having worked something out for stability to continue so feeding can continue. Otherwise, you would be back in the

same situation and the very events that led to your going in could occur once again.

Now, am I mistaken in that impression?

Mr. TARNOFF. You are absolutely accurate in every respect, Senator.

Let me add that another element in the strategy was the political reconciliation process among the Somalis themselves, which was initiated early this year and which resulted in two major meetings of the Somali leaders in Addis Ababa; the second of which was in March of this year, and resulted in an accord among those leaders.

So it was thought early on that it was necessary for the Somali political leaders themselves to reach a degree of accommodation in order to better guarantee the kind of stability you are talking about.

Senator SARBANES. I thank the chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brown.

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this hearing. I had first asked for hearings on this subject back on December 1, after President Bush had discussed the potential of sending troops in, and had committed that to a written request.

As you will recall, Mr. Chairman, the White House was a little reluctant then to publicly discuss it. They did have a briefing on December 4, but would not subject themselves to questions and answers in public.

I was concerned about that, because I think a key part of committing troops anywhere is laying out clearly what the mission is. If there were one thing we would do differently, I suspect it is trying to define the mission before we would commit troops.

We had still not had hearings by February, either with the old administration or the new administration. And on February 25, I again submitted a request for hearings. My recollection is that hearings were scheduled on the African subcommittee I believe. I know Senator Simon was very interested and willing to go ahead. At that time, we ran into problems with the administration's willingness to testify.

We did finally have one hearing, and our record is far better than the Armed Services Committee. We have had one hearing; they have had none. We had public hearings. That was on July 29, but it was unfortunately not with the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense.

After the disaster of October 3, I again requested hearings, and followed up with a letter on October 9, my third request for hearings. They were originally scheduled for October 15, with the Secretary of State. I do not know about the Secretary of Defense.

Later, we moved the hearing to this date, because of the convenience of the Secretary of State. My understanding is the Secretary of State is in town but is preparing for a trip.

One gets the impression that it is a little like in school, when you ask a girl out on four different occasions and she tells you she is washing her hair on each occasion, that she may not be really interested in going out with you.

I get the impression that neither the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State are really interested in talking to us or discussing these issues openly.

I think this issue is much more important than what is convenient for a Secretary of State or a Secretary of Defense. I think it is important enough that they owe the American people a response, even if they do not care to talk to us. And I guess my question is: Is the Secretary of State, is the Secretary of Defense going to come and finally testify before us some day?

The CHAIRMAN. I would insert here that the Secretary is scheduled to be with us on November 4.

Senator BROWN. I wonder if you can confirm that?

The CHAIRMAN. Sure.

Senator BROWN. What about the Secretary of Defense?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I am not aware of any pending request for the Secretary of Defense to come before the committee.

Senator BROWN. Well, I have written three letters, but if we have not, let me make it clear now. I think the Secretary of Defense ought to come. Our jurisdiction is very clear. This happened under a U.N. mandate, under a U.N. operation, that it falls squarely under the jurisdiction of this committee. And my hope is the Secretary of Defense will be willing to testify before this committee.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I will certainly take that message back.

Senator BROWN. Let me ask, just to get the air clear, we have had reports in the press and some on the Hill that returning troops have been asked or directed to not speak with Members of Congress or not speak with the press. Can you advise me if that is accurate or inaccurate and what the facts are on that?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I have not heard those reports. I would be dumbfounded if they are true. But I will check.

[The information referred to follows:]

The reports alleging that soldiers have been instructed not to speak to Congress or the press are untrue. We do request that soldiers not discuss certain operational aspects of the mission for obvious security reasons. Reporters have been given extensive access to U.S. troops and their commanders in Somalia. To illustrate the access that the media has had to the troops, it should be noted that Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durant and three other Rangers who had recently returned from Somalia were recently interviewed on the Larry King talk show. Further, there have been a number of interviews with wounded Rangers from their hospital beds and within the last few days an article in the New Republic by Joshua Hammer. This article detailed an extended interview with Sgt Richard Knight and his platoon, part of the 10th Mountain Division.

Senator BROWN. Do you know of any requests to military personnel to not speak to the press or to not speak to members of Congress?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. As to members of Congress, certainly not. And as to members of the press, I have no knowledge. Obviously, people are told not to talk about operational details and that sort of thing.

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me.

It would be a good idea to insert in the record perhaps a copy of your letter to me asking for hearings.

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have copies of all three, and I will submit those, with your permission, in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. And my reply.

Thank you.
Senator BROWN. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]

U.S. SENATE,
WASHINGTON, DC,
December 1, 1992.

The HONORABLE CLAIBORNE PELL,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC.

The HONORABLE JESSE HELMS,
Ranking Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN and SENATOR HELMS: The situation in Somalia is tragic. The country is filled with thousands of armed bandits and dozens of Somali warlords. There is no civil authority and no government. Many have described it as a country in utter chaos. The result is extreme suffering by the Somali people.

The great tragedy unfolding in Somalia is one that the American people strongly empathize with. The U.S. must continue its humanitarian efforts there. However, it would be a mistake to send U.S. combat forces to Somalia without a clearly defined military mission or without the strong support of the American people. Any decision to commit America's brave servicemen and women must have the full and complete backing of our nation.

In other conflicts in our country's modern history, our troops were committed without the full support of the American people. I am convinced that one of the reasons for the great success of Operation Desert Storm was the large volume of national support.

Consequently, it is imperative that our Committee convene hearings at the earliest opportunity to understand current plans for U.S. forces in Somalia and to explore other possible alternatives. Congress must not abrogate its responsibility to be intimately involved in the commitment of American troops to conflict situations.

Please feel free to contact me if I can be any assistance in ensuring our Committee's earliest action.

Sincerely,

HANK BROWN,
U.S. Senator.

U.S. SENATE,
WASHINGTON, DC,
February 25, 1993.

The HONORABLE CLAIBORNE PELL,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC.

The HONORABLE JESSE HELMS,
Ranking Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN and SENATOR HELMS: The great tragedy in Somalia is one with which the American people strongly empathize. Our humanitarian efforts have greatly helped these starving men, women and children. Yet, our troops still remain in Somalia without the benefit of a clear American policy propounded by the Administration or a Congress that has carefully reviewed that policy.

The recent reports of riots in Somalia directed against the American troops there underscore the need for the active support of the American people for our military men and women who are in Somalia. In addition, their willingness to sacrifice their lives demands that we provide a set of clear goals that outline when our troops have accomplished their mission.

It is us, the Nation's legislators together with the country's policymakers, who must take the lead in defining our mission in Somalia. To date, our Committee has held no hearings nor marked up any legislation on this vital issue.

With events there deteriorating, it is imperative that our Committee convene hearings at the earliest opportunity. The goal of these hearings must be a clear exposition of current plans for U.S. forces in Somalia. As mentioned in my December 1, 1992 request for hearings on this same subject, we in Congress must not abrogate our responsibility to be intimately involved in the commitment of American troops.

Please feel free to contact me if I can be of any assistance in ensuring our Committee's earliest action.

Sincerely,

HANK BROWN,
U.S. Senator.

U.S. SENATE,
WASHINGTON, DC,
March 9, 1993.

HONORABLE HANK BROWN,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC

DEAR HANK: Thank you for your letter concerning the situation in Somalia.

The Senate, as you know, has acted on a resolution authorizing the U.S. military presence in Somalia, and it is my understanding that the goal is to turn over ongoing responsibilities to a U.N. force by May 1. Unless something goes awry between now and May 1, I am satisfied that the U.S. role has been satisfactorily defined and limited.

I am, however, concerned that the Somalia operation may serve as a precedent for other interventions. Consequently, I am giving thought to holding a hearing on Somalia as a case study for intervention in disintegrating nation states. I would welcome any thoughts you may have on that subject.

With every good wish.

Ever sincerely,

CLAIBORNE PELL,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

U.S. SENATE,
WASHINGTON, DC,
October 6, 1993.

The HONORABLE CLAIBORNE PELL,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: More than nine months ago, I wrote asking that our committee hold extensive hearings before U.S. combat troops were committed to Somalia. Instead, we were provided numerous closed-door briefings.

A few months later, I again wrote asking that we hold extensive hearings. Nonetheless, not until July, 1993 did our committee hold a public hearing on the commitment of U.S. troops to Somalia. Only an Undersecretary of State and the Director of Operations for the Joint Staff testified. Neither the Secretary of Defense nor the Secretary of State has appeared before the Senate to specifically discuss the commitment of American troops in Somalia.

Today, some of America's finest young men and women are risking their lives for our Nation in Somalia. Without a full, public vetting of the many complex issues concerned with the commitment of U.S. troops and without clear authorization by the Congress, the early euphoria for a humanitarian commitment in Somalia has evaporated.

We owe these young men and women and their families a full, public debate of our commitment in Somalia. Such a debate rightly should begin in our Committee with a hearing attended by the Secretaries of State and Defense.

Please let me know what I can do to assist in scheduling extensive hearings on Somalia at the earliest opportunity.

Sincerely,

HANK BROWN,
U.S. Senator.

U.S. SENATE,
WASHINGTON, DC,
October 13, 1993.

HONORABLE HANK BROWN,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC

DEAR SENATOR BROWN: Thank you for your letter requesting the Foreign Relations Committee to hold Cabinet-level hearings on U.S. involvement in Somalia.

I agree that an open debate on our commitment in Somalia should be held in the Foreign Relations Committee. Accordingly, I have received agreement from Secretary of State Warren Christopher to testify before this Committee on October 19. Secretary Christopher will be focusing his testimony not only on Somalia but on other aspects of U.S. participation in multilateral peacekeeping operations. In fact, I am considering that this hearing might be a starting point for a series of oversight hearings dealing with peacekeeping.

I expect that the Foreign Relations Committee hearing with Secretary Christopher will complement the Senate's recent activities regarding Somalia. The hear-

ing was timed to follow today's submission of the Presidential Report on the Somalia operation, requested by the Senate during consideration of the Department of Defense Authorization Bill.

In addition to the recent full Senate briefing on Somalia by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, you will remember that the Foreign Relations Committee held comprehensive hearings regarding Somalia within the last year at both the full and subcommittee levels. On July 29, 1993 we held a full committee hearing on Somalia; on March 22, 1993 we had a Members Briefing on U.S. and U.N. operations in Somalia; and on October 1, 1992 we held a subcommittee hearing on the U.N. humanitarian operation in Somalia.

In reference to your request that Les Aspin testify before the Foreign Relations Committee, the Secretary of Defense customarily declines to testify on defense related issues before this Committee because of the jurisdictional concerns of the Armed Services Committee.

With every good wish.

Ever sincerely,

CLAIBORNE PELL,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Senator BROWN. I should add, Mr. Chairman, you have bent over backward to be accommodating and helpful, and I very much appreciate the cooperation and I think the very helpful attitude that you have had.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator BROWN. When our troops were given the task to capture Aideed, do you recall when that was, when our troops were first tasked with that responsibility?

Mr. TARNOFF. I might be able to supply some of that information. It was in the aftermath of the events of June 5. The U.N. Security Council Resolution 837, which I think passed on June 6 or 7, mandated not only U.S. troops, but all U.N. troops to pursue those who were responsible for the attack against the Pakistani peacekeepers.

Senator BROWN. What were U.S. casualties? What were U.S. losses in Somalia before that date?

Mr. TARNOFF. I do not have that figure.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. It would have been very low.

Senator BROWN. Could you supply that to me for the record?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I will supply it as of any date you want, but give me a date.

Senator BROWN. Well, I think before they were tasked with capturing Aideed. I would be interested in the casualties. Also, after they were tasked.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. There is no question that it involved some casualties.

[The information referred to follows:]

Although there were no specific orders to arrest General Aideed, there was broader mission guidance that allowed for the detention of Aideed if encountered during security operations. The Ranger force that conducted many of these types of operations was deployed in late August. Since the beginning of the Somalia operation in December 1992 to the time of the Ranger deployment there had been 8 US KIA, 53 WIA. Casualties figures from 23 August 1993 through mid-November 1993 were 22 KIA, 118 WIA.

Senator BROWN. When did General Johnston first request armor to protect his personnel in country?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Do you mean the recent request?

Senator BROWN. Yes.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The Secretary of Defense first became aware of the request on September 23, when it would have been initiated a few days before that. As you know, it went first to General Hoar,

who made some modifications in it, and then went up through the chain. But I do not have that.

Senator BROWN. Could you supply that for me for the record, along with a copy of that request if you have it.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I cannot commit to supplying a copy of the request, but I will provide the date of it.

[The information referred to follows:]

The date of General Hoar's memorandum to General Powell outlining MG Montgomery's request was [deleted].

Senator BROWN. You cannot supply a copy of it because?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I have learned from experience that there are issues as to whether or not internal executive branch documents, particularly those relating to transactions in the military chain of command get made available outside the executive branch. I have not seen it. I have not.

Senator BROWN. Well, can you supply a copy of it on a secure basis?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. That is the question I will take back.

Senator BROWN. And you will respond to us on that?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Sure.

Senator BROWN. So you do not know when, but you will try to supply that, when General Johnston made the request?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. There is no question that it was made within in a few days before September 23.

Senator BROWN. How many tanks and Bradley vehicles do we have?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. In the entire military?

Senator BROWN. Yes.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I do not know. It is very large.

Senator BROWN. Thousands?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

Senator BROWN. Were some of them located in the Marine contingent just offshore of Somalia?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The Marine contingent is not always just offshore. There are tanks with the embarked Marine units, a limited number.

Senator BROWN. A limited number of them.

Were there Bradley fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I would assume so. I do not know for a fact.

Senator BROWN. Can you supply that for the record, what was available?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

[The information referred to follows:]

The complement of equipment assigned to a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) does not include BRADLEY fighting vehicles or tanks. A MEU is equipped with tracked Amphibious Assault vehicles and wheeled Light Armored Vehicles (LAV). An Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) that carries the MEU was not off the coast of Somalia in early October. Two ARGs arrived on 8 October.

Senator BROWN. How long does it take those vehicles to be delivered onshore?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. It depends on where they are coming from.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, could I just—should not some of this be done in a closed session? I mean if we are going to lay out in great detail——

Senator BROWN. My time is running out. I assume this will not count against my time.

Senator SARBANES. Well, hopefully not. But I think it is an important point. If we are going to lay out in great detail our military capabilities, which may be called upon in the existing circumstance, I do not know that we should lay it out in a public session. I mean I have no problem with the information you are trying to get.

Senator BROWN. Well, I have not gotten a lot of answers thus far. I do not know why you are worried. But maybe we will for the record. But, let me say, I just think it is relevant to our inquiry to know what we had, if they were available, and how close they were.

Senator SARBANES. And how long it takes them to get there.

Senator BROWN. Sure.

Senator SARBANES. Right now.

Senator BROWN. Sure.

Senator SARBANES. Because I assume that the time that applied then applies right now.

Well, I have trouble with putting that out in the public domain.

Senator BROWN. Well, I guess the question is how long it took to get them there. And if you do not know that or cannot supply it, I would appreciate you supplying it for the record.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I know the answer to that. And it is a matter of public record. The first of the armored units went out after October 4 arrived within a couple of days.

They went out by air. And it is not a military secret that you can fly an airplane around the world in a limited period of time.

Senator BROWN. Well, I will try to supply the other questions. Let me just conclude quickly. We have had some time delay here.

There have been reports in the press that General Powell favored the recommendation of supplying armored personnel carriers and armor. There have been reports that he opposed it.

What did General Powell do? Did he favor the request by General Johnston?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. As a matter of principle, I think questions as to what advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense recommended ought to be addressed to them and not come from third-party sources, which I would be.

Senator BROWN. Well, you know, we have been through 10 months of trying to get people to testify. They have not showed up. They have delayed. You are telling me you cannot supply the information as to what General Powell did or did not do or recommend?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

Senator BROWN. Will you supply it for the record?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I do not believe it is appropriate to provide information other than from the person who gave the advice regarding who gave what advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President in the course of deciding on military operations.

The CHAIRMAN. I must say I would agree. But if you want to make the request to General Powell, we could relay it to him from the committee if you would like.

Senator BROWN. Well, Mr. Chairman, I will try to submit that for the record and ask that it be answered.

I would simply note that the Secretary himself was the one who commented on General Powell and his advice.

And I have a number of other questions I will try to supply for the record if I may, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Simon.

And I am sorry to have delayed you as long as we have.

Senator SIMON. Not at all.

And let me apologize. I have been involved in another meeting on foreign policy, and I am going to have to leave right away after my questioning to get back on the floor on that.

First, if I may comment on Senator Brown's question in terms of the request for hearings. There was clearly reluctance on the part of the administration to testify on the Somalia situation for a while. Now, I understand that in the sense that it is a new administration coming into power. I do not think, for the future, that that can be an excuse for the administration, whether it is Somalia or what the country is.

A few other comments, and then a question. There have been comments that nation building was not part of the original mission. That is absolutely false. Nation building—and I think the administration ought to say that and say it clearly—maybe it was not articulated as well as it should have been, but clearly, that was part of the mission from the very beginning. Humanitarian was the one that dominated, but nation building was there.

And General Powell made clear that there would have to be a residual force of Americans who would assist other nations in the process of the nation building, and primarily technical people, noncombat people. And prior to the recent infusion by the President of the 4,500 people there, 2,700 were noncombat people working on transportation problems, water problems, things like that.

In terms of consultation, what we say in fairness to the previous administration, there was consultation. This idea that there was no consultation with Congress prior to the action in Somalia simply was not true. I was on the phone from that Monday up until Thursday. Senator Brown was there in the White House when we had a meeting prior to the President's announcement of his decision.

I do not know how many others were consulted, but there clearly was consultation.

Senator Brown's question on casualties is important, because the majority of casualties came as a result of a skewed policy that got—we got obsessed with grabbing General Aideed. And I am not here defending General Aideed. But the large majority of our casualties came as a result of that. Then, since we have had the course correction, I think that things have improved.

On the question about humanitarian assistance, there are still roughly a million people who need help. And there are 31 U.S. agencies over there right now helping to provide that assistance, and I think we can be proud of that.

And, then, finally, and then I will get to a question here, I also think that Senator Kerry's point is one we should mention; that we cannot just be responding to the needs in the Caucasian world; that we have to be responding to others. And I would add, not simply to the Christian or Jewish world. That when there are needs in Moslem countries or Buddhist countries or countries of other backgrounds and cultures and religions, we are going to be a country that is going to do the humanitarian thing.

Now, first, I welcome Ambassador Oakley's presence. I think he is a solid, stable, balanced person who can really help in a situation where sometimes we have not had that—real candidly.

In specific terms, what are his immediate goals going to be? Like, the meeting in Addis this week has been called off. In specific terms, what is Ambassador Oakley going to be doing there?

Mr. TARNOFF. Senator, the Ambassador himself is coming up this afternoon to talk to the committee in closed session. So he will be able to give you a more complete account of this. But, for the benefit of the more general audience, I can say that he was recalled because of the very heavy emphasis that we are playing on the political reconciliation process.

And I think there are two aspects to this, internally, within Somalia, Ambassador Oakley's presence in Mogadishu last week, which led to the conversations that he held not only with the clan leaders and representatives of the Somali factions, but with U.N. representatives in Somalia itself. As a result, the two prisoners, one American, one Nigerian, were released. And he indicated to them that he thought that there were ways to start the process within the country for meetings to take place among the clan leaders of the sort that he had brokered when he was in the country earlier this year.

So that is part of his mission.

The other part of his mission is to work with the leaders of several of the east African countries, primarily President Meles from Ethiopia and President Issaias, but others as well, to see whether it would not be possible to have some sort of gathering, conference, or some other meeting of the principal Somali leaders, not only the warlords, but some of the individuals who were coming up through the local and district election with the east African leaders themselves, with a view toward establishing a political entity. Probably not a full-fledged government, but at least an interim political authority in Somalia.

Senator SIMON. And are we doing anything? You have 36 or 38 local areas. I do not know how they are specifically defined, but where—and elections have been held in about half of them, as I understand it. Are we doing anything, either the United States or the U.N. or voluntary agencies, to support these new structures that are getting developed?

Mr. TARNOFF. Yes. We are supporting the U.N. in this regard. This is not a mission of the United States, as such. It is not part of our defined mission, but we are assisting the U.N. through personnel and through our contributions. And we are also encouraging NGO's, private, voluntary organizations many of which are Americans, to make a contribution to that effort.

Senator SIMON. I thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Coverdell.

Senator COVERDELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SIMON. If my colleague could holdoff for 1 minute, my staff just handed me a note. Four U.S. soldiers were killed prior to June 6, 25 since that time, so that the huge bulk of those casualties came when we started moving—got this dream we could solve everything militarily by grabbing General Aideed.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Coverdell.

Senator SIMON. I apologize to my colleague.

Senator COVERDELL. No, I thank the Senator. I was going to report a very similar number, also from the same source.

You have described, both of you, a rather elaborate process by which we moved to this new mission. And on October 7 the President suggested to the Copley News Service that the U.N. had changed its mission unwisely and failed to provide military operation to back up peacekeepers, and staffed the units with troops untrained for their jobs who refused to venture outside their areas and refused to take orders. The President also referred to U.N. actions as if he and his U.N. Ambassador had no role in formulating or approving them.

Now, this report—I spoke to this on the Senate floor and asked for clarification of this confusion. You added to it for me, because as you have responded to the questions you have demonstrated a rather precise forethought in terms of preparation for a changed mission and sanctioning in concurrence. What would be the reason for such disparate statements as we have heard here today and this statement? Which was repeated; this was not the only time we had this inference.

Mr. TARNOFF. Senator, I think part of the reason may be the difference between the intention of the U.N. Security Council resolution on June 6 with respect to pursuing those responsible for the attack against the Pakistani peacekeepers—I think that intention was fairly clear—and the execution.

It is certainly true, as I indicated in response to a different question earlier, that managing a military operation of this sort, given the disparity of forces involved, the lack of experience in the U.N. command structure for an operation of this sort, led to the elements of confusion and the lack of success in the operation.

It is my understanding that when the President was talking about the factors that you cited, he was referring more to the unwieldy nature of the U.N. military operation which followed the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 837. The intention of that resolution was fairly clear.

Senator COVERDELL. If that were the case, is the President inadvertently taking to task our own decisionmaking process in evaluating the nature of the alliance that would be available for the pursuit of Aideed, and that we underestimated the communication difficulties and that there was an intelligence or a communication flaw?

Mr. TARNOFF. I obviously cannot speak for what the President may have meant by those comments. But, clearly, the demands on the U.N., even before June 5, in Somalia have been unprecedented. Starting from the time that the UNOSOM II took up responsibility

in early May and then after the June 5 episode when the responsibilities of the U.N. forces were increased to pursue those responsible for the June 5 attack, there were demands on the U.N. structure in terms of mission, in terms of personnel, which really had never been assumed by the U.N. anywhere before.

We assumed at the time that the U.N. structure would be able to deal with the new requirements that were placed on it. It turns out that the demands were probably excessive given the experience and capabilities of the U.N. at that time.

Senator COVERDELL. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I am going to move to another point and another apparent incongruity. Secretary Slocombe, you have described a circumstance that reinforced the decision, that other U.N. participants would have been dissuaded from their role without U.S. presence. And, in particular, you spoke to the rapid response capacity.

And you can see why that would raise a question in anybody's mind. Given the mission that the other U.N. participants look to the United States to perform, why, then, would the Secretary—what would be your view of why would the Secretary deny a request for equipment that is specifically related to a rapid response and the securing of our allies there in the Bradley and the tanks?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. As the Secretary has said, the reason that he did not approve the request when it was first presented was it was presented in the context of a more active, a more offensive, a more aggressive, if you will, U.S. role. That was basically, for reasons that have been expressed by most of the members of this committee, not the direction that we would go in, and he decided not to approve the request on that basis.

Obviously, with hindsight, he said that if he had it to do over again, knowing what was to come in the future, he would make a different decision. But the request was asked in terms of facilitating a more active U.S. role, and it came at a time when the administration itself had all the pressure from Congress which was going in the opposite direction.

Senator COVERDELL. I am sure that as we have the chance—I will not pursue it—that it does raise a rather significant question. And I think some of the questions Senator Brown has asked for, which you have agreed to supply to the extent you can, and perhaps in the coming hearing it would be best to ask the Secretary directly questions related to the incident.

Let me move to the third subject very quickly. In terms of using—I have heard Somalia be described as a model—this is before circumstances unfolded—of something pointed to the future. And Senator Kerry has referred to the longer term definition, so to speak.

And the President, when he spoke to the U.N., said we support the creation of a genuine U.N. peacekeeping headquarters with a planning staff, with access to timely intelligence and a logistics unit that can be deployed on a moment's notice, and a modern operations center with global communications. Now this statement strongly suggests a role for U.S. personnel that would be subjugated to a U.N. command. It does not say that exactly.

I have noted in the statements following this incident there has been great effort to clarify that the combat personnel were not

under U.N. command. There has been a lot of concern about it. I share the concern. Would you comment on what this statement does mean? Would you elaborate on that?

Mr. TARNOFF. Senator, what I think the President meant was that over time we think it is important for the U.N. to build up its own organizational capacities with respect to managing peacekeeping operations around the world where there are, as you know, 17 or 18 U.N. peacekeeping operations are around the world, most of which involve no U.S. personnel.

Now, in this particular citation that you give, he is talking about having better communications, having more qualified military personnel at U.N. headquarters. These are not field operations that he was talking about, but simply to increase the chances that there will be a greater degree of professionalization in the way the U.N. manages its own security affairs, given its peacekeeping responsibilities around the world.

There is certainly no implicit commitment on the part of the United States either to have personnel or to commit our forces to U.N. peacekeeping operations as a result of this. I think he was talking primarily about the need to have a better administrative structure within the U.N. itself to organize these activities around the world.

Senator COVERDELL. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I have one other question that relates to—I will submit it in writing—a quote from your designee for Assistant Secretary of Defense for Democratization and Peacekeeping, Mort Halperin. It deals with this subject and it raises rather far-ranging implications. I will submit that in writing.

And let me just say that U.S. military personnel cannot be looked upon as an equivalent to, say, a Norwegian peacekeeper. We are such an international target because of our standing and stature, and I do not think that equation can be made. And I would exercise great care in trying to equate us on a level playing field. We simply are not, for better and for worse.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Gregg.

Senator GREGG. Thank you.

Secretary Slocombe, how many helicopters were involved in the October 3 incident and where shot down?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Two were shot down, one took a hit and was able to land safely.

Senator GREGG. And how many soldiers were on helicopters that went down, approximately?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. On the one that went down to the south, I believe there were six. As to the one that went on the north, I will have to get that for you.

[The information referred to follows:]

There were 6 soldiers (4 crewmen, 2 passengers) on the first helicopter and 4 soldiers (all crewmen) on the second.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The reason I am puzzled and not clear in my mind is that the one that went down to the north may have had a load of——

The CHAIRMAN. Would you hold the microphone closer.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I am sorry. May have had a load of Rangers in passage.

Senator GREGG. And when the helicopters went down, how many Americans had died at that point? When the helicopters were shot down on the ground, at that point how many casualties were there?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I do not know, and I am not sure anyone knows at the moment when the helicopters hit, how many people were hit. There are maximums, the crews, but there was not the entire crew in either of the helicopters.

Senator GREGG. Now about what time of day was that, when the helicopters went down?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. My impression is it was midday.

Senator GREGG. Midnight?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Midday.

Senator GREGG. And from midday—would that be on the second or the third?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The problem is the time difference as to Washington. I am not sure.

Senator GREGG. Well, we will call it midday day 1.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Day 1, yes.

Senator GREGG. From midday, day 1, when the helicopters were down, how much time elapsed before the last American was out of the fire zone?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. It was a substantial period of time. It may have been as long as 12 hours.

Senator GREGG. Twelve hours. During that 12 hours, did the American people who were on the ground run out of ammunition?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Not to my knowledge. But let me say, Senator, before we go too much farther, on the details of what happened a military inquiry is still proceeding, and one of the things which I think is most—one of the few things which is true about initial operational reports is that they are inaccurate or at least incomplete.

I think until we have an opportunity—and I know it has not been completed—to complete the regular military process of talking to people in a systemic way and collecting reports, we will not have a full understanding of exactly what happened and when it happened.

Senator GREGG. Do you have a timeframe for that report being available?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. No, but I can find out.

[The information referred to follows:]

USCENTCOM, USSOCOM and their components, are in the process of evaluating all U.S. operations in Somalia, including the events of 3 October. There is no estimate presently available as to when that process will be completed.

Senator GREGG. Well, I presume it is going to be before the end of the month. That will be 30 days.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Since the inquiry is being made through military channels, I do not know how long it will be.

Senator GREGG. They were there for 12 hours.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. That 12 hours is approximate, but it was a significant period of time.

Senator GREGG. What chain of command did they have to go through in order to get reinforcements?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Well, the American chain of command ran directly up to General Garrison, who was in charge of the Rangers.

The problem arose, according to the reports that we have in now, of ways of communicating with the U.N. But the deputy U.N. commander is an American General, General Montgomery, and he or his people then communicated with the Malaysian contingent which provided the armor that eventually went into the scene.

Senator GREGG. When you say the problem arose in communication with the U.N., could you be more specific as to what was the problem?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Well, there is obviously no question—simply for the very reason that Senator Coverdell has in mind when he gives his very sound advice, there is no question that the U.N. command structure is not as effective or as taut as it should be. There is no question.

Senator GREGG. Were we sensitive to that command structure? Had there been any internal memos written within the Pentagon or from the field commander relative to that problem of the U.N. command structure prior to this instance?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. There is no question that we have been long aware that the U.N.—more or less for the reasons that Secretary Tarnoff identifies, the U.N. has not got the kind of experience and capability necessary to run with a desirable level of effectiveness in international, multilateral military operations in anything like the kind of stressing environment that Mogadishu represents.

Senator GREGG. This leads to the obvious question, why, then, were we structured in this way and putting Americans into that very difficult situation?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. That is one of the important reasons that the United States insisted that all of our combat forces be under strictly U.S. chain of command.

Senator GREGG. So to the extent that American forces were on the ground for 12 hours and were not relieved, were not able to be removed, and may well have run out of ammunition, that was an American failure? To the extent any of that happened, and it may not have happened.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The point about running out of ammunition I cannot confirm or deny.

Senator GREGG. It is just a representation that has been out there.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I understand.

Senator GREGG. But we do know they were on the ground for 12 hours. We do know we could not get them out when we should have gotten them out. To the extent those failures occurred, they occurred not because of any U.N. command structure problem but because of an American command, but because of American difficulties?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. No. Insofar as there was a problem in getting a rapid response and lining up the necessary cooperation with third-country forces that, I think, was in part due to the fact that there is not any integrated multinational force there.

Senator GREGG. Now, hold on, you are being inconsistent. When I asked you the question of why did we put them in this position you said well, we never gave up control over American forces.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Over U.S. forces. But a situation developed in which it was necessary to have the assistance of third-country forces, and we are not in an integrated military command.

Senator GREGG. Well, then, it must have been an error on our part that we did not foresee that we would be put in a position where we would have people on the ground for 12 hours and we could not relieve them with our people, and we were going to have to turn to U.N. support.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The question of what was—what was or was not foreseen by the commanders on the ground is one that I think will have to await the result of the inquiry.

Senator GREGG. But I am trying to figure out——

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Like you, I can sit here in Washington after the fact and think of all kinds of questions that people should have asked, things people should have done. The distinction between that and what people actually thought of and whether they made a misjudgment, I am not prepared to say until we have access to the kind of information that we need to know, in detail, what actually happened.

Senator GREGG. Well, I guess I am just like a lot of other folks who want to know where and why—or why there were American troops on the ground for 12 hours and they were not supported.

And all I am asking, and I think it is a fairly legitimate question in light of the fact that a number of weeks have transpired here since the event occurred—that I would have presumed that you folks would have made an initial assessment as to whether or not the failure to get support to these troops was a structural problem within our command structure or a structural problem within the U.N. command structure, as we have still got troops there and I presume they may be confronted with the same situation?

And so that is not an unusual question.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. There is nothing unusual or unreasonable about the questions. It is just that they require, for their answer, not speculation but the best possible facts, and those facts have not been developed.

Senator GREGG. But if the incident occurs again today. Because we still have the troops there, they could still be confronted with the exact same—well, not the exact same, but a very similar fact pattern. Do we know that we have taken the action necessary so that the mistake that occurred on October 3 will not reoccur, or do we have to wait for this study to occur to find out?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I suppose, like most things, we have taken steps to make sure that what happened in the past does not happen again. That is rather different from guaranteeing against things going wrong.

Senator GREGG. But that is not what I am asking.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Wait a minute. War is a very uncertain business. Combat operations are a very uncertain business. And you are absolutely right. As long as there are American combat forces anywhere, in any situation, when they make it into combat there are risks. I am not disputing that.

Obviously, steps have been taken to—the situation which arose in the Olympic Hotel attack will not arise again because as of now we would not do such an attack which involved putting very lightly

armed, highly mobile, if you will, snatch and grab forces into place to do a particular operation, which may become engulfed in a full-scale firefight with hundreds of opposing forces. That is not going to happen again since we are not doing that kind of operation.

Senator GREGG. Just one more question. Do we know approximately how many Somali casualties there were as a result of this incident?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. As a matter of principle and practice, we do not try to estimate adversary casualties. We have reason to believe, recognizing the softness of this figure, that the number of Somalis killed was on the order of several hundred.

Senator GREGG. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. Yes, thank you. I am sorry, I had to be in another meeting. I do have one question I want to pursue just a little bit, and I will ask the rest of my questions for the record, and that is, organizationally, how this administration makes decisions?

Now, I know on Somalia that there have been a number of phases. But we have the CIA, we have the State Department, we have Defense, and we have the White House Office of—the White House adviser, Anthony Lake. Now how do you folks get together?

For example, I would—and this is not on Somalia, but Mr. Aristide. Now, we are told that he has all kinds of emotional problems, that he has all kinds of human rights violations when he was running Haiti. We are told that he was not a Democrat once he was elected, with a small D. But something like that, is that phased through these agencies? Do you talk about it and then do you present it—who presents it to the President?

It appears to me that the Defense Department has a we/they mentality: the military "they," the civilians "we." The State Department, very frankly, I think is—at the top levels I do not know if people know who is reporting to whom. You might comment on that.

But, for example, how do you staff through a thing like what to do with Aristide or Somalia? What sorts of meetings occur?

Mr. TARNOFF. Senator, there is really a three-tiered system which is place. And it is identical to the system that we inherited from the Bush administration, although some of the names of the groups are different and obviously the players are especially different. At roughly the Assistant Secretary level in the Departments and Agencies that you are talking about, there are a whole series of interagency working groups called IWG's.

Senator PRESSLER. Right, I know that, I know that. But I am talking about the top level.

Mr. TARNOFF. They staff something called the Deputies Committee, which is chaired by the Deputy National Security Adviser, Sandy Berger, and also with representatives——

Senator PRESSLER. A deputies committee.

Mr. TARNOFF. Right.

Senator PRESSLER. Now, are those Deputy Secretaries?

Mr. TARNOFF. Deputy and Under Secretaries.

Senator PRESSLER. Deputy and Under Secretaries.

Mr. TARNOFF. From the five Departments. I can give them to you specifically: State Department, Defense Department, the Central

Intelligence Agency, JCS, and the Office of the Permanent Representative to the U.N.

Senator PRESSLER. OK, wait a minute now. Five offices, I have got seven down here. I have got CIA, State, Defense, White House, JCS—oh, JCS is Defense there.

Mr. TARNOFF. No it is separate from OSD. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is represented and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is also represented.

Senator PRESSLER. So there are seven, seven people that sit around and a table, then, when you get down to the final thing. Chaired by?

Mr. TARNOFF. Chaired by, at the Deputies level, the Deputy National Security Adviser.

Senator PRESSLER. Who is Sandy Berger.

Mr. TARNOFF. Sandy Berger.

Senator PRESSLER. All right. And these meetings occur at the White House, is that right?

Mr. TARNOFF. They occur at the White House.

Senator PRESSLER. Now, did several of these occur on Somalia early on?

Mr. TARNOFF. Yes.

Senator PRESSLER. They did. And they are occurring on Aristide now?

Mr. TARNOFF. They are continuing on a whole range of issues.

Senator PRESSLER. Do they meet every day, the Deputies Committee.

Mr. TARNOFF. Well, it is an irregular pattern. I would say that the Deputies probably meet three or four times a week, but not on the same subject, because they are monitoring a whole range of issues. Above the Deputies—just to complete the picture, Senator, above the Deputies level is what is called the Principals Committee.

Senator PRESSLER. The Principals Committee.

Mr. TARNOFF. Right.

Senator PRESSLER. Now, who is on the Principals Committee?

Mr. TARNOFF. Exactly as was during the Bush administration, it is chaired by the National Security Advisers. You have as members the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of Central Intelligence, and the Ambassador to the U.N.

Senator PRESSLER. So, there are five there?

Mr. TARNOFF. Well, there may be assorted——

Senator PRESSLER. How often did the principals meet on Somalia before the thing—let us say, 3 months ago?

Mr. TARNOFF. Since I am not involved in those meetings I cannot give you an exact figure.

Senator PRESSLER. OK, then the principals meet. Then who takes it to the President?

Mr. TARNOFF. Then either collectively or through the National Security Adviser the report on the deliberations of the principals is taken to the President so they can meet with the President, which they do on occasion, or they could submit their recommendations through the National Security Adviser to the President.

Senator PRESSLER. Well, I said in my speech on the floor on Somalia that it was not so much a difference between the Byrd amendment and the McCain amendment, but what we were crying out for was a formulation of foreign policy so that we knew what our objectives were, so that we knew what our troops were sent there for, what the plan was.

And it just appears to me, as a Member of the Senate here, that for the first time in a long time—and I am not being critical necessarily of the Clinton administration per se. But there seems to be such drift in terms of public administration at the top levels of those agencies. There does not seem to be a formulation of policy.

Now, probably this has been covered, but we seem to have a lot of trouble getting witnesses up here quickly, or maybe we are not asking at the highest level, at the Foreign Relations Committee on some of these issues. Maybe that is our fault, but we have not, in my judgment, had enough speedy hearings. And I am told it is because the administration does not want to send the Secretary up, et cetera, et cetera.

Has this been covered before? It has been. OK, then I will read the record.

But there is something amiss organizationally here in the formulation of policy, and maybe I am talking to the wrong people here, but I am very bothered by it because those agencies should work together with the information they have.

If the CIA brings in something on Aristide that is as bad as what I have heard it is, I am surprised that the group keeps going forward and presents him as a Democrat. He was elected in a free election, but when you rule by mob scene, and when you force death sentences on people, and when you rule as a dictator for 2 years it seems that it is very strange that we are supporting that fellow. That is what I am saying. What is going on?

I hope that this is being discussed by the principals and Deputies, and I hope that it is not sort of an ad hoc thing going on over here in Defense and an ad hoc thing going on over here. It is being sent through. It does go up through the channels. You are listening to the military, because some said that there were lessons learned in Somalia, maybe by some of the civilians at the top.

But, I mean, I served as a mere second lieutenant in the Army in Vietnam. I think a lot of these lessons have been learned before by the military. I think that if we listen to them on some of these occasions we can have those.

But what I am saying is that I feel, as one Senator, that there has been—on this whole Somalia thing that we have not had our policy act together with all these agencies. It might not be your fault. I do not know what is going on. I get a feeling now that there is a more intense effort.

But on Haiti, I have not seen the foreign policy objectives of the United States enunciated by the principals or whoever is supposed to enunciate them. If I go back to my State and explain—because I like to support the President, I like the Senator Vandenberg tradition and all that. I just wanted to get that off my chest. Do you have any response?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Senator, you made one observation that I do want to respond to, and that is that in the Defense Department

there is a we/they mentality between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the military Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is simply not true.

I served in the Pentagon during the Carter administration, and one of the things that I have been impressed by is the degree to which, largely I think because of Goldwater-Nichols, there is a much more open and much better relationship between the staff levels of the military staff and the civilian leadership in the Department.

There may be various problems in this Government, in this administration, but a we/they mentality in the Pentagon is not one of them. Obviously it is important that the civilians let the military do their business and an inquiry into what went wrong in a military operation is preeminently a military function.

Senator PRESSLER. Well, I have a feeling—and I appreciate your comments, and I have known you a long time so I appreciate your integrity. But I have a distinct feeling that just below the surface over there there is a very we/they mentality. And I have the feeling that it is going to get worse as time goes along, and I hope that it is resolved.

But we want to help you out. We want to work with you, at least I do. But we have got to have some foreign policy formulated, and we have got to have some defense policy formulated. Some of the stuff that is coming out of this that must be from the Deputies and the principals is very helter-skelter in this Senator's view.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I have two specific questions.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Senator Pell, I am not as young as I was when I was in the Government before. I need a very brief break.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly. We will recess.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Senator PRESSLER. May I ask just one followup question?

The CHAIRMAN. Surely.

Senator PRESSLER. May I get for the record dates of the meetings of the principals and the Deputies regarding Somalia over the last 5 months?

Mr. TARNOFF. Certainly.

[The information referred to follows:]

The information requested is classified, and is in the committee files in room S–116 of the Capitol.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I have two very specific questions. One is a press report here reads: "a month before his militia killed 18 U.S. soldiers on October 3, Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed offered to cease hostilities and begin a mutual dialog with the U.N., according to a confidential U.N. document. But the peace overture was rejected by the senior U.S. representative in Somalia, retired U.S. Adm. Jonathan Howe, and senior U.N. and American military commanders in Somalia, according to John Drysdale who resigned last month as Howe's political adviser."

Can you just say, is that a correct or an incorrect story?

Mr. TARNOFF. Mr. Chairman, the only communication that we were aware of or are aware of from Aideed during that period was a letter that he wrote in late August, I believe, to President Carter.

In that letter he did make a proposal for the convening of a commission that would look into the responsibility for the events of June 5, notably the attack against the Pakistanis.

In return for that he indicated that there could be a relative cessation of hostilities, and through other channels he even indicated that he might be willing to leave the country for a period of time while that investigation was occurring.

This is the only communication that we were aware of. And I might say that after it was received the President, Secretary Christopher, Mr. Lake, and others met with President Carter, and this was one of the factors in our decision early in September to begin exploring actively the political process. So, that is the only communication that I am aware of that came from General Aideed on that same general subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Now, on a different subject, we are all glad the Michael Durant has been returned to us. At the same time, I understand that the U.N. still holds many Somali prisoners and that, at the urging of the United States, the U.N. was unwilling to consider a prisoner exchange. And so far Somali prisoners are not being released in response to the release of the American and Nigerian prisoners.

My understanding is that the legal viewpoint, is that it is because there is no international conflict in Somalia, and because the U.N. is an international organization and is not a party to the Geneva Conventions, and there is no war in the technical sense of the word.

So, what would be the status of the prisoners on each side? I do not believe the Red Cross has been called in, and this is a question that may come up more in the future.

Mr. TARNOFF. It is true that the U.N. is holding some 20 to 25, I believe, Somalis who have been captured in the course of the operations over the summer.

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me. Are they being treated as prisoners of war, or just detainees?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. For the reasons you state they are not prisoners of war because there is not an international armed conflict. They are, however, being given a treatment which is the equivalent to that which would be given to prisoners of war.

The CHAIRMAN. Somewhat off the subject but in the same line of questioning, has Durant received the Purple Heart?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So, that would indicate that there is a war.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. No, not necessarily, because we take the position which I think makes a lot of sense that the eligibility for American service personnel who are wounded in the line of duty by hostile action should not depend on the niceties of international law. He is properly entitled to receive the Purple Heart without that having any legal implications on the character of the war or the character of his confinement. As a technical matter, he was also in the view of the United States a detainee rather than a prisoner of war.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that the treatment given to the Somali detainees is equivalent to the treatment they would receive as POW's?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. In that case, have they been visited by the ICRC?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I have not asked that specific question, but we can get the answer.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe you could for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

Yes. While not soldiers or prisoners of war, the detainees are afforded the same privileges that a POW is guaranteed under the International Law of Land Warfare, They are visited by representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross twice a week. The ICRC officials have made no complaints about the conditions under which the detainees are being held. Accommodations are sparse, but clean and dry and the detainees are fed three meals a day. High level detainees are also given an exercise period. As necessary, medical treatment is also available.

The CHAIRMAN. The record will stay open until the end of the day for additional questions.

I would turn now to Senator Brown.

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to go back to the discussion of armor or supplying armor, and the decision not to supply that armor that was requested by General Johnston.

Secretary Slocombe, did you participate in meetings where the question of supplying armor was discussed?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

Senator BROWN. Can you tell us what General Hoar's recommendation was? I believe the recommendation was sent through him.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. For the same reason that I said—the same answer that I gave with respect to your question about General Powell's recommendation, I think it is inappropriate for me to describe or characterize the advice given, particularly by the military chain of command to, in this case of course, General Powell, and beyond that to the Secretary of Defense.

Senator BROWN. Are you aware that the Secretary of Defense has already characterized that advice in the press publicly?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes. I assume you mean his statement to the effect that there were differences of—that the advice was mixed, I think was the basic thing. I think there is a distinction between the person to whom the advice was rendered talking about it and people who happened to be in the room or who happened to have access to documents describing what they hear or, indeed, what they personally recommended for the same reason that I suspect you would not appreciate members of your staff describing on the public record the advice they gave you on various matters.

Senator BROWN. Well, do I understand you to say that it was inappropriate for Secretary Aspin to characterize that advice?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. No, because I draw a distinction between the person who receives the advice, in this case the Secretary of Defense, who may choose to talk about the advice he got, rather than somebody who simply happens to be in the room or happened to have had access to the document.

Senator BROWN. How would you characterize people who give advice to you? Is that something inappropriate for you to speak about?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I believe that as a Presidential appointee I am responsible for the decisions that I make, and I would not normally think, in the absence of some allegation of wrongdoing or some-

thing like that, it appropriate for me to characterize the views of my staff.

Senator BROWN. But it was appropriate for Secretary Aspin to characterize them?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I am in an intermediate position. Secretary Aspin is a decisionmaker with the responsibility for the operation of the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense depends, as all the other Government agencies, on people being able to give candid advice and not have that advice then become a subject of public——

Senator BROWN. Well, I think my questions are pretty straightforward.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Your questions are very straightforward, very reasonable, and I understand why you are asking.

Senator BROWN. Let us take a look at where we are at. The Secretary turned down a request for armored personnel carriers and tanks that were needed for the safety of the troops.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I do not agree with that characterization.

Senator BROWN. Well, I think those are public statements.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. There is no question that what he has said is that if he had had it to do again, knowing what he knows now, that with the light of hindsight he would have made a different decision.

Senator BROWN. But nevertheless, the troop commander requested the equipment. The Secretary did not respond to that request positively.

The Secretary has publicly characterized the advice that he got and the Secretary, in spite of repeated requests, has not been willing to come forward and testify before the committee. You have come in his place and you are unwilling to testify.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The Secretary is testifying this morning before the House Armed Services Committee, and I assume this will be one of the subjects discussed.

Senator BROWN. Well, I think that is very nice for the House. The question is here. And let me ask you, are you asserting a privilege against testifying?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. No.

Senator BROWN. You are not asserting a privilege, you are just refusing to testify.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I am saying that I believe it is inappropriate for a staff person who was in the room at a time when military advice was given to the Secretary of Defense, again absent some extraordinary circumstance, allegations of impropriety or something like that, to characterize that advice.

Senator BROWN. Well, let us pin it down so I understand. You were in the room. You heard discussions relevant to the subject. You are unwilling to answer questions before this committee about that information. Is that correct?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. If it gets to be a question of the legal instruction, I would then do what as a lawyer it seems to me makes sense, and that is to consult the advice of counsel or the advice of the department of what they want me to do.

My personal view is that absent some instruction otherwise, I think it is inappropriate for staff people to characterize other people's advice to the decisionmaker.

Senator BROWN. Well, when you went through confirmation hearings, did you not commit to answer questions from Congress?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

Senator BROWN. Is this not a question from Congress?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Look, if you want to make this an issue of an instruction from the committee to answer, I will consult with the Department of Defense as to what I am supposed to do. I am only saying what I believe is an appropriate scale of inquiry.

Senator BROWN. Well, if I understand where we are at, I have asked a question about the comments of General Hoar on this matter with regard to honoring a request for equipment that was needed for the safety of troops. You have declined to answer.

I have asked a question with regard to General Powell's recommendation with regard to honoring a request for equipment necessary for the safety of troops and you have declined to answer, even though the Secretary himself has commented in public on this subject.

If I understand your refusal to answer it does not relate to asserting a privilege.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I do not know whether the Department would want that privilege asserted. A privilege may well exist, but I am not in a position—as I understand it, I am not in a position to assert it personally.

Senator BROWN. Well, I thought you came here to testify and to answer questions. I do not know how we get to the facts of this case.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I will be glad if you would like, Senator, to consult with the legal officers of the Department of Defense as to whether they have a view on my answering the question. And I believe I would also need to consult with the Secretary of Defense, and I would like to consult with General Powell before I am the person who characterizes the advice that he gave to the Secretary of Defense.

Senator BROWN. Well, I would appreciate it. We have only been waiting 9 months for the hearings. Would you follow up on it? I thought that is what you were prepared to do when you came up today, to answer the questions. Now when we get to the questions I find you will not answer them; that you do have the answers but you will not respond, and you are not asserting a privilege.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Well, for the record, I will reserve the question, whether the Department wishes to assert a privilege. I do not hold myself out as an expert on the law of executive privilege, and therefore I am certainly not waiving it. It is not mine to waive.

Senator BROWN. Can you tell me who at the Pentagon—the Secretary's statement is, "I found the views at the Pentagon were kind of mixed on the issue as to whether we ought to grant that," referring to the request. Can you tell me who at the Pentagon opposed sending armor?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. It is the same question.

Senator BROWN. And you decline to answer?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

Senator BROWN. What was the backup plan to rescue our men or backup our men on the October 3 mission?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. That is a question that will have to be addressed to the military authorities. I do not know.

Senator BROWN. Well, I thought you came here representing the Defense Department. You are not aware of a backup plan to rescue the men?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I will be glad to take that question. The fact is that the operation was planned by the U.S. officers in the field, on the ground, and I am simply telling you as a matter of fact that I do not know what the details of that plan were, just as I do not purport to know in detail the events.

I mean, like many of us I sat in briefings and I heard reports on what happened. I do not hold myself out as an expert on the details of what happened or what the plan was or what the defects of the plan may or may not have been or what various alternatives were.

Senator BROWN. Mr. Chairman, I thought we had finally gotten to hearings so we would have answers. What I find is they are unprepared to answer.

My hope is two things, Mr. Chairman. One, that we would hold additional hearings where we can get answers so that they will be prepared, and I will do my part and try to submit the questions in advance, if that is helpful.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. That would be very helpful on such issues as this.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you might care to submit them today.

Senator BROWN. I will submit them today. I wonder, can you give me an idea as to when you might have answers for me?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Obviously, I will consult immediately when I get back to the building. I have been making a list, and the people sitting behind me have been making a list as to your areas of request.

Senator BROWN. And I will try to get written questions to you.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Some of them will take a while to answer. Some of them we will be able to answer immediately. On all of the questions, I do not know how long it will take to answer them. If, for example, they require getting information through military channels, through people in the field, that will take a while.

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I would just observe, I have been in the Government, in the Senate for 33 years, and in the executive branch for 11 years, and I completely sympathize with Mr. Slocombe because you stand responsible for what you do. And I do not blame my legislative assistant for giving me bad advice, I have to live or hang by it, and I think this is what Mr. Slocombe is saying here. But I just wanted to make that observation.

Senator BROWN. I guess the reason I feel so strongly about it is the only way we make sure we do not endanger American's lives in the future again needlessly is if we learn from our mistakes. And if the response to this tragedy is to cover everything up and to not get at the facts and find out who it was that did not want them to have armored vehicles and so on, if we try to cover it up we do not learn from the mistakes.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a good argument on both sides, but I think I come out a little more on the Slocombe side. It did not used to be that way when you were representing the administration in Vietnam.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Excuse me? I have held this view from service in various administrations and when I was in private life.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Coverdell?

Senator COVERDELL. Mr. Secretary, I would like to return to the discussion we were having about looking proactively about future policy.

I am reading to you a quote from Assistant Secretary Designate Halperin. This article appeared in Foreign Policy this year. He said, "the United States should explicitly surrender the right to intervene unilaterally in the internal affairs of other countries by overt military means or by covert operations. Such self-restraint would bar interventions like those in Grenada and Panama unless the United States first gained the explicit consent of the international community acting through the Security Council or a regional organization."

I wondered if you share this view? Is he beginning to articulate a policy that is on the agenda of the administration? Is this something the Department of Defense is beginning to see as, so to speak, the strokes of the new manner in which we will engage in these kinds of affairs?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The answer as to the view of the Department of Defense to the question of whether that is the position of the Department of Defense or Secretary Aspin is no.

Senator COVERDELL. Good.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I think the right place to pursue the question of what Mort Halperin's views are would be in a hearing on his confirmation, and I hope that such a hearing will be scheduled shortly.

Senator COVERDELL. Well, I would agree with that except, as we said a little earlier in our discussion, and I think Senator Kerry pointed to it and Senator Simon to some extent, that out of what as I, even in this hearing, think has been the acceptance of hopes that were not necessarily met and that out of Somalia will come lessons, I have been concerned about statements such as the one I read of the President's and then you match it with a statement by Mr. Halperin.

I am just curious. I can go back and I would read to you a statement by Secretary Christopher in his confirmation hearing. "I think we have to find ways to make available to the U.N. a rapid response force." That sounds very similar to what we have been talking about, "so that the U.N. can go into situations and not leave it to the United States to be the action officer in the situation."

You see sort of a thread that is tying these together, and I am probing to understand where you feel this is pointing us. Do you generally embrace these ideas? You have said that this is not the policy of the Department of Defense.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. That we should never intervene.

Senator COVERDELL. Right. I am saying, is this something that you have before you at the State Department?

Mr. TARNOFF. Senator, let me respond to the broader issue to which I think you are referring, and that is the question of whether the United States acts alone in certain circumstances, or whether we act with others, and with others might not always be in a U.N. context. It might be a NATO context.

Senator COVERDELL. Or a coalition.

Mr. TARNOFF. Or a coalition. I think the policy of the administration as defined very clearly by the President himself when he was in New York and by various other senior administration officials last month was that we will reserve at all times our right to act unilaterally, but it may on some occasions be in the interests of the United States to work with others—coalitions, NATO, with the U.N.

Even when we act in concert with others, there will be certain criteria that we will apply to our participation. We will ask for a defined mission statement, we will ask for a high degree of support from other nations, and of course we are going to consult very actively with the Congress of the United States.

So there are a series of criteria when the President would make the judgment that it is in our interest to act multilaterally. That will be determined on a case-by-case basis. There is certainly no blanket policy with respect to multilateral operations at all.

Senator COVERDELL. Well, you may want to have some internal discussions prior to his confirmation hearings, because this statement is very explicit, and a dramatic departure from past U.S. policy.

I have one other, and I am using these all as guideposts. Boutros Boutros-Ghali recently admitted that the operation—and I assume he was talking about Somalia—"is moving into uncharted waters in Somalia and deals with operational concepts that lie beyond the realm of peacekeeping."

I think one of the things we have seen here—and there is no way to exactly document this, but one almost gets the sense of an imposition of a broader international view, and that crosses a threshold that is somewhat uncomfortable for me. From your inside observation, what do you think the Secretary General is referring to here when he says, lie in the realm beyond peacekeeping? What is he headed toward?

Mr. TARNOFF. It is difficult for me to interpret, but I guess that when I saw that statement, Senator, I thought he was talking about a degree of uncertainty with respect to future relationships between the U.N. and the principal members of the Security Council, the principal potential troop-contributing countries, and that quite frankly we needed a lot more definition of roles of the United States and of the member nations.

One of the things that struck me when I was in New York last month after President Clinton addressed the U.N. was the very positive reaction in delegations among chiefs of state and in the U.N. structure itself to his requirement that countries impose criteria on their participation in U.N. operations, because I think people in the U.N. are understanding that they, too, need criteria so that when countries, not usually the United States but other countries, ask them to do things, they will have some commonly accepted criteria.

Therefore, I take the Secretary General's statement to mean that we are going to have to work together, and this administration will have to work internally and with Congress refining the definition of when peacekeeping is appropriate, when we should be acting unilaterally, and in many cases these are uncharted waters for reasons we have been talking about here, because we are all facing situations that are different from what we encountered during the cold war.

Senator COVERDELL. I will conclude. I do think that Senator Byrd very eloquently described what I would feel is a very broad view among our people with regard to ultimate accountability, our system of election, and therefore acceptance, ratification of accountability, which is exceedingly difficult to do under a U.N. jurisdiction, so it is all part of this process of formulating how we are going to go ahead in the future.

I appreciate your response.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you both very much indeed for being here. We will meet again at 10 a.m., tomorrow morning, and the record will be kept open for 2 days.

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, but I was hoping until we receive responses to the questions, obviously responses may not constitute answers.

The CHAIRMAN. The record will be kept open until the end of the week.

Senator BROWN. That is fine.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a 4:30 p.m. briefing, too, with Mr. Oakley.

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10:04 a.m., October 10, 1993.]

SOMALIA, THE UNITED STATES, AND U.N. PEACEKEEPING

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1993

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pell, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, Brown, Jeffords, and Coverdell.

The CHAIRMAN. The Foreign Relations Committee will come to order to receive the testimony of Ambassador Albright. It is truly a timely discussion that we will have.

Today, the air is thick with cries to pull American troops out of Somalia, to abandon the U.N. peacekeeping operations of which we, the United States, were a major architect. Some critics would demand that the President cease all support for U.N. peace operations. Yet, before these drastic steps are hastily taken, time needs to be taken to reflect on an alternative policy path.

Yesterday, we heard public testimony from Under Secretary of State Tarnoff and the Under Secretary of Defense, Walter Slocombe. We received closed testimony from Ambassador Oakley concerning our policy toward Somalia.

In his letter on Monday to the majority leader, President Clinton welcomed the opportunity to engage the Congress in a full, constructive dialog about the process of executive legislative relations regarding America's engagement in a changed world. Our hearing today provides an opportunity to begin that dialog with the executive branch.

Having been present at the creation, when the U.N. Charter was adopted in 1945, I am a strong believer in increased consultation, not information but consultation about the U.N. and our policies toward it. Ambassador Albright is an equally strong proponent of such an approach toward the Congress. I welcome her testimony. I turn to the ranking minority member, Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is good to have you here, Ambassador Albright. We appreciate your coming for testimony today.

During your testimony perhaps you will cover the points that are made in a statement in the Washington Post this morning entitled, "A Grand Bargain." I quote so that you will have some idea of the context I suspect of some of our questioning this morning.

Washington Post writers Martin Gelman and Daniel Williams say:

The Clinton administration gave three clear signals yesterday that it would rather switch than fight. It announced the withdrawal of Army Rangers, the latest reinforcements that barely arrived, it ordered U.S. troops in Somalia to stay quietly in their garrisons, and it allowed that Aideed probably will have to be a part of the Somali political settlement.

Exactly what form that political settlement will take is not so much a matter of indifference to the Clinton administration as it is a matter of acknowledged impotence. President Clinton is far more concerned at this point with settling two gnawing conflicts between American soldiers and Aideed's militia on the streets of Mogadishu, and between the executive branch and Congress in Washington.

Clearly, these are substantial allegations, and I am hopeful in your testimony today or in your additional responses you will clarify what is at hand.

I thank the Chair.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Biden?

Senator BIDEN. I realize it is slightly out of order, but I could I be yielded 30 seconds?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Senator BIDEN. Ambassador Albright, I chair the Judiciary Committee, and once a year we hear from the National Drug Coordinator regarding the administration's national drug policy. Unfortunately, that hearing was scheduled prior to the scheduling of this hearing so I am going to have to leave.

I would like to ask unanimous consent that my statement, which I would have made at the appropriate time, be entered in the record at the appropriate place, and say only that I hope that the administration does not take from the Somali experience the lesson that the promise of collective security cannot be fulfilled.

I know you do not feel that way, and I hope the administration does not draw the wrong lessons from the mistakes and some of the inadvertent obstacles that it has run into in Somalia and other places.

I thank the Chair and I thank my colleagues for the interruption, and I apologize, Madame Ambassador, for not being able to stay.

[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR BIDEN

Madam Ambassador, at the outset let me state that I am extremely sympathetic to the foreign policy challenges facing this administration. You were dealt a difficult hand, and inherited numerous problems that began during the last administration—problems that went largely unattended during the heat of the election campaign.

These challenges are compounded by the complexity of a multipolar world marked by a multiplicity of threats—albeit threats far less serious than those that faced the United States during the cold war.

But the administration must not take from the Somalia experience the lesson that the promise of collective security cannot be fulfilled.

As the world's lone superpower, only the United States is equipped to strengthen the commitment of the international community to contribute to—and support—U.N. interventions to protect international peace and stability.

Unfortunately, on this central question, the administration has signaled not U.S. leadership but growing U.S. doubt.

I have been somewhat dismayed to see administration officials engage in elaborate exercises enumerating the obvious problems of collective action while failing to come to grips with how we will overcome those problems.

I myself remain convinced that we have at hand—in an unused article of the U.N. Charter, Article 43—the means to achieve the objective we seek. This goal was ar-

ticulated quite well by President Clinton during his inaugural speech: "Together if we can; alone if we must."

Article 43 does not, as some may believe, mandate a standing U.N. Army. Nor does it mandate that U.S. forces be assigned to a foreign commander.

Rather it envisages an effective process—by making forces and *capabilities* available to the U.N. Security Council in advance of any contingency that may arise.

From an American perspective, Article 43 represents all benefit and little cost. Through Article 43, the forces and facilities of many nations would be committed to the Security Council, but could only be *used* by the Security Council pursuant to a decision—a decision over which the United States would exercise a positive influence and an absolute veto.

As matters now stand, each contingency faced by the U.N. requires a new initiative in "rounding up the posse." Under Article 43, the posse would be assembled in advance—but used only when the key members of the Security Council, always including the United States, saw fit.

This is not a question of ceding American sovereignty or of contracting out American foreign policy. This is a question of advancing and protecting our national interests—in a manner that shares the burden equitably with other nations.

I recognize that the President may feel twice burned on multilateral military actions: once in the Somalia action he inherited; again, by the Bosnia action our allies would not permit.

These mishaps may offer a sobering reminder that we cannot always expect that U.N. actions will be successful or that the U.N. will even try to do the right thing.

But they offer no reason for not acting to fulfill the U.N.'s full potential—as *one instrumentality* of American foreign policy.

I say all this not to lecture, but to encourage you, amidst the current tempest over the United Nations, to not lose sight of the possibilities for collective action—at the United Nations and elsewhere.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Very briefly, the Ambassador knows of my opposition to the Somalia action, but I would like to take this opportunity to say that it does not mean I do not believe that the U.N. does not potentially play a very constructive role.

We do have a problem now with people saying, looking what happened in Somalia, you cannot have an effective U.N. operation. I would like to say today that I do not think that is always the case. In fact in Cambodia it appears that there has been a very effective operation.

The goal, I think, of all members of this committee is to find the right balance, and make sure that the U.N. actions are the type of action that the American people can be comfortable with. I would like to be a part of that process and avoid the possibility of pure isolationism or feeding a frenzy of belief that we have no role with regard to promoting these activities throughout the world. And it also, of course, could cost our country less if we are able to do this.

So, I think it is important at this time to make it clear that even though some of us have severe reservations, and in fact I think we ought to get out of Somalia right now, does not mean in the future that we should not work together to make the U.N. as effective as possible in these situations.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I would now turn to Ambassador Albright, and say how glad we are to have you, and look forward to hearing your testimony.

I would add that there is going to be a rollcall vote at 10:30 a.m., and another one at 11:30 a.m., so there will be a certain amount of coming and going, but I know you will understand and sympathize. Ambassador Albright.

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. It is a pleasure to be here today to discuss international peace operations and America's role in them. I do not even need to say that it is always a pleasure to appear before you.

A vigorous debate has arisen in recent weeks surrounding these issues, and it is vital not only that the executive branch and Congress conduct a substantive dialog, but that the American people be engaged as well.

Yesterday, as you mentioned, Under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff testified before you concerning U.S. policy toward Somalia, and although the focus of my testimony today will be on our overall approach to U.N. peacekeeping, there are a few things that need to be said right up front about the United States, the U.N., and decisionmaking concerning Somalia.

President Kennedy once observed that in Washington a successful policy has a thousand parents, while an unsuccessful policy is an orphan. The recent finger pointing regarding Somalia is a fine example of that.

The fact is that it is illogical for anyone to say that they favor the humanitarian mission of feeding starving children but not the mission of preventing it from happening again.

From the time President Bush ordered U.S. troops into Somalia last December, it was understood that there would be a division of labor on this. The United States would guarantee a secure environment for the delivery of relief, and then the U.N. would work with the local population to create a civic structure within Somalia that would make relapse into famine and anarchy unlikely.

The handoff of primary responsibility and the resulting modification of mission was authorized in March with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 814. I should emphasize that this step was designed not to increase American involvement in Somalia, but the reverse. It allowed us to reduce the number of American troops from 25,000 to 4,500.

Significant problems did not arise until after the murder of 24 Pakistani peacekeepers on June 5, which set back efforts to maintain a secure climate within Mogadishu. The U.N.'s decision to authorize the arrest of those responsible for the murders was strongly supported by the United States and by me. Security Council Resolution 837 was approved unanimously.

It would have been extraordinary if we had not responded to the ambush of U.N. peacekeepers this way. There remains nothing wrong with the principles set forth in that resolution. Unfortunately, some serious problems did arise in the course of its implementation.

Clearly, the difficulty of apprehending those thought responsible for killing the Pakistanis was underestimated. Further, while the U.N. was increasing military pressure, the targets of that pressure were gaining strength.

Meanwhile, more and more resources were devoted to the components of the military mission at the expense of other aspects. As a result, top level officials in our Government, and some at the

U.N. and in other governments, came to the conclusion that a far greater emphasis on the track of political reconciliation was needed.

Although the policy was moving in that direction by late September, it took the shock of October 3 to turn the train completely around. We are now firmly embarked on a corrected course, and encouraging progress is being made.

Looking back, I would caution against drawing sweeping conclusions about the institutions involved in these events based on what were in fact differences in individual judgments about tactics. Based on my own visit to Somalia in early July I think the better lesson, which I will discuss later in my testimony, is that the more comprehensive the approach to a peace operation, the more likely it is that it will succeed.

If UNOSOM had had more robust military capabilities last summer, better military results might have been achieved. A stronger political and communications staff at U.N. headquarters in Mogadishu would have helped, and greater international support for the training and development aspects of the peace operation would have brought closer the day that Somali affairs could be returned entirely to Somali hands.

We should also not forget what has been accomplished in Somalia since Operation Restore Hope began 10 months ago. American service men and women have abundant grounds for pride. Because of their efforts and their sacrifice, thousands of children are alive, crops are being planted, and political development at the district level is underway.

Our commitment to humanitarian goals in Somalia continues although, as the President has made clear, it is not open-ended. In some respects the same applies to our commitment to U.N. peacekeeping in general.

Now, let me turn a little bit more generally to U.N. peacekeeping. In that connection let me recall for you where the issue of U.N. peacekeeping stood only 9 months ago, when I first came before this committee.

Consider the Bush administration's assessment in January 1993, and I quote, "with the paralyzing divisions of the cold war now over, the U.N. has been given a new lease on life, emerging as a central instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and the preservation of peace. In concert with others, the United States must renew its efforts to improve the recent effectiveness of the U.N. As was demonstrated in the Gulf war and in subsequent crises, we now have the opportunity to make the U.N. a key instrument of collective security."

President Bush's views were widely shared. His predecessor, President Reagan, went even further, calling in a speech in 1992 for, "a standing U.N. force. An army of conscience that is fully equipped and prepared to carve out humanitarian sanctuaries through force if necessary."

At the U.N. itself, the end of the Soviet obstructionism had produced an explosion in the demand for help in preventing, containing, or ending conflicts. The result was more peacekeeping operations in the last 5 years than in the previous 43, a sevenfold increase in troops, and a tenfold increase in cost, and as we have

been reminded so tragically in recent days, a dramatic rise in complexity and danger.

The Clinton administration took office intending to provide strong support for U.N. peace operations but concerned about the potential for problems. For example, in my testimony to this committee at my confirmation hearing one day after the President's inauguration I noted, "if more and more nations are inclined to say, let the U.N. do it, and at the same time do not push comprehensive reform and build a sound financial base, then the United Nations stands in peril of collapsing under the weight of the new burdens placed upon it."

In the months since, it has been increasingly apparent that the rapid rise in peacekeeping activity has caused great stress in the U.N. Events in Somalia, and to some extent Bosnia and Haiti over the last few months have also caused dramatic swings in American public opinion.

Depending on the month or the place, the U.N. is accused of attempting to do too much or of not doing enough, of relying too heavily on force or of reacting passively to the use of force by others, of trying to run things or of failing to be assertive enough.

It is both necessary and appropriate in the wake of the tragic death of American servicemen in Somalia that we who make policy take stock. Clearly, the bipartisan consensus that so recently guided our approach to the U.N. peacekeeping has broken down. It is essential that we, the executive branch and Congress, work together to reestablish that consensus so that we may have a clear and politically sustainable policy governing America's role in U.N. peace operations.

This is necessary to maintain the credibility of American leadership, minimize the likelihood of harmful miscalculations abroad, and to keep faith with the American people, particularly those who serve in our Armed Forces.

This morning, I will outline the broad elements of what I believe could be the basis of consensus on U.N. peacekeeping. This outline has two guiding principles—realism about what the U.N. can and cannot be expected to do, especially in the short-term, and concern that we not overreact to setbacks and thereby forfeit opportunities for enhanced international cooperation that have been a long time in coming and may not come again soon.

What are the elements of this potential consensus? The first element of consensus should be the easiest. I think most of us can agree that both American character and American interests dictate that we remain active and engaged on the world stage not as a global policeman but as consistent and persistent proponents of free markets, democratic values, and adherence to international law.

Second, I would hope we would all agree that although multilateral peacekeeping is a potentially valuable foreign policy tool, it cannot serve as a guarantor of our own vital interests, nor should it lessen our resolve to maintain vigorous regional alliances and a strong national defense.

We want a stronger U.N., but we are not about to substitute elusive notions of global collective security for battle-proven and time-tested concepts of unilateral and allied defense.

Third, we should recognize that current U.N. peacekeeping capacities and decisionmaking procedures are not adequate and must be strengthened. Unfortunately, the U.N. emerged from 40 years of cold war paralysis overweight and out of shape, and since the fall of the Berlin Wall its responsibilities have grown faster than its capabilities.

Today, U.N. peacekeepers need reformed budget procedures, more dependable sources of military and civilian personnel, better training, better intelligence, better command and control, better equipment, and more adequate resources.

In his speech to the General Assembly 2 weeks ago, President Clinton called for, "the creation of a genuine U.N. peacekeeping headquarters with a planning staff, access to timely intelligence, a logistics unit that can be deployed on a moment's notice, and a modern operations center with global communications."

The administration is also insisting that the U.N. decisionmaking process on peacekeeping be overhauled. We are seeking to do that by asking that fundamental questions are asked before, not after new obligations are undertaken.

Does there exist a real threat to international peace? Does the proposed mission have clear objectives? Can an end point be identified? What are the projected costs? If it a peacekeeping as opposed to a peace enforcement operation, is there a cease-fire in place? Have the parties to the conflict agreed to a U.N. presence?

These criteria are not intended as rigid guidelines, but they are questions that must be asked whenever new peacekeeping missions are considered.

Fourth, the United States should provide appropriate levels of personnel, technical assistance, and equipment credited against our assessment to improve the management and to improve the effectiveness of U.S. peacekeeping capabilities.

Territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars, and the total collapse of governmental authority in some states are now among the principal threats to international peace and security. Although many of these conflicts may not impinge directly on the national security interests of America or its allies, the cumulative effects of continuing conflict include economic dislocation, humanitarian disaster, terrorism and other forms of international lawlessness, regional political instability, and the rise of leaders and societies that do not share our values.

These problems can and do affect us, and concern us. If we do not wish to assume responsibility for containing these conflicts ourselves, we must either enhance the U.N.'s capability to do so, or accept a future ruled not by the law of nations but by no law at all.

Fifth, the U.S. share of U.N. peacekeeping expenses should be reduced. We now pay more than 30 percent under a scale of assessments that has not changed in 20 years. Fairness dictates that our portion should go down and the amount owned by nations whose economic power has increased dramatically over the past two decades should go up.

Sixth, where it is in our interests the United States should support and sometimes participate in well-planned U.N. peace operations. Let me repeat that. Where it is in our interests the United

States should support and sometimes participate in well-planned U.N. peace operations.

I anticipate that the U.S. contribution to such operations will most often be in areas such as logistics, intelligence, public affairs, and communications rather than combat.

Seventh, under no circumstances should American servicemen or servicewomen be sent into situations where involvement in hostilities is likely in the absence of competent command and control, nor under this administration or under prior administrations to my knowledge have they ever done so. The issues of command and operational control will always be central.

As General Shalikashvili put it during his confirmation hearing for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, he said, "we should reserve the right, it seems to me, on a case-by-case basis to decide whether we should get involved in any particular operation. And one of those considerations should be just how robust the command and control arrangement is, and even who the commander is, whether in fact we consider the commander to be competent to lead our soldiers in that operation."

As a practical matter, this means that when large-scale or high-risk operations are contemplated and American involvement is necessary, we will be unlikely to accept U.N. leadership. Rather, we will ordinarily rely on our own resources, or those of a regional alliance such as NATO, or an appropriate coalition such as that assembled during Operation Desert Storm.

I should note here for purposes of precision that the President will never relinquish command authority over U.S. forces even if the President should determine that U.S. forces can be placed temporarily under the operational control of a U.N. commander. The fundamental elements of U.S. command will always apply. The chain of command from the President to the lowest U.S. commander in the field will remain inviolate.

The eighth element of our consensus is consultations. Consultations between the executive branch and Congress on U.N. peace operations must be conducted on a far more routine basis than in the past. There are several reasons why ad hoc or crisis-driven consultations are not sufficient.

The changing nature of U.N. peace operations has led us into uncharted territory. Traditional peacekeeping was a dispute resolving mechanism conducted between nations with the clear consent of the parties concerned, with neutrality rigidly observed, and with the minimum use of force.

Recent and current operations in places like Cambodia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Somalia are far riskier and far more complicated. The ways and means of each are unique to that mission. We are all in the process of being educated about what will work and what will not.

Television's ability to bring graphic images of pain and outrage into our living rooms has heightened the pressure both for immediate engagement in areas of international crisis and immediate disengagement when events do not go according to plan. Because we live in a democratic society none of us can be oblivious to those pressures. But regular consultations between us can nevertheless contribute to steadiness of policy and purpose.

The relationship of the United States to the U.N. is in the process of begin redefined. The outcome of this process, which involves issues of financing, reform, priorities, and approach, will be determined by decisions made not only at the White House but on Capitol Hill. The better the working relationship we have, the better the outcome will be.

Finally, the fluidity of world events dictates that we continually examine and reexamine our assumptions and policies. If lines of communication are clear, this will produce needed flexibility. If they are not, it will produce confusion.

I can tell you that either I or my office are ready to come to the Hill on a monthly basis to consult with you concerning the Security Council's agenda for that month, and any or all of the peacekeeping and other issues before the U.N.

The ninth element are the lessons learned in Somalia and elsewhere. The ninth and last element of this proposed outline for consensus on international peacekeeping is simply that we must be honest about and must continually learn from past successes and past setbacks.

Recent difficulties should not obscure the fact that multilateral peacekeeping has made a significant contribution to international peace and security. Historically, U.N. peacekeeping operations have separated combatants and preserved cease-fires in such areas as south Asia, the Middle East, and Cyprus.

More recently, in Cambodia a landmark election has been held under U.N. supervision, a new government has been formed, hundreds of thousands of refugees have returned to their homes, and fields that were once red with blood are now green with crops.

One reason for success may have been the decision of UNTAC officials to avoid being drawn into violent confrontations despite repeated provocations by the Khmer Rouge. Another reason was that the magnitude of the challenges in Cambodia was matched by the magnitude of the U.N.'s most expensive and far-reaching operation ever.

Another success story is Namibia, where the U.N. helped to manage a transition from guerrilla war to independence. The changeover was remarkably peaceful, and Namibia has become a stable democracy.

In El Salvador, we are seeing the value of confidence-building measures and a step-by-step approach to demobilization and reconciliation following a bitter civil war.

The difficulties of peace operations in Angola, Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti demonstrate that traditional approaches are not adequate where government and civil society have broken down, or where one or more of the parties is not prepared to end the conflict. It is not only the United States but officials at the U.N. from other states, large and small, that are now grappling with such questions as when to use force, how to structure multilateral coalitions, and how to guarantee strong command and control.

In these areas, there are many opinions but few established experts, no immutable guidelines, and a multitude of partial precedents which like the Bible can be cited to prove just about anything you want.

The complexity of modern peacekeeping missions underlines the importance of being very clear about what the mission is and how the mission is to be accomplished.

Today, we have a mission in Somalia that is clear. Provide logistical support to U.N. forces so they can maintain order, supplement the ability of U.N. forces to deal with emergencies, help the U.N. accelerate the process of political reconciliation, and to ensure that our own troops are protected.

The goals that mission are worthy. They protect the gains made in Somalia so far. They maximize the prospects for further progress, and they serve our interests by preserving American leadership.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, America under President Clinton is being called upon to develop a new framework for protecting our territory, our citizens, and our interests in a dramatically altered world.

In devising that framework we will depend for the most part on our own reserves of military and economic power. We will look for help from old friends and new. And we will need a consensus that includes you and the members of this committee for according an appropriate role to the U.N., an institution which has accomplished much despite a turbulent past, and which if streamlined and strengthened can contribute greatly in the future of interests that we share with other states.

Certainly, U.N. peacekeeping is not a panacea. It is one tool among many, and it cannot operate in isolation from a political process. But we cannot afford to abandon either peacekeeping or a multilateral approach to solving difficult problems.

As much as we would wish otherwise, conflicts are going to continue. The world is going to look to the United States for leadership. It will be in our interest to provide that leadership, but we cannot and should not bear the full burden alone.

America will be stronger and more secure if the U.N. becomes more capable and effective at preventing, containing, and ending international conflict.

I hope that we, as members of different branches of the same Government, will continue to work together to find common ground that will enable us, in cooperation with friends and allies, to get that job done.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I think some of you know that I have been a professor in my past life and have studied history fairly closely. And it is my sense, as I have said to some of you before, that we are living in one of the major watershed periods; that what we are looking at is what the world was like in 1815 or 1945; and that as we all go back and look at what people say about that period or have been writing about what it was like 1945, more often than not there is language similar to what Chairman Pell just stated about being present at the creation.

I think this is the most challenging job for all of us, and I consider it my major challenge and, frankly, a major honor to be one of those that is in a position to be present at this recreation of an international framework, and I hope very much that we are able

to do this work closely together because the world is really looking at us for answers.

Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, indeed. I think we will limit ourselves to 9 minutes each, which should permit everybody who will be here to ask a question.

I agree with you about the fact that the U.N. is coming into its own. In fact, Rip Van Winkle has been asleep for 40 years, asleep because of the cold war, and unable to do the functions that we intended in San Francisco. And now with the removal of the cold war, the removal of the Wall, we are in the position to do what we originally designed in 1945.

A couple of questions on specifics. One, you say that one of our missions is the adherence to international law. Does that mean that the administration will be pushing toward compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. We are obviously very concerned about abiding by international law. We also are concerned, obviously, about our sovereign rights within an international entity, and we are always examining that issue, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I would hope we do move in that direction. When you used the word robust to describe the command and control, what do you mean by robust? Does that mean strong?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, I think that it obviously means strong, but also better planned and better coordinated. I think that one of the problems that we see is the difficulty of coordinating our actions with those of the U.N., and that it will require more comprehensive planning.

The CHAIRMAN. In connection with the U.N., I was wondering if you had had the chance to peruse the final report of the Commission on Improving the Effectiveness of the U.N. that that group put out about 2 months ago?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. I have seen various versions of the draft. I was in fact summoned to meet with that group, and I think some of their suggestions are excellent. And they are the kinds of suggestions that need to be looked at because, as I said in my testimony, I think we are all looking for ways to improve the functioning of the U.N. As I say, it is kind of an elephantine bureaucracy that is now being asked to do gymnastics.

The CHAIRMAN. Right, and as a commission it is kind of unique in that it received absolutely no government money at all. Support for it was entirely from private sources. Also, have you had a chance to look at the staff report of our committee, "Reform of U.N. Peacekeeping Operations: a Mandate for Change"?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Yes, I have in a general way.

The CHAIRMAN. I think both of these publications have come out at a singularly significant time. Could you elaborate for a moment on the review process by which the Government defines its position toward the U.N.? Do you meet in the National Security Council? How do you present your views to the Government?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Let me explain in a general way how we do this. Obviously, as a member of the National Security Council Principal's Committee, I am there at the initiation of the policy process, and therefore am a part of the overall decisionmaking.

However, in the bureaucratic way that this is carried out through the State Department, the process on actual resolutions or instructions that we take in New York are delivered to me via the Department of International Organization and Assistant Secretary Bennett. That is the normal procedure for receiving instructions for various resolutions.

Let me say, however, that there also is a great deal of back and forth. I enjoy comparing with my colleagues what it is like to have your capital an hour away versus having it across on the other side of the world, and the fact that mine is an hour away means that we do a lot of talking on the phone and elaboration of instructions. But it goes through technically what we call IO, the department.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe that the administration has been conducting a review of our participation in the peacekeeping process. If that is correct, I was wondering what the status was of that review. Will you be consulting with the Congress before a final version is agreed on?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, we are conducting such a review, and I think if you put it into also the context of my testimony today and others who have spoken about this, this is clearly one of the more complex issues that this administration is dealing with. We have been doing some consulting at staff level. We obviously will consult further in order to have congressional input, congressional views about the process.

The CHAIRMAN. Right. And as you know, there is some disagreement about what consultation means. To my mind, consultation means the exchange of ideas. The administration in the past seems to think it is more a question of informing. I would hope that as much as possible it be true consultation.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. I would certainly agree with that, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Secretary General recently announced changes in the organization of the U.N. peacekeeping functions. Could you give us just a very brief outline of what those changes are and what the effect will be at the U.N.?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all I think this is very much to do with the Secretary General's own realization that the peacekeeping operations were inadequate for this larger load. So, what he has been trying to do is to make some changes in the structure.

He has expanded the staff of the department that deals with peacekeeping. He is in the process of creating an operation division to support these peacekeeping operations. He is very concerned about the lack of professionalism within the public affairs aspect of the peacekeeping operation.

He is working on the enhancement of the capability to support the development and training of various parts of the peacekeeping forces as well as the police forces, and he is working on coordinating the standardization of training and peacekeeping.

We are pressing him further to make some major changes in the budget reforms of peacekeeping, and we also have been instrumental in helping the U.N. set up a functional operations center so that we have given them technical advice on manning it 24 hours, on having the right information. We are assisting in that particular regard.

Also, Mr. Chairman, we are, through the Security Council, working on regularizing the whole peacekeeping operation. I had the honor of being president of the Security Council in August, and during the American presidency there we made it a point of saying that we could not authorize peacekeeping operations without knowing what the preliminary budget was, that new peacekeeping mandates had to have sunset clauses in them, and that it was important to send out an observer or a reconnaissance mission before we actually deployed the peacekeepers.

So, we in the United States are doing as much as we can to press the Secretary General even further on his own desire to really refurbish and restructure the peacekeeping operations.

The CHAIRMAN. We wish a fair proportion of the troops to be American and the budget to be American, and I believe as you point out that it is more than 30 percent now, which compared with today's share of the world gross product would not be fair. We would like it to be a quarter or somewhere in that order.

In that regard, should there not also be an understanding of the number of troops involved, that there would also be a smaller number, a small proportion? And I know that I shivered when I read the administration's proposed 25,000 Americans and 25,000 others to go into Bosnia, and to my mind the proportion should be 1 out of 5 or 1 out of 6 as it is in Somalia.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. On that issue, Mr. Chairman, I think first of all it is very important to get the U.S. assessment of the peacekeeping operation down. That has to be done. We bear an unfair burden for that.

Also, as I said, we are not likely to have American troops in most of these peacekeeping operations. We will only have them where we consider it vital to our interests.

But in terms of the numbers about what the proportion should be, I think that it should be commensurate with what the mission is, and so that our troops when they do participate in a multilateral effort of this kind are there in numbers with which our commanders feel comfortable.

I think one of the issues that we have to deal with is the whole support system by other contributing countries. I went to Somalia and I saw what it looks like with 30 countries contributing to a peacekeeping operation. I think one of the lessons that we are learning from all of this is that each country trains its people somewhat differently.

We do not yet have interoperability of weapons. We have to do a great deal more about the training of these peacekeepers. And I think that the percentages should not be such as to limit what is most important in the American case, which is the safety and well-preparedness of our own troops when we decide to participate.

The CHAIRMAN. We should recognize too there is no fixed number. I remember the pride that I had when President Eisenhower put me on the U.S. delegation to a conference that set up IMCO, the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. And we were able to get it down to, I think it was about 8 percent of the total budget was American. That would be a good target to shoot at. I believe it still is around 10 or 11 percent.

What will be the Secretary General's procedure to get a truly effective military staff, one on which we can call?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. What would be the Secretary General's procedure?

The CHAIRMAN. Is he making efforts to get a truly effective general staff?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. I think he is. I think he is having a hard time because a number of countries, and this is why the Secretary General is always going around with a tincup trying to determine which countries are willing to contribute and to what particular peacekeeping operation.

Obviously, each country has a different set of criteria or a different set of needs for contributing to these operations. I think that the Secretary General is making an effort. I think that we need to press him even harder on moving this process forward. If there is going to be as much reliance on peacekeeping as he would like to have, then I think it behooves him and his staff to get that peacekeeping office into order.

Let me say in that regard that I have reorganized the mission in New York, and changed the portfolios of the Ambassadors up there. As you know, there are several Ambassadors at the top and Ambassador Inderfurth, who I believe has testified before you, his major portfolio is to deal with peacekeeping and how it evolves within the U.N. system, and he presses all the time.

He has been instrumental in helping to set up a contact group of countries that contribute peacekeepers so that within the U.N. system there is also a group that is dedicated to thinking about how to assist and press the Secretary General to have better budgeting as well as better operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me, I must interrupt. I have to go over and vote. This committee will stand in recess.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Senator FEINGOLD [presiding]. The committee will come to order. Senator Jeffords would be next.

Senator JEFFORDS. Madame Ambassador, one of the problems in U.S. participation in U.N. peacekeeping forces of late is the unwillingness to send U.S. troops into dangerous situations in areas far from our traditional spheres of interest. The American public does not think that a young person who is willing to die for his country but is placed in a place like Somalia is there for that purpose. Yet, there are very real American interests in participating in the U.N. in regional peacekeeping missions.

I have been working on a proposal of specially designated, specially trained units within our Armed Forces that the President can call upon for participation in unique situations. These units would be comprised of people who have volunteered, specifically understanding and knowing that this is not in the national interest under the ordinary perception.

I wonder if you think, either in our own forces or in the U.N., that it would be wise to look at least at that option to see whether it would be preferable to the American public to have units made up in that respect?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Senator, you have raised a very important point and I think also made an excellent suggestion. Let me elaborate on this.

I do think that the idea of serving within an international operation such as the peacekeeping operations is obviously different than some people signed up for and therefore there has to be some clarification. But let me also say, I did go to Somalia this summer and I was deeply moved by the dedication of the American men and women, the service people there, by their commitment to what they were doing and their understanding that they were fulfilling a humanitarian mission which obviously had wider ramifications.

I think that any American would have been very proud of those people. I have to say I have never reviewed troops before in my life, therefore I was not quite adept at what it was that one did. So, I decided to shake hands with every one of those people to thank them for what they were doing, and they really I think felt that they were doing something that was very important.

I also must say that if one looked at some of the quotes on television from some of the service people in Mogadishu after the accident of October 3, most of them said they wanted to finish the job, that they were not feeling that they ought to leave, that they were not looking for a way out. So, I have great admiration for the Americans that are serving there.

I do think, however, that your idea about some kind of designated troops is an excellent one. First of all, it would obviate this problem that Boutros-Ghali has of, as I said earlier, going around with a tincup trying to figure out who from where.

Second, it would obviate a different problem which is, and I think this is the most serious problem in peacekeeping, that these troops have not trained together. They do not know each other. They arrive in a place and they have not had the same training. They come often different cultures, have different weapons, and I think anything that we can do to regularize the aspect of the peacekeeping operations—and I think kind of have honesty in packaging I guess is the label I would put on your proposal, which is that those people know what they are getting into because I think that they think that it is a good idea.

Again, if I just might add, there was a Marine I met not long ago who was part of the Nobel Peace Prize-winning peacekeeping operation who talked about it as one of the most important military experiences he had ever had. So, I think for the most part our military, when they know why they are doing what they are doing, are comfortable with it. So, I would welcome your suggestion.

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you. I know we had one of our former aids go to Mogadishu as a volunteer, basically pretty close to being in harms way. And I know she is going to stay there, and she believes very sincerely in what she is doing in helping humanitarian delivery.

I have discussed it both with high school young people who think that, yes, volunteer to go if you want to do that. It would be no problem. I think it would try to get us over that basic question that people ask. Why are we there? Why is my child there?

Well, if your child wanted to be there because they felt they were doing something appropriate, I think that alleviates that concern. Thank you.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. I think also, if I might add, that I think we ought to figure out a way to have commendations for those people that have served in peacekeeping operations, and it ought to be something that helps people's careers and does not hurt them, and that they need to know that what they are doing is not only in the service of the international system but also to their own country.

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you. Well, I will keep going if I still have some time. To follow up on that, I think that we have to put more emphasis on what the image of the United States would be if we decline to participate in the U.N., and the impact that will have on the positive aspects of opening markets and being able to participate, because we are not going to increase our standard of living and improve upon it if we do not actively participate in the world.

I wonder if you would agree with that view, that there are markets opening up out there and it is to our advantage to have a good reputation for being able to help in those areas?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Yes, sir. My feeling is that an overriding objective of American foreign policy has to be to make sure that we have a vibrant economy that exists within a functioning international system, and that there are various obstacles in the way of that such as these regional disputes.

I will not elaborate on that, but the gist of what you are getting at is that there are many problems along the way. It is essential, I think, to the average American that we have the options for having the greatest economic opportunities worldwide, and that disruptions in various places create a barrier to those options being available.

I think that it is essential that we have a great dialog with the American people about how we fit into the world and that it is impossible for us to live behind two oceans in this day and age. And our participation in the U.N. and in other organizations or our general behavior internationally should be directed toward that goal of the United States having a functioning—not functioning, a vibrant economy within a functioning system.

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you very much. Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Albright, I appreciate your being here, and I want to start off with just a couple of questions relating to Somalia and then maybe a little broader.

Ambassador Oakley I think has done a good job in incorporating other African leaders into the political process that has to be pursued in Somalia. But independent of his involvement, how much cooperation has the U.N. received from Somalia's neighboring countries in that action?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all as I mentioned, I had been in the area in July and spent time with the President of Ethiopia who was particularly concerned about what was going on

there. I have on the Security Council talked with the permanent representative of Djibouti, who is also nearby.

I cannot give you an exact number in terms of troop contributors, but they are very concerned about what is going on there and are willing, as we now know, to be very much a part of assisting in the solution.

Also the OAU, as the regional organization, is desirous of being of assistance. And I think that what Ambassador Oakley is doing is exactly right in moving toward the energizing of an African solution to an African problem.

Senator FEINGOLD. What about the Arab league? Have they given an indication?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, they have also been a part of this group that actually Boutros-Ghali has tried to energize. He just met with them in Cairo in order to move that process forward. I will have to give you the exact—you need a breakdown in terms of finances.

Senator FEINGOLD. That would be helpful, and I actually have a question following from that that is more general. What is the reaction of the other African nations to what we are doing there? I can see at least two different possible responses. One would be that this is in effect another example of colonialism, almost a Western display of arrogance to come into a region.

On the other hand, I can see situations such as Angola where they are maybe concerned that we would be abandoning our concern for Africa. I am just wondering how recent events are playing out with the various nations.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. I think that is a very wise question because one of the things we are talking about is there are a number of peacekeeping operations in Africa as we speak and they range from an operation in the Sahara, Angola, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, and those are really major operations in which there are cease-fires that have existed, that there is a variety of ways that the U.N. could be of assistance. As I mentioned in my testimony, the U.N. was of major assistance in Namibia. So, the U.N. has performed an important role.

I think that for most part, and obviously these are generalizations, is that Africans appreciate international interest in what is going on in their continent, and more likely they are afraid of being marginalized if we decide that we have no interest in them and that we are willing to participate in keeping activities in other continents but are not interested in theirs.

My sense has been that until recently there was not an anti-U.N. feeling within these countries. I must say again, and if I might take this minute to say, I specifically wanted to see how peacekeeping operations work. Most of my predecessors as permanent representatives have taken a large trip to consult before the General Assembly. I decided that I did not want to do that, that I wanted to make my trip very specific, and I went to visit three peacekeeping operations. I went to Somalia, Cambodia, and El Salvador.

And to speak about Somalia outside of Mogadishu, I was in Kismayo and there is no question that the activities of the U.N. were deeply appreciated and were not viewed as an intrusion. But obviously, Senator, there will be some—we will find elements of

people who do not want us there. But my sense from my work in New York is that the African countries want us to be involved because they see us as—and when I say us, I mean in this case the U.N. They see the U.N. as a way of assisting their progress and not as a colonial aspect.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you for your answer. On the cost of the Somali operation our witness yesterday said that he would not quarrel with an estimate that our operations in Somalia cost us more than $1 billion, and he also indicated it seemed that we would not receive any reimbursement from the U.N.

DOD has estimated that we may be eligible for as much as $193 million of reimbursement. Is that your understanding?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. I will have to get clear on the numbers, but let me say that the major cost is from the cost of UNITAF, which was an American operation, and the cost was decided to be born by the United States in a decision made by President Bush. And on the UNOSOM, our costs are according to the percentage.

We also are reimbursed through a special fund when we have assisted Third World countries in their logistical support, and that is what that fund is for is to reimburse us for that. But the major cost of this was UNITAF, a decision made by the previous administration.

Senator FEINGOLD. What about the U.N. trust fund for Somalia? Is that what you were referring to?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Yes, right.

Senator FEINGOLD. Who contributes to that fund?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, the major contributor has been Japan.

Senator FEINGOLD. And it is to be used for?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. It is used to reimburse the countries that have assisted in the transportation. The logistical support for Third World countries that could not be there otherwise. I will have to get you the exact numbers.

Senator FEINGOLD. Did you say we could expect some return?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Yes.

Senator FEINGOLD. There have also been some suggestions to improve the U.N.'s ability to meet the cost of immediate peacekeeping, for example, establish a $50 million humanitarian revolving fund for emergency situations, creating a $1 billion U.N. peace endowment fund against which the Secretary General would be allowed to borrow funds commercially. What is you opinion of these kinds of proposals or are there other ideas for budgeting?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, clearly the funding of the U.N. is a problem not just for us but for other countries, and there are various attempts and suggestions made through reports about different ways of doing things. I do think that it would be useful to have money on hand for humanitarian assistance. We cannot always predict when the need is there.

On the other hand, you know, I think there is kind of a catch-22 here. I do think that it is very important for member states to maintain complete control over the activities of the U.N. The U.N. cannot and should not be some kind of a totally independent body that acts on its own. It is a composite part of its member states.

And by contributing, that is one way that the states keep some strings on them, and there is a question about how large an independent fund should be before the U.N. is then totally independent to spend it how it wants. But as you can see, there is kind of a between. It would be good if they had something that they could use for emergency situations. On the other hand, I think the U.N. needs to be dependent on the way that its member states—because how you contribute is a sign of your support.

Senator FEINGOLD. One further question, Mr. Chairman. Is my time used up? Real quickly, on Macedonia we sent 300 troops as part of a U.N. mission to Macedonia as one of our responses to the situation in the former Yugoslavia. Briefly, what is the command and control situation there?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. That is one situation where the operational control of that unit is under UNPROFOR. As I explained in my testimony, overall command is always under the President of the United States, but there is operation control there by a Nordic commander.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Ambassador. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madame Ambassador, I do not know what the distinguished chairman said in welcoming you here this morning, but I know it was gracious and I would like to associate myself, as we say in the Senate, with his remarks.

Mr. Chairman, I am not going to have an opening statement. You do not happen to live in Virginia, do you?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, actually I have a farm in Virginia, yes.

Senator HELMS. But you do not have to cross the 14th Street Bridge every morning?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. No.

Senator HELMS. Well, it is the nearest thing to a demolition derby I ever saw, but anyway we get here somehow.

The CHAIRMAN. The Rochambeau Bridge.

Senator HELMS. Pardon?

The CHAIRMAN. The Rochambeau Bridge.

Senator HELMS. What did I say?

The CHAIRMAN. You said 14th Street Bridge. It is also called the Rochambeau Bridge.

Senator HELMS. Oh, I see. I tell you, the city of Washington is doing a pretty good job of demolishing the streets in this city, too. You try to get here and you cannot do it.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Come to New York.

Senator HELMS. Ma'am?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Come to visit the streets of New York.

Senator HELMS. Right. Well, I have been tempted to recommend that they build a dormitory for Senators and Congressmen and lock us in at night.

Anyway, the President spoke at the U.N, I believe it was on September 27, and he specified four criteria for U.S. participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations. Just for the record, I will mention them. I know you know what they are.

One, is there a real threat to international peace? Two, does the mission have clear objectives? Three, can the end point be identified for those being asked to participate? And four, how much will the mission cost?

I thought at the time, oh, well, it looked pretty good. The President outlined then, as I understood it, that this would be a litmus test before we would embark on a mission or the mission began. I listened to the radio this morning about 6 a.m., and I know you have heard about the shot that was fired at another helicopter and missed, thank the Lord.

I mention all this just to emphasize the quandary in which the American people and a great many of us in the Congress find ourselves, wanting to support the President who is, after all, the Commander in Chief, but there are a lot of things I frankly do not understand.

Anyway, a couple of weeks after the President spoke in New York or the U.N., the U.N. Security Council voted to approve three brand new peacekeeping missions, Haiti, Rwanda, and Liberia, and these are going to cost something in the neighborhood of a quarter of a billion dollars. Is that pretty much correct?—$253 million or something like that.

Now, I do not believe, Madame Ambassador, that any one of these missions met the President's clearly stated criteria. And you can see why some of us are confused. We do not understand what appears to be double talk.

The President said if the American people are to say yes to U.N. peacekeeping, the U.N. must learn to say no. I do not know whether you helped him with that line or not, but it was a good line. And the last time I checked, the United States has a veto over all Security Council resolutions, meaning that the United States alone can vote to say no, and no is it. Up to this point we have not.

It seems to me that we might be like Cool Hand Luke, a movie I saw an eternity ago. What we have here is a failure to communicate. If the U.N. cannot say no and the administration does not say no to these peacekeeping missions, then why is anybody surprised when people in Congress say, wait a minute?

Maybe we have—let me confine it to myself. Maybe I have a strict constructionist view on the question of who can declare war and who cannot, but it prompts me and I think it prompts others to say wait just a minute. If the administration is not going to do this, the U.N. is not going to do it, then we have got to do it.

All right. In August—you have met Ben Gilman, my counterpart over in the House, a nice guy. I think he is smart. We agree on some things. We wrote jointly to the administration, specifically the State Department, about all of this. We got a letter back from the administration saying that Somalia was not considered, "a sustained military action," and therefore congressional authorization and approval were not required.

Maybe you can help me. What did the administration mean when it used the words, sustained military action?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Can I go back and deal with some of the other issues you raised about the criteria?

Senator HELMS. Yes, ma'am. I know this is sort of a winding road, and I apologize for that.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. I think the issue here is the following. We are very concerned about what really looks like the growth industry in peacekeeping. These peacekeeping operations are proliferating and it is something that has concerned me ever since I got up to New York.

In August, the United States was President of the Security Council, and we decided that under that presidency we would begin to turn the screws on a series of peacekeeping operations. And specifically as a result of our action, from now on the following things happen whenever anybody thinks of a peacekeeping resolution which has fit within the President's criteria.

First of all, we ask what the cost is going to be going in, not coming out, and the Secretariat has to give us a preliminary cost estimate on it.

Second, we are insisting that every peacekeeping operation have in it a sunset clause so that the burden of proof has be to renew it, not just that it kind of has to go along. And third, we would first send out a small mission to find out whether this is something that ought to be done or not.

So, being typically American, we wanted openness and accountability, and that is what is happening on those particulars from now on.

I also was concerned about Rwanda, and I asked my staff up there specifically how does Rwanda live up to the President's criteria? And I can, if you want, go through this with you because it does.

And does the U.N. peacekeeping operation meet the guidelines? There is a threat to international peace and security. Rwanda rebel troops invaded Rwanda from Uganda in 1990. Almost 1 million people were displaced from their homes or made refugees by the fighting, requiring an aid effort of $100 million this year alone. And an international community of interest exists for dealing with the problem.

Several countries, including the United States, participated in the peace talks and the OAU have deployed—I will not bore you with all of this, but we basically were able to answer all those questions.

I have now asked the same questions about the possibility of renewing the mandate on Angola that comes up. I do not know if that is going to meet the criteria. We are subjecting it to these criteria, and I promise you that we will continue to do that.

Now, let me say, there is really a two-tiered process to the criteria. One is, under what circumstances would I vote for a peacekeeping operation which in no way commits U.S. troops to anything? It commits the fact that we would pay our fair share, or more than fair share as it turns out, of the assessments but does not mean that we contribute troops. There is a different set of criteria that the administration is working on which would explain under what circumstances we would commit American troops to it. So, there really is a two-tiered process.

I think we are well aware of the question that you have asked, which is why should the United States be interested in this series of peacekeeping operations all over the place? And what we are

doing, Senator, is our very best to get a handle on it because we have exactly the same concerns that you have.

Senator HELMS. That is fair enough. I wish you would send me what you summarize.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. I will do that. I will be happy to do that, Senator.

Senator HELMS. If you would do that I would appreciate it. Mr. Chairman, I did not begin my questioning period until 5 minutes after that light. Can we assume that the first 5 minutes was my opening statement?

The Ambassador: Yes.

Senator HELMS. I will not be long.

Senator KERRY. Does that double it for everybody, Mr. Chairman?

Senator HELMS. Every ranking member will get it, and every chairman. There have got to be some prerogatives, have there not, Mr. Chairman?

Has anybody asked you about proposals for approximately 18 new observer missions? Is there any comment on that?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Nobody has asked me. I do not know if there are 18 observer missions.

Senator HELMS. You do not know anything about it?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. No.

Senator HELMS. Well, this is pending before the U.N. Security Council.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Not 18 new observer missions, no.

Senator HELMS. Well, I wanted to be sure that I was briefed accurately.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Senator, one thing that I said when you were not here is that I would be pleased to come once a month myself or send somebody from my office to go over with you the month's work that the Security Council has. We have a program of work that is put out. A lot of it has to do with the renewal of various of the Security Council mandates and also upcoming missions and things. We will be very happy to consult with you on those on a regular basis.

Senator HELMS. Well, I think that would be good and I certainly am interested in that sort of relationship because, you know, we dangle out here and do not know what is going on, and then I ask you a question and nobody briefed you on it. So, let us agree to do that.

And since I had some objection to taking more time, I will yield back my time, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. And now we will turn to Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If the U.N. does not do peacekeeping in some of these instances, what will happen?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, I think that they will go back into a situation where fighting resumes among various groups. That is the question in Rwanda. It is the problem in Liberia. Certainly, as we know, we are concerned about the return to anarchy in Somalia, which is why the President felt it important for us to stay to give them, as he put it, survival rights.

I think you ask a crucial question, Senator, which is that the U.N. I do not think is making work for itself. The U.N. is not on a power grab. What has happened is that basically countries where strife has taken place or where there is cross-border aggression have come to the U.N. as a way of trying to, in a peaceful way, move into a post-chaotic situation. And if the U.N. does not do it, then that chaos is there.

Senator SARBANES. Is not the problem really more to scrub down how the U.N. does the operation and how they get paid for it, and how the command and control works rather than saying no to the operation?

But let me ask this question. What recent peacekeeping has the U.N. undertaken that it should not have done?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. I happen to believe that all the peacekeeping operations that have been mandated are appropriate ones. I do think that there is a danger of people wanting peacekeepers without us having rigorous criteria. And so I think we will find agreement among other members of the Security Council that they also want to know what is going on, but I do not think that there have been peacekeeping operations to date which were unnecessary.

I do think, Senator, that we have to be concerned sometimes about the length of the peacekeeping operations, which is why we thought that the sunset clause was a good idea in order for the Security Council to maintain some control over what is going on.

Senator SARBANES. Well, it is my perception that a lot of work needs to be done in how the peacekeeping is carried out, how it is funded, and how it is conducted, and how the whole organization operates including, of course, the other problems we have with making the U.N. a more efficient, austere organization. But I am hard put to see at the moment, in terms of peacekeeping functions that have been taken on, what could have been done as an alternative, because in most instances it seems that failure to do that would have led to tremendous loss of life in various places.

Let me ask about Somalia specifically. Was the plan that over time the United States would disengage entirely and other nations would move their forces in and assume the role in Somalia for sustaining a secure environment?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Yes, and the plan I think, to keep the chronology here, is that as we know initially there was a relief effort that went forward in Somalia. Then the Pakistanis took over UNOSOM I. As we know, that did not work because they were not capable of dealing with a vast tragedy, and then President Bush decided to send in UNITAF forces, American forces, which numbered around 38,000. And then we transferred from UNITAF to UNOSOM, and already the number of Americans there fell from 28,000 to 4,000 or so. That was part of the drawdown.

Then the subsequent plan was for the United States first of all to fulfill the mission that it was there to perform, and I think here there is increasing confusion between the U.S. mission and the U.N. mission. The United States had only a part of the U.N. mission, and the U.S. mission there was to assist in the humanitarian delivery of food and to help secure the supply lines.

We were going to draw down on a regular basis and also pursue part of a U.N. mission, which was to begin to make available police forces so that they could take over the roles of some of the management of the environment. So, there had been a process whereby we would become increasingly disengaged, with the U.N. out of there by 1995. That was the plan.

Senator SARBANES. Now, were the other countries putting in their forces on the assumption or on an understanding that the United States would play a certain role, continue to play a certain role in Somalia?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. I think that each one of them probably came in with different assumptions. They had been recruited by the Secretary General, who is the one that basically tries to get the countries to provide. I think they did see the United States as being there in order to provide that particular duty.

But let me say, Senator, when I reported to the Security Council about the President's decision to end our part of the mission March 31, every member of the Security Council understood that the United States had made the major contribution through UNITAF and then subsequently, and they said that they would provide additional troops.

And Pakistanis have provided additional troops, the Indians, and the Nepalese, and I think some others. It is not going to be easy, however.

Senator SARBANES. How many troops are in there from other countries in Somalia?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. I believe about 30 at this point.

Senator SARBANES. 30,000.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. No, 30 countries. I think there are about 30,000 all together.

Senator SARBANES. The Security Council then, I take it, accepts or has a policy consistent with the U.S. plan now to disengage all of our forces by the end of March?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, the Security Council understands what the U.S. position is. However, the Security Council has not yet decided about the length of the UNOSOM mandate.

Let me say that on October 31 the UNOSOM mandate comes up for renewal. The Secretary General has now requested a 2-week extension of that mandate so that he can return his—whether he goes to Somalia or not I think is still an open question, but he has been in the area. He is going to report to the Security Council and then I think the Security Council as a whole, as they review the renewal of the UNOSOM mandate, will make a determination about the length of time for which to renew it.

Senator SARBANES. What was the last length of time?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, the plan was that we would—when Admiral Howe came to report the last time, he felt that the U.N. would be there until 1995, with the idea that the renewals I think were for every 6 months that the Security Council had to express its will on how that mandate worked.

We had just mandated that UNOSOM in March, so this was the 6-month review on it.

Senator SARBANES. Have there been divisions within the Security Council with how to deal with Somalia over this year?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Not really. I think what has been happening in Somalia is that the Security Council was very supportive of the resolution, the transfer of UNITAF to UNOSOM, felt it was an important transfer, supported us. The Americans wanted there to be a transfer from UNITAF to UNOSOM, and I think there has been surprising unanimity. For instance, on resolution——

Senator SARBANES. I think you just ought to, instead of using all those acronyms, spell out who it was being transferred from and to whom and what that represented.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. UNITAF was an operation that was run by the Americans. It was American forces there following a U.N. desire to have U.S. forces there, but it was an American operation.

UNOSOM is specifically a U.N. operation which has its own mandate in Resolution 814, and of which the United States is an integral part. That is the difference.

Senator SARBANES. But the UNOSOM mandate was designed, was it not, to provide a way over time to disengage the American forces. Is that correct? Otherwise, we would have had a situation of having a large number of American forces. What would we have done with them if we had not arranged the procedure whereby responsibilities would be shifted over to U.N. forces?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, that was exactly the purpose was to have an orderly transfer from a U.S. operation to one in which the international community through the U.N. would take over. We would, in an organized way, draw down our forces, and other forces from various countries that the Secretary General had recruited for this would take up the slack and then would move toward the next phase of trying to get police in there.

This is a moving target. I think that there was a real desire to keep the train moving here.

Senator SARBANES. Designed to prevent the reoccurrence of the very events of starvation and death which led President Bush to put American forces in in the first place.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Absolutely. And the point here is, and I think this point should not be missed, that the work that was done by the U.S.-led force and now the U.N. force has prevented the starvation of hundreds of thousands of people, and that everybody acknowledges the fact that that was a vital and viable humanitarian operation.

As I said in my testimony, it is sometimes very hard to just separate out a humanitarian aspect of it. A secure environment is another part of it. And may I say that it was clear to me when I visited Somalia that for the most part, except for this part of southern Mogadishu, it has worked. And those of you that have been there also know that. So, I think that that mandate is one that is properly being followed through.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, Ambassador Albright, with the capture of Army WO Michael Durant, many veterans organizations, the American Legion specifically, have raised an important point, that the Geneva Convention of 1949 deals with treatment of prisoners of war. But the Geneva Convention, at least in this par-

ticular instance—the capture of Michael Durant—did not appear to apply.

The State Department refers to Durant as a hostage and the Department of Defense as a detainee. Now, would it not be a useful point of policy for our Nation to obtain an amendment to the Geneva Convention that would provide the same rights and protections for persons captured when serving in U.N. operations. We have such a situation in Somalia.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. I think that is absolutely right, Senator. And one of the issues the President did talk about was the necessity of having the rights of the Geneva Convention apply.

Again, I think there are a whole series of issues like this which are new to the situation that the international legal system has to get up to date with.

Senator LUGAR. I appreciate that and know you cannot do that instantly. Yet, I raise it as an important point in terms of your own leadership in our country so that it can be moved along, because we now have a whole new class of international conflict occasions.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me. I think yesterday this was raised and I think Ambassador Oakley, I am not sure which witness it was, said that the prisoners we had, the U.N. had, were being treated like prisoners of war although they do not have the legal status of prisoners of war.

Senator LUGAR. I understand that, Mr. Chairman. I heard that and I am pleased to hear that, but at the same time the status of captured U.S. combatants is important.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. I agree.

Senator LUGAR. I appreciate the comment you made to Senator Helms, that you would be prepared to make a monthly report on U.N. activities so that the committee can review what has occurred or to raise questions. There may be months that pass in which not much happens. Nonetheless, I suspect that will not be the case given the agenda you have mentioned this morning.

Likewise, on the cost issue which has been touched upon, what is involved here is a kind of international entitlement program. The meter is running at 30.4 percent of the peacekeeping account. It essentially becomes an increased liability for us. I think there is an inexact idea on the part of the committee and the Senate as a whole as to the obligations that are piling up.

From time to time when we have crises we all become very conscious of that. Perhaps as a part of your monthly reports, if that is to be institutionalized, you might give some idea of what the tab is, because otherwise the U.S. cost is going to come as a surprise, and the appropriators will find it very surprising. If they do not appropriate the money and we go further into arrears at the U.N., that becomes an international embarrassment for us.

I also want to raise a question that gets back to a complex situation that might be extremely difficult for you as well as the President to try to work through. In his message on Thursday, October 7, the President indicated that although the U.N. Security Council had passed two resolutions dealing with nation building and the capture of General Aideed or other malefactors, that we were going to move as a Nation unilaterally away from those positions.

The problem that I perceive, and I am certain that you do, according to reports of your visit with Boutros-Ghali, was that the rest of the U.N. was still bound by those resolutions, still on that track, and that still appears to be the case. This creates a dilemma because on the one hand the most powerful Nation—the United States—is on one horse while the U.N. would appear to be on another.

Now, it could very well be that through the administrations of Ambassador Oakley a cease-fire had occurred and Mr. Durant's freedom has been obtained. But the reports we are getting are that essentially our forces are hunkered down in the bunker, in the compound in Mogadishu, that they are not out pressing the situation either in terms of making certain that food is flowing and that order is obtained.

In other words, their orders are essentially that if attacked, defend yourselves but do not look for trouble and stay out of harms way. Yet, it appears that the rest of the U.N. mission still continues on, whatever may be our current predicament.

How is this all going to work out? In other words, our forces are coming out in some time sequence, that is, some forces are coming in and others are coming out presently. What happens meanwhile, and what does the U.N. do? And in your responsibilities in that capacity, what are you advising them?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. First of all, as I mentioned there, I think that most of the countries that I have dealt with on the Security Council are well aware of the fact that the United States has borne the major burden on the Somali issue through the original role that we played when the Americans were in charge, so as not to use the acronyms, but they also are there in large numbers doing work themselves.

It is very important, and I must say again the Security Council was most interested in hearing my report, about the efforts that Ambassador Oakley—successful ones that he had made to kind of kick-start the political negotiating process.

Let me say parenthetically that the last time that Admiral Howe came to report to the Security Council, which I think was now about 3 weeks ago, he was asked a number of questions about where the political process was going. This is not something that was just on the minds of Americans but others, and he reported at some length about the number of district councils that have been set up, and he got pressed by other nations about the necessity to move that process forward.

It is our optimistic sense at the moment, and you heard from Ambassador Oakley yourselves yesterday, that that process is in fact moving and that some of the requirements for an active military presence may decrease as a result of the political process moving forward. We are hopeful that there will be a conference under various auspices at which the clan leaders will be able to meet.

And if I might again say something parenthetically here, this concept of nation building is not—it has become kind of a slogan, but the bottomline is it does not exist in the resolution, and none of us believe that we can build a nation for anybody. Every country has to build its own nation. The people within that country have to do it themselves.

If you read the resolutions carefully, what they say is we will assist, we will promote, we will help, which is frankly what all our assistance legislation always says. And that particular way of operating is what we think will continue in Somalia, helped by others, and the humanitarian programs that go forward.

It is important, I think, for everybody to see the political process move forward and not have Somalia be an armed camp in perpetuity. So, the UNOSOM mandate goes forward with a real hope that the military part of this will have to be—can be less and less, not more.

Senator LUGAR. Well, the military part of it I suppose was twofold. First of all, we had a large force there to make sure that order could be obtained while we did the humanitarian feeding. The second military mission occurred after the massacre of the Pakistanis and others, and the reentry of our Rangers and other troops.

It appears to me that we still have some ambiguity. The President has talked about maintaining pressure on the malefactors, at least in his initial statement. But apparently now, as far as the United States is concerned, we are not attempting to capture General Aideed. It is not really clear whether all other elements of the U.N. share that view.

What happens if some elements of the U.N. are after Aideed while we are busy trying to start the political process and even mentioning Mr. Aideed, as Mr. Tarnoff did at the same table yesterday, as a possible participant? I just find this very, very difficult to work my way through.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. With all due respect, sir, I do not think it is ambiguous in the following way. As we all know, force and diplomacy go together. What the President has said is he intends to maintain military pressure there, which he has done. There is a Marine amphibious unit that has come in. He has beefed up the number of troops that we have there, and that is designed to keep military pressure on. There also are efforts at diplomacy, which is what Ambassador Oakley is involved in.

It is my understanding that the U.N. is not actively pursuing a search mission for Aideed because Under Secretary Kofi Anan, who is in charge of the peacekeeping, said that the cost of it outweighed its usefulness.

Now, another aspect of what is going on in trying to deal with this highly complex situation is to live up to Resolution 837, which does call for a way to hold accountable those that were involved in the Pakistani massacre. I think, we all think, the U.S. Government thinks and other members of the U.N. Security Council believe that you cannot have people shooting up peacekeepers with impunity because what it does is send a message for peacekeepers everywhere. Therefore, the idea of holding people responsible for that, accountable, continues.

What is being explored now that is being explored through this African initiative is the possibility of an investigatory commission which would assess the responsibility of those involved in it. That is another way. I mean, frankly, what we are doing is dealing with the same problem and trying to sort out better ways to do it. I think that nobody wants to see the loss of life.

The political process has been kick-started by Oakley. But the general approach is that the Africans have to begin to deal with this, and every indication that we have is the President of Ethiopia and the President of Eritrea as well as leaders of Djibouti and Kenya are taking hold of this issue with the assistance of Ambassador Oakley and others in the area. So, I do not see an incompatibility between the force and the diplomacy on this.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador Albright for your presence here today. I just want to emphasize the last sentence or two of your statement, which I think deserves repeating. And that is that America will be stronger and more secure as the U.N. becomes more capable and effective in preventing and ending international conflict. I think that thought is not unanimously embraced, but I believe it is embraced by most of us here in the U.S. Senate.

There are some who question that statement, but yesterday we had a debate before the Senate, and obviously on particular amendments the political outcomes will be determined by many factors. The fact that by a vote of almost 2 to 1 the Senate rejected the notion that U.S. forces under any and all circumstances ought never to be under non-U.S. command. I think this is a healthy message, that we do support peacekeeping, but preferably with forces under U.S. command.

Maintaining that U.N. peacekeeping role is critically important if in the post-cold war period we are going to continue to play a powerful and meaningful role in the world, and if we are going to have institutions that are capable of dealing with these problems. So, I just wanted to commend you for that particular comment.

Let me come to a different issue. I have raised this with you in the past but I gather it is coming to a head next week. The Sixth Committee of the U.N. General Assembly is scheduled to turn to the report of the International Law Commission, which includes a 68-article draft statute on the international criminal court. As you know, I have a deep interest in this and I subscribe to the notion that in the absence of having some basic, fundamental principles established in international law, we then function on an ad hoc basis in many ways.

For example, you have some disagreement over who is the outlaw in Somalia or what are the outlaw elements. We can establish some basic principles of what is considered by most as outlaw behavior, renegade behavior, actions that clearly violate the rights of people.

If there is some basic body of law to which we can all refer, then it becomes easier, it seems to me to begin to address some of the questions that surround peacekeeping. When is it proper and appropriate for peacekeeping forces to take some action? Not that it establishes this in all cases, but at least it moves us in that direction.

There are many who have argued, for instance, that had there been some basic principles of international law in operation at the end of World War I, the world might have spoken at rather than watching those basic principles violated piecemeal, ultimately culminating in World War II. I subscribe to the view that, in fact, had

there been more of an ability of the international community to respond we might have avoided the conflict of World War II.

So, I would ask you—and I have raised this with you in the past—what role will the United States take in trying to promote progress on this issue? I realize we have not taken a position on it definitively yet, but I am very interested in what the position will be of the administration.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Senator, we agree with you that it is essential for there to be some code here that would assist this increasingly varied group of nations to know how to behave. As you know, like everything else it is not a simple matter but we are pursuing it.

In fact, David Scheffer on my staff here in Washington spends a great deal of time working on this particular issue so that the United States will be in a position to be supportive. It will be something that in principle we very much want to see happen. I can tell you from experience now up there is that it is interesting how difficult it is to get agreement on a universal set of anything.

We have now 184 nations within the U.N. There are those who want very hard, for instance, when we set up a war crimes tribunal as we are tying to do on Bosnia, to make sure that it is sui generis. They are always very concerned to kind of put limits around things.

So, we who believe in universality of human rights and a whole series of other universal truths want to see something like this happen, but we do not underestimate the difficulty of it.

Senator DODD. Well, I appreciate that. I just hope at some point we will take a leadership role on this issue. It was the leadership of the United States at the end of World War II that established the genocide convention. The great irony, of course, was that we were one of the last nations to ratify it.

Again, I think very legitimate questions about sovereignty and constitutional law need to be addressed, but I hope our fixation on those issues would not cause us to miss an opportunity here to establish some of those basic principles that we have championed for decades as a Nation. We ought not to miss an opportunity to help establish some of those principles and thus to clarify the appropriate role of peacekeeping.

I was interested on the consultation issue. Let me commend you for your comments on that today. The only thing I caution you is to be careful because there has been in my view an absence of appropriate consultation. I am not speaking specifically of you at all, but I think a lot of the difficulties that we faced in the last few weeks were because a simple phone call to people saying here is our problem, here is what we are doing, just did not happen often enough.

The danger at moments like this is to go to the other extreme and start making unrealistic commitments. We will be up here every 3 or 4 weeks for example. We are not going to be able to do that as often as you think. Filing reports once a month can just become another bureaucratic burden. There is a need for it, but I would urge you to strike a healthy balance about keeping the appropriate members or committees informed as to where we are going on this on a regular basis as appropriate.

I think what is needed is some balance rather than institutionalizing something that can sometimes end up having the countereffect. It becomes so institutionalized no one seems to pay attention to it. So, I commend you for your comments on consultation, but I just urge you to be cautious about going overboard on it.

Last, if I could, I was intrigued with a recommendation I was looking at recently regarding reforming the peacekeeping operations. One of the elements suggested is providing U.N. peacekeepers with access to timely intelligence. Having read that, it just sort of struck me to inquire as to what people are envisioning here.

Are we talking about establishing within the U.N. system its own intelligence operation, or relying on the intelligence data of members of the Security Council? What is the current thinking on that?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, the question of intelligence is a sensitive one here, as well as at the U.N. We believe that they sometimes do not have timely information on the peacekeeping operations that they have, and we have in fact assisted them with timely information on what is going on in Somalia through our information networks. But this is not something where the United States would all of a sudden take over the intelligence capability of the U.N. We are talking about timely information because they have not had it.

We do now, through a system, assist them in getting timely, on the ground information about Somalia. But let me just mention as well, and I want to add this to my opening comments, I think at moments like this where there is tremendous and appropriate attention being paid to areas where there have been mistakes and shortcomings, do not let people forget where there have been some great successes.

Senator DODD. Senator Sarbanes raised it in his question about where you think there has been improper involvement. I have spent a great deal of time focusing attention on this hemisphere, and but for the U.N. involvement in El Salvador I do not know where that situation would be today, frankly. It was a herculean effort that brought together people that I never thought would be able to sit down and resolve their differences and come up with some answers, and it is still bumpy along that road. In the absence of the U.N. involvement there, 70,000 people lost their lives in that little country, it might still be going on.

I happen to think that in Haiti, while there is appropriate concern about the role of U.S. forces becoming engaged in a dangerous situation, the fact that the President did not inject those forces when the dangerous situation presented itself, and the efforts made at the insistence and support of the United States to come up with a sequential approach on how we might restore democracy in that country is something no one ought to apologize for.

In fact it is a demonstration, a success in my view, of how this can work. So while very legitimate questions have been raised about confusion in Somalia, my fear is that as legitimate as those concerns are we will lose sight of the success and the tremendous ability that this approach can have in terms of resolving some of these questions. And in the absence of doing that, the burden more

clearly falls on ourselves or others who may not have the same interests that we do in the long or short term.

So, I think that it is important that that be emphasized at a time like this as well. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Madame Ambassador. I apologize for not being here for your opening statement, we are trying to health care hearings along with this, but I have had a chance to read it since I have been here and I hope everybody takes the opportunity to read it. I think it is an excellent statement, a clear analysis of Somalia, and even then the broader context that you go into of peacekeeping and our relationship to the U.N. It really is a very concise, important statement I think.

Senator DODD. I would like to second that. I think it is terrific.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Thank you very much.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Just a couple of observations, and I believe you touched on it in response to Senator Helms' question regarding the differences of roles in peacekeeping, that the United States would vote for a number of peacekeeping operations but as participants with our own forces playing a role there have been very few. The fact is, it is my understanding Somalia and Macedonia are the two largest operations we have ever participated in with our own forces. Is that correct?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. That is correct.

Senator KASSEBAUM. In Angola, which is where there is a peacekeeping effort that played earlier on certainly an important role as elections were held, I think we have had five observers. El Salvador, which is a success, and Cambodia, a success where we have had minimal participation. So, I think it is important for people to understand when you alluded to that, but it is important to reiterate the difference in types of participation.

Haiti, and Senator Dodd mentioned that, is an example where I think it poses some real problems, and I guess I would like to raise this with you. As far as a commitment, and it goes back again to Senator Helms mentioning the President as Commander in Chief, it is something that I feel. The President should not have his hands tied, nor Congress micromanage.

On the other hand, we will be doing that of course, and we have the power of the purse as has been endlessly argued through these arguments. And Haiti I think is a good example where the past history of the United States in relationship to Haiti should, I think, have been a warning sign that we are a lighting rod there. But once a commitment has been made on our part to be a major participant, then what kind of signal does it send when we in Congress have some real reservations about that commitment?

Now, true, the President withdrew that when he realized there were difficulties. But I think should there not have been some point earlier on where before that commitment was made on our part we took some historical context into account? I would just like your analysis of that because once a commitment is made then there are all kinds of other issues that arise and problems for us.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, let me say you have raised several very important aspects in this. I think that what is going on in other places in these revered buildings is one of those 200 year dis-

cussions about the role of Congress and the role of the executive branch and the Commander in Chief and all of that. It is one that I love, I have to say, having taught about it. I love to teach about it and read about it. I am not sure I love being involved in it, but it is going on and it is there.

It has become, obviously, more complex as a result of this additional way of doing business through peacekeeping. I think clearly the writers of the Constitution, the Founding Fathers, had not thought through what happens in this kind of multinational world.

I do think that it is necessary for the Commander in Chief to be able to have control over actions on a day-to-day basis, or we will not be able to function as the leader that we must be. On the other hand, I also believe fully that Congress has an essential role to play, and I must say I appreciate what Senator Dodd said about not regularizing consultations because I see the real downside of that.

But I think that we should, and we all welcome the chance to discuss issues with you more and see where they are coming down the pike. That would be the only thing, I think, is to alert to the issues that are coming up.

But I think that in a general way there ought to be a place where there are more executive-legislative consultations on general commitments to issues.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, Haiti might have been one.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. It might have been.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Because, again, I am not sure but it seems to me the past history there, there is a place it would seem it would be best to draw other nations and be supportive of their participation which could have worked better than ours.

Senator DODD. If my friend would yield, and I give her my time on this one, I think her point is very well taken. Some of us talked with Larry Pezzulo, frankly, about these issues, and I have got to tell you I raised some real concerns about it as well, about whether or not they are going to be able to reform the Haitian military. It was a rather optimistic view, frankly, but maybe they could have done more of it, I think. I think your point is well taken.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, I just raise it.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. If I might add, I do think to a great extent we were being as sensitive as we could to problems of an overwhelming U.S. presence in the area, the necessity to include the OAS, and the necessity to have this not be an American military force.

If I might say, as the President said, Haiti was not a peacekeeping or a peacemaking operation the way it was set up. It was to be a technical—or the American part there was to be a technical assistance aspect, to go and help train the military. Therefore we were, believe me, very sensitive to not kind of overwhelming everybody with Americans.

And there was again within the Security Council discussion of this a great point of saying that the OAS was a part of this, that President Aristide, for instance, in the most recent thing that we did in the sanctions, had requested it.

But that does not in any way obviate what you say, which is consultations at a certain level.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, I bring it up as an example which on paper might have looked fine. I think that we realized that as it is viewed it really looks very different, and then to say there is a ripple effect of problems that come from that I think is important.

But I would like to go on with the time I have with just a couple of questions on Somalia. You mentioned also, of course, that the U.N. mandate on Somalia expires on October 31, and maybe you addressed it before I came. But could you share with us perhaps your thoughts on ways that UNOSOM II should be changed, and if we are contemplating putting forward any different thoughts on the mandate?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, this is something that has just evolved recently. We are waiting for the Secretary General to return from the area.

The way that the mandate normally becomes renewed is on the basis of a report from him. We are beginning some preliminary thoughts, but I think actually this is a perfect example of where we might be in closer consultation with you on your ideas for this, I think.

The idea as I see it, in a preliminary way, is that more and more be done to transfer from a military to a civil authority within the area, to really add greater depth to the attempts for the political reconciliation and the evolution of—this is for the U.N. mandate, not the United States. The U.N. mandate to help there to be structures that would allow for law and order, and that is where we have to concentrate on.

Of course, obviously, a great deal now depends on the success that the Oakley initiative, along with the Africans, brings.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you. My time is up, and there are many questions that we could exchange. I just would like to call attention to chapter 8 in the U.N. Charter regarding regional arrangements. I believe, particularly in Africa, the opportunity which exists with ECOWAS, which exists with the OAU, and it says were that before something is referred to in the Security Council these regional arrangements should perhaps be strengthened as conduits to perhaps resolve some of these problems.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Agreed.

Senator KASSEBAUM. It has never really been implemented. It has been difficult to get any real participation and strength through OAU and ECOWAS, but maybe that is coming. Maybe some time we can explore that.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. That is definitely something that we are doing.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Madame Ambassador. I do not want to dwell too much on the past stuff because I think there have been a lot of clarifications, and I think it is a different policy today basically.

And I think frankly what is a lot more interesting and, frankly, important to us is a better definition and understanding of the process by which we are going to proceed in this new world and understand better what this concept of peacekeeping, peacemaking, nation building, et cetera will demand of us and how we are going

to do it. And I think that is where the American people need more understanding and education.

We are not going to be able to do all of that in the time that I have, obviously, or in the time we have here, but I do want to ask a couple of quick process questions that still trouble me because I think, depending on the truth of what happened or did not happen, it could be a precursor to problems in the future and I just want to understand it.

On the Somalia sort of expansion into this UNOSOM II nation-building strategy, the President has suggested that he was unaware of the expansion of the U.N. operation in Somalia, and by extension the mission that we were involved in. You have, on the other hand, said very clearly that according to press reports the White House was well-informed.

The reason I ask this is, obviously, that if there is something in the process that is not informing the President or if there is some way in which these decisions are not being fully vetted, clearly that is something we ought to understand or perhaps you can clarify for us so that we understand if there are any weaknesses in that process.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all I believe that the issue about the President is what he was saying was that he was disturbed by the fact the political process had gone off track. He was not aware of the extent to which it had gone off track from the mission that he knew it to be.

He had pressed us to make sure that it got back on the political track. Secretary Christopher and I met with Boutros-Ghali. The President himself said that to Boutros-Ghali when he was up there for the General Assembly, and that he was disturbed by the fact that it had not moved faster into the political track than he had wanted.

Senator KERRY. Fair enough. Accepting that, there are reports that the political adviser to Admiral Howe, John Douglas, in I think September had negotiated a cease-fire with Aideed, but that Howe and other UNOSOM officials said no, that they refused to pursue it. Are those reports true, do you know?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. I know only what I have read in the newspaper on that, and when Admiral Howe was in and reported to the Security Council there was no indication of that.

Senator KERRY. So, to whatever degree the political process may have gotten off track, it could have happened at that point and you may have never known it either. Is that correct?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Yes.

Senator KERRY. Well, I appreciate it.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. If I might, Senator, one of the difficulties of all of these peacekeeping operations is it is difficult to micromanage them from either the U.S. mission or in the Secretariat. One of the problems is they are out there, the umbilical cords are——

Senator KERRY. Is that an inherent problem in the peacekeeping effort or is that a current problem of the command and control structure of the U.N.?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. I think it is both. I think that the peacekeeping effort is a brand new way of doing things, where the peace-

keepers are now being asked to do much more than kind of sit somewhere between two groups that have agreed to their presence and who are there literally as a buffer, whereas peacekeepers are asked to do a great deal more and the links that exist between them and the peacekeeping operation in New York, which all of us have said from the beginning needs to be better attuned to the needs of this very rapidly changing situation.

Senator KERRY. Well, I think I want to impress upon you the perceptions of colleagues here, which I am sure you do not need to have impressed on you, but I think it is important to understand that we are not going to be successful going down the road here unless there is a better structure at the U.N. for that, tracking and commanding. I mean, we are just not going to do that. It is evident in yesterday's turmoil over the Nickles amendment. It is evident in other emotions that are being expressed.

And for those of us who want these operations to succeed, we cannot at the same time be sops or excusers of a rather antiquated or not modern command structure and information flow and intelligence gathering. I think we have really got to work those out because the interests of this new structure depend on that.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. I might say, Senator, in response to that, that is why I appreciate so much what Senator Dodd had said and Senator Sarbanes, that there are problems here, there is no question about it, but we have to be incredibly careful not to throw the baby out with the bath water.

There is a need for the U.N. to act in these peacekeeping operations, and it is up to us to be supportive of what they are and then to be tough in order to make sure that these issues that you have raised and the other Senators have raised take place, because this is a process in the making and we have our opportunity to put our imprimatur on how things ought to be done.

Senator KERRY. Well, you know what is interesting, it is a process in the making, but the more I have been thinking about it in this last days the more I think it is also not a process in the making. I mean, what is new is that we do not have the superpowers dominating the superstructure of these things. But, frankly, we have done these things even in the context of the cold war, and we have had the capacity to resolve these, and we know fundamentally what has to be done.

In Cambodia, and maybe this is the way to lead into the next question, you had a political structure. You had a consensus among parties and within the country itself, and that really helped the difficulties to be leapfrogged.

In Somalia we had no such political structure, et cetera, and that begs the question of whether or not you have to be prepared to only be a buffer until such time as you have achieved that political capacity to move forward, and that it is easier to sell and safer to implement if you are exclusively in that sort of buffer situation versus what we have leaped into in Somalia.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, I think it is a genuine question as to what the roles are. As I said earlier, I went to three peacekeeping operations to see just this, Somalia, the way you just described it, Cambodia, which is the next step where there was a structure,

and El Salvador which Senator Dodd mentioned which had more of a structure to work with.

I think clearly it is harder to operate where there is no structure. The question that I think we all have to ask ourselves is, does that mean that we do not go in there at all or do we go in there with some different way of doing things?

And I think here the problem is, and this is why these criteria are so important and why we are actually pressing the U.N. to look at criteria, the Secretary General always says there are thousands of people dying or starving in other places and we are not paying attention. And the question is, what is the selection process? Which ones do we do and how?

Senator KERRY. Well, that is where I think there has to be a greater capacity to set sort of a priority. It is a cruel priority but it is cruel world, and there are realities of limitations. We are going to have get more resolute about setting linkages of interest, if you will, and declaring those linkages of interest up front and trying to define it.

I have suggested a number of times in the course of the debate over the last week that we ought to think about—and the more I do think about it, the more I think it can work—creating a volunteer force within our Volunteer Army. We have a Volunteer Army but it is not strictly speaking volunteers. We had a lot of people go into it with the assumption the only thing they might ever have to do is defend the United States of America. They are not, per se, signing on to this broad peacekeeping effort. Therefore, families have not bought into it and the constituency has not.

But if we said to a lot of people within the military, look, there is thing within the military called peacekeeping and if you volunteer for it that will be your billet and there will be a special understanding of how to achieve that.

Thinking back to my own service during the Vietnam period, I volunteered for Vietnam. A lot of people did, and a lot of people thought, gee, there might be a war but that is what I am choosing to experience at that point in time. And for career soldiers it was particularly attractive because it is the route to command. If you do not have that experience it is hard to be a seasoned commander.

I would suspect you would have a lot of young Americans buying into the idea that this is a bold endeavor, that this is a way to serve the world as well as their Nation, and that peacekeeping is a noble endeavor that they are going to take the risks for, and that they might move up the command and control faster.

I still believe that must not become an excuse for leaving Congress out or not having the consensus of the Nation. But if you do build a consensus of the Nation you will greatly facilitate our capacity to sustain these efforts if the people being injured are choosing to be injured and not against their will being put there.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, I think it is a very good idea, one exceptionally worth following because, and I now—first of all, I have in my job here spent a great deal of time consulting with the military. General McAffrey in fact is kind of my JCS military adviser who comes up to New York and we spend a great deal of time talking about peacekeeping. I have spoken at the invitation of Gen-

eral Sullivan to his officers on the issue of peacekeeping. Spoken is the wrong word—exchanged views with all of them.

They see peacekeeping as a very important part of the American military mission but designate it in a way that people know what they are doing, your point and I think very well taken.

The other is that the peacekeepers that I have met out there, and I mentioned this earlier, the men and women in Somalia that I met with knew that they were doing something really important, and they felt—and even now, after this tragedy, many of them said that they wanted to continue the job.

Again, a Marine that had been part of the Nobel Peace Prize-winning peacekeeping operation said that this was a highly important part of his military training. I suggested earlier that I think we need to do more to command those who are operating in peacekeeping operations, that it does not mean that they are out of the system, that in fact it helps them in their command structure so that they are not in effect punished for having taken a sidestep.

And I think your suggestion is very well worth exploring, and it would make it easier to get support or consensus. So, we would welcome working with you on that.

Senator KERRY. I appreciate it. My time, I see, is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I think it is a wonderful idea, and if you put it in legislative form I would love to cosponsor it.

Senator KERRY. We are working on it. We have a cosponsor already. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brown.

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madame Ambassador, we do not know whether to be angry with you here or sympathetic with you. It might be a little of both.

You took what I thought was one of the most extraordinary, capable staffers who had worked for members of this committee, Frances Zwenig, to be your chief of staff. So, for that we should be angry with you.

Senator KERRY. I am.

Senator BROWN. But knowing how Frances ran her former boss into the ground, we should be a bit sympathetic. He had not a single gray hair when she went to work for Senator Kerry originally.

You have mentioned cost-sharing at the U.N., actually a difficult subject. My recollection is that we are somewhere in the neighborhood of 22 percent of the world's GNP. What is your view of the appropriate share of the U.N. operational fund, not peacekeeping but operations, general operations that we should be bearing?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Senator, I have no specific view on the percentage, but I do think that we bear too large a percentage. First of all, the way that the percentages are calculated puts us, in peacekeeping for instance, somewhere around 31 percent, which is more than our regular assessment. We have been, through a variety of ways, pressing at the President's direction to lower that amount and to get there to be a different calculation on the basis of which those investments are made.

They are made on a 10-year GNP calculation when clearly things have changed and there are now countries who have increased their GNP that are not being properly assessed. Part of various reports that have come out have argued for reassessment. We are

pressing for that, and believe me it is something that we feel very strongly about.

Now, one of the reasons frankly that we are also pressing for an expansion of the Security Council to include Germany and Japan is we believe that those two countries specifically should be bearing the larger share of the burden.

Senator BROWN. But the 10-year calculation of GNP would not give us a 31 share, would it?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. No, but the peacekeeping is done on a different basis, calculating on exchange rates. We will send you a paper on it.

Senator BROWN. So, the general maintenance, the general cost of the U.N. is on a GNP allocation in a 10-year form.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Yes.

Senator BROWN. And we pay what, about 25 percent now?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Twenty-five percent.

Senator BROWN. And that I assume will be going down. Is that adjusted automatically each year as we calculated?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. No, it is not. That is the problem. It has not been calculated.

Senator BROWN. Oh, it is a historic figure?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Right. So, we are pressing for recalculation.

Senator BROWN. So, your position is that it should be recalculated on a regular basis?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Yes.

Senator BROWN. The peacekeeping allocation, have you a formula or a proposal in that area other than just to reduce our share?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, we are pressing to reduce it. There is no particular formula, but we believe that at least it ought to be the 25 percent and not beyond the 25 percent until the 25 percent is recalculated.

Senator BROWN. Your proposal is to base it on the GNP or GDP? I guess we use GDP.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. GDP.

Senator BROWN. Does this come for a vote? How is it effected? Is it a recommendation by the Secretary?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. It is something that has to come through the General Assembly and it is not going to come rapidly, but what we are pressing for is we have a whole kind of agenda of reform items that we are looking for at the U.N. We want there to be an inspector general. We want there to be a reassessment of various ways that things are done. This is a part of that.

Senator BROWN. Is there a point that we take action unilaterally, that is withhold donations?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, there are those who have done that. Personally, I do not think that is a good idea because then it ties our hands to take action. As I said, there is a fine line sometimes between losing your credibility and having leverage.

Senator BROWN. Would it be fair to say you are studying alternatives at this point?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Studying alternatives.

Senator BROWN. There has been something written of late which I think is perhaps part of the operation of a free press about the

potential that you had cast votes in the U.N. for the expanded mission in Somalia that the White House was unaware of or had not approved.

You dealt with this previously, I think, with Senator Kerry and others, but just to put it clearly on the record, have you cast any votes for the United States that did not have the approval of the State Department and the White House?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Absolutely not. I cast votes under instruction.

Senator BROWN. The votes in March, and I think there was a later one that clarified and expanded somewhat the mission in Somalia, were those ones that specifically you had clearance on from the White House?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Yes, sir.

Senator BROWN. I appreciate that, and I do not mean to rub salt in the wound but I think it is important to have that on the record.

You mentioned that the mission in Somalia is now clear or is clear, and I believe that includes maintaining order. My recollection is that the resolutions at the U.N. in the past were interpreted at one point as authorizing the apprehension of Aideed and the capture of weapons in Somalia, that those resolutions have not been changed, and I am assuming that while the resolutions have not been changed you are comfortable that the direction to the forces in the field is different.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Sir, on that I just happen to have the resolution with me, and that paragraph which specifically states what the mandate is it is to secure the investigation—this is those who are responsible—their actions, their arrest, their prosecution, and their punishment. It does not state any names whatsoever, and it talks about accountability. That is what this is about. That was a resolution which we took in emergency session after the killing of the Pakistanis.

The President has said that while we wish to depersonalize this particular effort, we must hold accountable those who were responsible, because if we do not hold accountable those who were responsible then you get into the position of having open field day on peacekeepers.

If I might just make a kind of aside here about the difficulties of how we personalize foreign policy, what happened during the cold war is everybody was pretty much aware of who the enemy was, and even before that we had Hitler, and before that and after that you had Stalin and you had the Red Menace, and various ways that were easy enough for the public to deal with.

In the post-cold war world one of the reasons I think that we have difficulty in mobilizing support for these various actions is that it is very hard for people to understand what it is that we are doing in these various places. So, the tendency is, with some of the rapidity of this news and television, to personalize the enemy, which is what President Bush did with Saddam Hussein and television did with Aideed.

The problem then is if you do not get that person, as we did not with Saddam Hussein, how do you depersonalize it? And this is one of the crucial problems in how you mobilize support for policy these days. I think it behooves us all, and why I always welcome a dialog

and I love to give speeches to make clearer what our policy is about—and by the way, Senator, I am going to our mutual home State of Colorado next weekend to give speeches. And I just believe that it is very important for us to try to explain this new era to the American public so that we are not always stuck with putting a face on the enemy and then having problems when we want to depersonalize it.

Senator BROWN. I know you will have a warm welcome there. We highly recommend speeches during ski season.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. That too.

Senator BROWN. Mr. Chairman, I have just one thought on the clarification of the mission, if I could complete it.

The CHAIRMAN. Please.

Senator BROWN. I guess to put you on the spot, but would our forces be tasked with arresting Aideed now?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. No.

Senator BROWN. What about capturing weapons?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. At this time the mission that we have is we are not a part of the search for Aideed, and as described now our mission is to be there to assist the logistic mission of making sure that humanitarian goods are available, and also to protect the Americans that are there.

Others within UNOSOM are in fact engaged in making sure—not in disarming but in kind of monitoring these weapons caches.

Senator BROWN. I appreciate it. Basically, the resolution states the specific tasks assigned to U.S. forces are somewhat different now?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. And again, sir, something that I think that we have probably not made clear enough, there is a difference between the U.N. mission and the U.S. mission as a part of it.

Senator BROWN. That is quite helpful, and I might say your testimony today stands in sharp contrast to some we have had from others recently. And if you ever want to move into the Defense Department you will have many boosters.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Coverdell.

Senator COVERDELL. Thank you, Madame Ambassador. I am going to be brief, and I may submit several questions in writing.

To follow up both the question of Senator Brown and your comments that we were maintaining a military pressure, I was reading this morning from General Montgomery. And I will read you this quote. "But Montgomery also made clear that contrary," and this is the point I want to make, "contrary to the expectations of many U.N. officials and much of the American public, the newly committed 6,600 combat troops will not be given the task of retaking the streets of Mogadishu," et cetera.

It bothers me that he would say, "contrary to the expectations of many U.N. officials" at this junction. Why would you think he would say that?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. I am sorry, Senator, but I do not think I can answer that question. I mean, the way that we understand that the U.S. forces were there is as backups for the U.N. forces as a division of labor. I also have to say, and this may be part of my new skepticism, but I do not always believe every quote I have read in the paper.

Senator COVERDELL. I recognize that. That probably ought to be a caveat that goes with all of us. We have all experienced that. Nevertheless we all have to use these as a device of information. It often leads to some clarification and I think that is an interesting statement.

It goes on to explain his description of the mission pretty succinctly, but I think that is an interesting comment.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. I will check into it, sir.

Senator COVERDELL. Now, I will not belabor this nor read the quote that I did yesterday to Secretary Tarnoff, but shortly after the events of early October, the President characterized to Copley News Service that he did not realize the mission had changed. He made reference to you as well.

You have been very candid here and direct this morning, this afternoon too, stating that it was a methodical process. How do you think that happened? Has he been mischaracterized in terms of stating that the mission was not clear to him?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, I think obviously the President as the President and Commander in Chief is aware of overall American policy. But this is a process that evolved, and it is my understanding from having spoken with him that he is satisfied with the explanations that he has had about the process and procedure on this evolution.

Senator COVERDELL. That is an important point, a distinction. Just to share part of it with you it said, and it was to the Copley News Service, that "the U.N. had changed its mission unwisely, failed to provide military operation to back up peacekeepers, and staffed the units with troops untrained for their jobs who refused to venture outside their areas and refused to take orders."

Now, that is very serious allegations. I spoke to this on the Senate floor. Then he went on to say, and it says—there is an editorial comment as well, although this has appeared in several periodicals. The President also referred to U.N. actions as if he and his U.N. Ambassador had no role in formulating or approving them.

This in particular was a comment that I thought you do not take carte blanche, but if this were so it is very serious.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. If I might say, what I see as having really happened on this is that the President was aware of the mission of the U.N. in Somalia, as what it was, and I will not spend my time quoting to you, but basically of securing the environment. This is the U.N. mission, of providing humanitarian relief and working toward reconciliation.

What happened, and this is where the President said that he did not feel that we had enough of a role, was that that mission got off track. And this goes to the other parts of your quote, that there was not enough attention being paid to the political track of this, and that what had begun to happen was that seizing Aideed, just to put that in, had become too dominant and that the political aspect of it had not been supported as strongly.

I reported to the President when I came back from Somalia and told him and others that I thought that what was going on outside of Mogadishu, that the political process was moving well, but that in southern Mogadishu there was this kind of operation which was dedicated to dealing with the violence in Mogadishu.

The President asked us, me and others, to make clear to the Secretary General and the Secretariat that we wanted there to be greater emphasis put on the political track, and we did that. And I met with the Secretary General, the Secretary of State did. We did this at a number of lower levels. The President voiced that concern himself when he met with me.

And where I think he felt we were not able to push it enough was to make sure that that political track was being carried on as vigorously as he wanted us to in fulfillment of the mandate that was set out by 814. So, I think it is a matter of emphasis.

Senator COVERDELL. I think the whole incident, in addition to the hope that thousands of people will have been spared a death by starvation, we have all alluded to that, Somalia probably will be a historical incident that has a great deal to do with some of these prospective questions that everybody has been alluding to here today, not the least of which is the role of Commander in Chief.

I would suggest that some review of the flow of information might be in order because he is ultimately the Commander in Chief and bears, therefore, the responsibility for what may happen in the flow.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. I am sure that the President thinks that also.

Senator COVERDELL. I am sure. Madame Ambassador, yesterday I read this quote to Secretary Slocombe regarding the Clinton nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense for Democratization and Peacekeeping, from an article that Morton Halperin wrote this year, 1993, in Foreign Policy on multilateralism.

The quote is, "the United States should explicitly surrender the right to intervene unilaterally in the internal affairs of other countries by overt military means or by covert operations. Such self-restraint would bar interventions like those in Grenada and Panama unless the United States first gained explicit consent of the international community acting through the Security Council or a regional organization."

Now, this is important as it relates to you because it is this new section in the Department of Defense for peacekeeping, and I am wondering if you agree with this fairly serious departure from our current standard or could elaborate on that, and how you see your interaction with this DOD section on peacekeeping?

Now, let me quickly say that Secretary Slocombe said that this was not the Department of Defense view in his response.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, may I say—I mean this is, as I understand it and the date that you read it, an article that Mr. Halperin wrote before he was appointed. It is not the view of the Department of Defense. It is not my view. It is not the view of the President. It is not the view of the Secretary of State.

What we have said is that there are now any number of ways that the United States has to deal with the serious problems with which we are faced internationally, and that when our vital national interests are threatened we do not exclude any means. We are there. We will have unilateral means when they are appropriate as we did. For instance, the more recent one that I was involved in was when we decided that we had to take some action

against Baghdad after it became evident that there had been an assassination attempt on Mr. Bush. And, therefore, unilateral means are the means that we will use when we see that our vital national interests are threatened.

Where I think we need to look at is under what circumstances are multilateral means an appropriate tool for the United States to use in the fulfillment of our national interests. I think we will find that there are circumstances where international multilateral means are useful. And again, let me cite something very recent—Haiti.

In the last week, because we are very concerned about the fulfillment of the Governor's Island agreement in Haiti, we believed that it would add strength if the international community were mobilized in support of that action. So, we first had a resolution of the U.N. reimposing the sanctions, and sanctions are most effective when they are multilateral. And then another resolution in which we were able to get multilateral enforcement of those sanctions so that now the American ships have been assisted by Canadian, Argentinian, and British I think just saw most recently, so that the interest that we have, and we do have interests as far as Haiti is concerned that have to do with the restoration of democracy, protection of our people, and trying to make sure that there is not an outflow of refugees, that American interest is strengthened by the presence of a multilateral action.

So, my view and those of the President, the Secretary of State, and the Defense Department are that we take unilateral action where it serves our interests best, and that multilateral action is an available tool to pursue American interests.

Senator COVERDELL. I appreciate your clarification, and I also join with the others in complimenting you on the definitive opening statement. I thought it was a very thoughtful document and will lead to a lot of meaningful discussion.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator COVERDELL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ambassador Albright. I share those thoughts and congratulate you on your statement.

I have a couple of further questions. Following up on Senator Kassebaum's reference to the OAU, I believe that the role of regional organizations in settling disputes is an important one. I am curious what your own thought was, whether the OAU would play a role in Somalia.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Senator, first of all one of the things that we have worked on at the U.N. is to get regional organizations more involved in cooperation. That is true of Haiti with the OAS. As far as some of the issues in Nagorno-Karabakh we have been talking about the CSCE, the Minsk process.

And also there is very much the attempt to get the OAU involved in Somalia. President Meles is, I believe, now Vice Chair of the OAU, and there are regional African interests there, but also the OAU specifically. Also, ECOWAS and OAU have been instrumental in Liberia and in the western Sahara, so every attempt is always made to try to share the burden with the regional organizations.

The CHAIRMAN. On a completely separate matter, but I believe you are familiar with it, could you tell us what can be done to keep

the Cambodian mine action center that has been in charge of the demining activities in Cambodia for the last several years? I understand that the expatriate military staff is being pulled out.

I am just curious what you saw onsite because obviously there is a huge danger to the population if they are pulled out.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Absolutely. The issue here, I think any number of you as well as we have said that we see in Cambodia, the UNTAC is a major success for the U.N. and therefore for all of us, and most of all for the Cambodian people who are however concerned about not just kind of leaving there. And the United States is specifically interested in having an initiative to pursue the demining, and we are working very hard on making sure that the demining process continues and that there are funds for it.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any possibility you might raise this with the Secretary General to extend the funding and authority at least on a temporary basis until a longer term solution can be worked out?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. We have. We have talked to him about that. We have talked about any number of kind of post-UNTAC activities and getting different countries, a larger group of countries, involved in the post-UNTAC activity in Cambodia. We have. We will press that.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. The record will be kept open for 2 days and we thank you very much, indeed. We now adjourn.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 12:52 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

RESPONSES OF MR. TARNOFF TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR BROWN

(October 19, 1993)

Question. Sunday's (October 17, 1993) *Washington Post* led off with a story by Ann Devroy and Jeffrey Smith entitled "Clinton Reexamines a Foreign Policy Under Siege." The first paragraph states that at 8 am. on last Sunday:

> " * * * as far as the U.S. action was concerned, Somalia was all over but the leaving."

The story goes on to explain that by later in the day the message had "turned to fog." The result was eventually the President's current Somalia policy—a heavy build-up and then a pull-out on March 31st.

Before this fast-paced reordering of U.S. policy in Somalia last week, what had been the U.S. plan?

Had a pullout date been set?

Answer. Our involvement in Somalia has never been an open-ended commitment.

Before the President's October 7 speech, we had planned to reduce our logistics force by 50 percent to around 1,400 troops by December 31 and to withdraw the remaining logistics troops during 1994. As circumstances permitted, we planned also to remove our combat troops—the Quick Reaction Force—offshore and eventually out of the region.

We had not set a deadline for troop withdrawal before the President's speech.

Question. In selecting the current pull-out date, what criteria were used?

Answer. The President and his military advisers believe that 6 months is a reasonable time in which to achieve the objectives he outlined to the nation on October 7.

We also wanted to be sure that UNOSOM can plan appropriately for our departure by turning over the functions our military now performs to other countries or to private contractors. Six months offers enough time to accomplish this.

As the President noted, there is no guarantee that Somalia will be without problems after March 31st. However, this is sufficient time for the Somali people to make reasonable progress toward the reconciliation so necessary to their country's future.

Question. What caused the initially-selected early pull-out date to lengthen into 5 additional months—ESPECIALLY after the initial engagement promised by the Bush Administration was for a 30–60 day commitment?

Answer. The reference to an "early pull-out" date is unclear. With the exception of the logistical troops, there never has been a set date for withdrawing any of the U.S. forces.

A limited number of U.S. forces remained in Somalia after completion of Operation Restore Hope to participate in a U.N.-led operation. U.S. forces remained in Somalia beyond the initial period projected when Restore Hope began because it was clear that their presence was required to fulfill the mission's objectives. The U.S. troops accomplished this mission.

Question. What effect would accelerating the pull-out by 2 months have had?

Answer. An accelerated pull-out would raise serious problems.

First, accelerating the pull-out from March 31 to January 31 would increase the difficulty of ensuring a smooth hand-off to the United Nations. There simply would not be enough lead time to identify troops to replace the U.S. and get them into position inside Somalia.

Second, it also would increase the difficulty of supporting the political reconciliation process. This is part of the mission President Clinton outlined to the nation on October 7.

Question. Secretary Tarnoff mentioned that the "Somali people help themselves in fashioning a lasting political solution to their civil conflict, and to produce a secure environment to enable the free flow of humanitarian aid."

Can this mission be achieved by March 31, 1994?

Answer. There is no guarantee that the Somali people can resolve their differences before U.S. troops withdraw. However, we think that there is a reasonable chance that the Somalis can make progress toward a lasting political settlement.

Question. What is the difference between what has been achieved to date and what will be achieved by March 31, 1994?

Answer. We are hopeful that the Somalis, helped by others including the U.S., will have made major progress toward a lasting political reconciliation.

In addition, our expectation is that the U.N. will have made considerable progress toward its major goals, including establishment of the district and regional councils and revival of the police and judicial systems.

Finally, by March 31, we will have withdrawn U.S. troops.

Question. What is the role of U.S. troops between now and March 31, 1994?

Answer. U.S. troops will be escorting supply convoys and helping to keep supply routes clear. They will also continue carrying out their force protection and helicopter supply operations.

U.S. logistical supply troops will continue to perform their functions both on and off the four U.S. compounds in Mogadishu.

These tasks are consistent with the policy President Clinton outlined on October 7.

Question. Will life in Somalia be normal after April 1, 1994?

Answer. We can only speculate about Somalia's future.

Outsiders can help them revive their economy and civic institutions but it will be up to the Somali people to prevent their country from sliding back into the chaos that prompted the original international intervention.

We think our policy will offer them significant help toward that end.

Question. I am very concerned with the mission objectives, or the lack thereof, with respect to the Somalia operation. In fact, I believe that the historic debate that took place last week in the Senate was more about our frustration with our ever-evolving, always murky mission objectives in Somalia.

Could both of you please state for this Committee, what exactly is our mission in the remaining few months of our mission in Somalia?

Answer. As outlined in the October 13 report on Somalia issued by President Clinton, the mission of the U.S. troops in Somalia is to "assist in providing a secure environment to enable the free flow of humanitarian relief by providing U.S. military logistic services to UN forces."

We also have provided "U.S. combat units to act as an interim force protection supplement to U.N. forces in emergencies."

Question. Have all American troops been accounted for in Somalia?

Answer. No U.S. troops are unaccounted for.

RESPONSES OF MR. TARNOFF TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR PRESSLER

Question. What role have you and the Secretary of State played in the decision-making process in Somalia?

Answer. As Under Secretary for Political Affairs, I have assisted the Secretary of State in following developments in Somalia since the beginning of the Clinton Administration. Senior Administration officials, and the Secretary of State, have always been deeply involved in the Somalia policy process.

The Administration is strongly committed to ensuring that the Congress is fully consulted on Somalia and other foreign policy matters. In this vein, I testified before the Congress on July 29, and welcome future opportunities to work closely with the Congress.

Question. Did the State Department play any role or make any recommendation to the Defense Department against sending additional armor to Somalia, as requested by the U.S. Commander there and recommended by Central Command?

Answer. The Department of State made no such recommendation to the Department of Defense.

Question. What role does the National Security Council have in general? And what specific role has the NSC played with respect to Somalia?

Answer. The National Security Council plays an essential coordinating role, ensuring that all the viewpoints and perspectives of the agencies with a role in national security and the formulation of foreign policy are reflected in the policy-making process.

The NSC has coordinated the Administration's Somalia policy process. The President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Ambassador to the United Nations, and their key deputies have all participated in the formulation of U.S. policy in Somalia. The Principals and Deputies Committees have deliberated and reached decisions on various aspects of U.S. Somalia policy during the past several months.

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR PELL

(October 20, 1993)

Question. Could you provide a detailed account of our attempts to involve the OAU in the resolution of the Somalia crisis?

Answer. Although the OAU and other outside parties made numerous but unsuccessful attempts to end the fighting in Somalia in 1991–1992, the OAU generally has had a limited role in Somalia. It lacks the resources (staff, communications, etc.) to mount the type of operation required to resolve a complicated situation like the conflict in Somalia. Thus, while we have encouraged the OAU to play a helpful role, we have looked to the United Nations to assume most of the burden. As recognized in Security Council Resolutions 751, 794, and 814 we nonetheless have supported the United Nations' decision to work with the OAU and other regional organizations in the search for peace.

Since early 1992, we have had an extensive series of diplomatic contacts on the Somalia question with the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea, the principal members of the OAU's Standing Committee on the Horn of Africa. Since mid-July, the importance we attach to the active involvement of both governments has increased. Our continuing interest in working with the states of the region has been underscored recently by President Clinton, who asked Ambassador Oakley to work closely with the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments in the effort to re-energize the reconciliation process in Somalia.

In addition to our frequent contacts with Ethiopia and Eritrea, we remain in regular contact with the senior officials of the OAU Secretariat, including the Secretary General, and with this year's chairman of the organization, President Mubarak of Egypt. President Clinton anticipates a full discussion on Somalia with President Mubarak during his visit in late October.

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR FEINGOLD

UN TRUST FUND FOR SOMALIA

Question. Please describe the United Nations Trust Fund for Somalia.

—When was it created?
—What is it to be used for?
—How much money is in it?
—Who contributes to it?
—Are there any conditions on the contributions?

Please submit for the Record the amounts each donor has contributed and to which countries the money has been disbursed.

Answer. The Somalia Trust Fund was authorized by United Nations Security Council Resolution 794 of December 1992 and formally established by an agreement between the U.S. and the UN on January 29, 1993. The Fund was to be used to help pay some of the costs for developing nations to participate in UNITAF, the U.S.-led operation President Bush initiated in December 1992 to guarantee the safe delivery of food and medicine to the Somali people. Reimbursement was authorized to help pay U.S. incremental costs for support of these countries resulting from their participation in UNITAF; in addition, the Fund authorized direct payment to these developing nations for their incremental expenses relating to:

- transportation of military forces to, from, and within Somalia;
- food and clothing for these military forces;
- vehicles, equipment, spare parts, and petrol;
- goods and services.

On September 22 the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 865, which welcomed contributions to the Fund for the additional purposes of reestablishing the Somali police, penal, and judicial systems. To date, Norway has contributed $1 million to the Fund for the Somali police program, and the U.S. has given $6 million for the judiciary. The U.S. and UN are in the process of actively soliciting contributions from other nations.

On October 6 the Somalia Trust Fund Committee, comprised of representatives from the United States, Japan, and the United Nations, met to determine the status of claims submitted against the Fund thus far. Some claims were reduced because the expenses were not reimbursable; in other cases, claimants were asked to submit additional documentation by November 15. Nigeria and Turkey have not submitted any claims, but may do so before November 15. Once claims have been settled and final payment has been made, a surplus is expected to remain, which we propose using toward paying for the reestablishment of the Somali police. Japan has indicated it would consider this after all claims have been settled.

A complete list of donors, amounts contributed, claimants, and amounts paid to date follows.

List of Donors to Somalia Trust Fund

Nation	Amount contributed (US dollars)
Antigua	$500
Austria	1,000,000
Brunei	100,000
Denmark	1,000,000
Finland	677,295
Iceland	50,000
Ireland	115,000
Japan	100,000,000
Korea (South)	2,000,000
Malaysia	50,000
Philippines	5,000
Singapore	25,000
UNITAF subtotal	105,022,795
Norway	1,000,000
United States	6,000,000
Police/judiciary subtotal	7,000,000
Interest	322,000
Grand total	112,344,795

List of Claimants to Somalia Trust Fund

Nation	Amount claimed	Amount paid to date
Botswana	$11,253,288	$3,474,753
Egypt	15,280,063	6,624,712
Morocco	54,053,459	17,000,000
Pakistan	3,589,432	1,000,000
Tunisia	1,279,250	1,100,000
United States	27,541,015	27,541,015
Zimbabwe	987,454	250,000
Total	113,983,961	56,991,350

Responses of Ambassador Albright to Questions Asked by Senator Lugar

UN Peacekeeping Funding

Question. According to the *Christian Science Monitor* U.N. peacekeeping and peacemaking commitments in the current fiscal year are expected to be about $4.4 billion. We contribute about 31% of this amount through our assessed contribution. This will amount to more than 10% of our entire foreign operations budget (e.g., 10% of $12.9 billion). This cost does not include the cost of deploying American relief forces in Somalia and Haiti which would drive the $4.4 billion figure much higher. Moreover, arrearages from previously assessed contributions for peacekeeping are being carried forward and this is more than $1 billion.

We are in effect, paying for the U.N. peacekeeping activities of other countries in places that have little or no direct national security interest to the United States.

—Shouldn't the U.S. contribution to U.N. peacekeeping be made through voluntary contributions, rather than through assessed payments, so that the Congress can judge the necessity of each operation?

—Is this the best use of our scarce resources?

—In a time of budget shortages, should the President be making such costly commitments to the U.N. without weighing the impact of diverting scarce funds from other programs in the budget?

Answer. Experience has shown that exclusively voluntary funding of peacekeeping operations cannot provide the assured financing that most nations view as necessary for deployment of their troops.

The Department is instead pursuing a combination approach by which host countries and those who benefit (such as for operations in Cyprus and Iraq/Kuwait) assume large parts of the costs and thereby reduce the gross amount payable through assessments by the U.S. and other member countries.

It costs us less to participate in multilateral peacekeeping operations than to go it alone. Our national security is dependent on a democratic world order and international peacekeeping and peacemaking bring order out of chaos. We recognize there are competing demands for resources, but we believe this is a cost-effective use of our scarce resources.

Question. Is the State Department taking steps to see that the provisions of the Geneva Conventions will be applied to U.N. peacekeepers? (And I don't just mean Americans, but anyone engaged in a peacekeeping mission.)

Answer. Yes. We have insisted that peacekeepers be accorded at least all the protections offered by the 1949 Geneva Conventions. In Somalia, peacekeepers were detained illegally, in violation of Security Council resolutions. We demanded their immediate release.

Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions, which applies to internal armed conflicts such as that in Somalia, requires humane treatment and that the wounded and sick be collected and cared for. It prohibits violence to life and person, humiliating treatment, and extrajudicial punishments.

We share your concerns about the attacks and use of force against all persons engaged in U.N. peacekeeping operations. We are examining further the application of the Geneva Conventions to U.N. peacekeepers. Proposals, including a proposed convention, to clarify international law or establish any necessary new law concerning the protection of personnel engaged in peacekeeping and other operations, have been formally presented in the United Nations. We support the goals underlying such proposals and will be an active participant in the future consideration of this important subject.

Responses of Ambassador Albright to Questions Asked by Senator Helms

Proposed observer missions

Question. Could you please address the status of observer missions for the committee, as well as the difference between an observer mission and a peacekeeping mission? Has the United States ever vetoed a proposal to upgrade an observer mission to a full-scale peacekeeping mission?

Answer. There are currently 18 UN peacekeeping missions mandated by the UN Security Council. A list of those missions is attached.

—A number of additional peacekeeping missions have periodically been proposed to address particular problem areas, but none are now under active consideration by the Security Council.

- Sixteen of the current 18 missions are authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which allows UN mission personnel to monitor and observe, but does not allow them to use armed force, except in self-defense, to fulfill their missions.

—However, the personnel deployed in the UNOSOM II mission in Somalia and the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia and Croatia (but not in Macedonia, which is Chapter VI) are authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which allows them to use armed force, if necessary.

—In some of the 16 missions, the tasks of monitoring and observation are carried out by military units, usually of battalion size. In other cases, such as in Liberia and Georgia, observers operating individually or as small teams perform these tasks.

- The U.S. has never formally vetoed a proposal to change the authority of an ongoing peacekeeping operation from a reliance on Chapter VI to a reliance on Chapter VII.

—Resolutions of that nature are rarely brought to a vote if it is known in advance that they will not be approved.

CURRENT UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

Africa

UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).
Established: April 29, 1990; Personnel: 348 (30 U.S.).
UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II).
Established: May 30, 1991; Personnel: 69 (0 U.S.).
UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) (Chapter VII).
Established: April 24, 1993; Personnel: 26,112 (2,821 U.S.).
UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ).
Established: December 16, 1992; Personnel: 6,498 (0 U.S.).
UN Observer Mission in Uganda and Rwanda (UNOMUR).
Established: June 22, 1993; Personnel: 81 authorized (0 U.S.).
UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).
Established: October 5, 1993. Personnel: 800 authorized (0 U.S.)
(Note: UNOMUR and UNAMIR will become one mission in December).
UN Military Observers in Liberia (UNOMIL).
Established: September 22, 1993; Personnel: 650 (330 military, 320 civilian) requested.

Americas

UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL).
Established: May 20, 1991; Personnel: 363 (0 U.S.).
UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIHAT).
Established: September 23, 1993; Personnel: 1,267 authorized, to include approximately 600 U.S. Sea Bees and military trainers.

Asia

UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP).
Established: January 5, 1949; Personnel: 39 (0 U.S.).
UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).
Established: February 28, 1992; Personnel: 9,354 (32 U.S.).

Europe

UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).
Established: March 4, 1964; Personnel: 1,076 (0 U.S.)
UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) (former Yugoslavia).
Established: February 21, 1992; Personnel: 25,612 (584 U.S.).
UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG).
Established: August 24, 1993; Personnel: 88 authorized (0 U.S.).

Middle East

UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).
Established: 1948; Personnel: 220 (17 U.S.).
UN Disengagement Observer Force on the Golan Heights (UNDOF).
Established: May 31, 1974; Personnel: 1,071 (0 U.S.).
UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).
Established: March 19, 1978; Personnel: 5,215 (0 U.S.).
UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM).
Established: April 9, 1991; Personnel: 367 (15 U.S.).
Note: Personnel data is as of September 30, 1993.

NATO WARNING TO THE SERBS

Question. Serbian military attacks against the beleaguered capital of Bosnia continue. In response, NATO airplanes have increased low level sorties over Serb positions in Bosnia. Yesterday, Secretary Christopher stated that NATO is considering the implementation of its threat to protect the city by military force.

—Is the United Nations supportive of air strikes against Serb targets?

—What would the United States do if any of these low flying NATO planes were shot down?

Answer. Under the terms of its August 9 decision on the use of air strikes in response to the strangulation of Sarajevo or other areas in Bosnia, NATO would seek initial authorization for the use of air power from UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali. There would not need to be any formal Security Council action.

Should the decision be taken to implement air strikes, the U.S. and participating NATO Allies would be prepared to take whatever steps we deemed necessary and appropriate to protect our aircraft and their crews.

CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL FOR U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN BOSNIA

Question. Two weeks ago Assistant Secretary Oxman came to the Committee to brief on the status of peace negotiations in Bosnia. He reiterated the administration's willingness to commit tens of thousands of U.S. troops to Bosnia to enforce a peace settlement but was rather vague about any other U.S. policy options in the region.

— Is the United States considering committing U.S. forces to Bosnia, either in a multilateral context or unilaterally, for any reason other than enforcing a peace settlement?

—Will any additional forces be dispatched to Bosnia, including for humanitarian reasons, without Congressional authorization?

Answer. As previously indicated, the U.S. is prepared to participate in implementing the August 9 NATO air strike decision should circumstances warrant. We have no plans to send ground forces to Bosnia for any purpose other than implementing a fair and viable Bosnian settlement.

In his recent letter to Senators Mitchell and Dole on Bosnia, President Clinton stated that it would be helpful to have a strong expression of support from the Congress prior to the participation of U.S. forces in implementing a Bosnian peace accord. The President added that for this reason, he would welcome and encourage Congressional authorization of any military involvement in Bosnia.

RUSSIA

Question. I understand that just last night the Security Council approved an observer mission to Georgia. This is the second United Nations observer mission to that country.

I consider this a major step toward United Nations involvement in the former Soviet Union.

The Russian Foreign Minister himself has asked for United Nations support and funding for Russian peacekeeping while stating at the same time that these operations are necessary because Russia is "losing geographical positions that took centuries to conquer."

—What is the Administration's response to Foreign Minister Kozyrev's request that the United Nations underwrite Russian peacekeeping?

—Will the Administration support and fund Russian peacekeeping operations in the former Soviet Union?

—Is the Administration contemplating any other peacekeeping operations in the former Soviet Union? Would the U.S. military serve any role in these operations?

—Is Russia capable of being a neutral mediator or is peacekeeping a means to bring former Soviet republics back into the Russian fold?

Answer. With respect to the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), the Security Council, in resolution 858 on August 24, 1993, authorized dispatch of 88 observers to monitor the cease-fire agreement reached between the Republic of Georgia and Abkhaz separatist forces on July 27. No new observer mission was created by the Security Council resolution of October 19.

—Four UNOMIG military observers and four civilian support staff members had arrived when the fighting initiated by Abkhaz forces in violation of the cease-fire agreement caused UN deployments to be suspended.

—We support a continued UNOMIG presence in Georgia. However, the Security Council is considering changes related to UNOMIG's mandate and deployment in light of changed circumstances on the ground.

On the more general question of peacekeeping in the New Independent States, we are aware of the Russian proposal, the essence of which is that the international community would make voluntary financial contributions to peacekeeping operations in the New Independent States carried out by Russia and Russian-led coalitions. In return, Russia would accept UN oversight and act only with the consent of all parties concerned.

We are prepared to consider carefully the proposal and are seeking clarification of a number of issues related to it.

Because of current financial circumstances, it is unclear how much, if anything, the U.S. could contribute to a voluntary fund.

There are UN and CSCE efforts underway to find a resolution to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and to work for an eventual political reconciliation in Tajiksitan. The CSCE is also engaged on the ground both in Georgia and Moldova.

In the absence of cease-fire agreements it is premature to consider peacekeeping operations.

We do not anticipate U.S. military personnel serving in peacekeeping operations in the New Independent States.

We believe a Russian peacekeeping role in former Soviet republics could be constructive, and we would consider supporting such a role, under certain circumstances: if such a role is desired by the parties to the particular dispute; it is carried out under the principles of CSCE and the UN Charter; and it is based on maintaining the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the New Independent States.

UNOSOM II EXTENSION

Question. On October 31, the mandate for UNOSOM II (the peacekeeping operation in Somalia) expires. The UN Security Council will review the mandate and move to renew, extend, or modify the broad sweeping scope of the Somalia mission. The U.S. has expended over $1 billion in Somalia, in support of all the combined operations—UNOSOM I, UNITAF, and UNOSOM II. The Administration, as I understand it, has not requested any reimbursement, credit, or offset against the UN assessment to the U.S. for 30.4% of the total cost of operation.

- With this in mind, I want to know, as the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, will you support the extension of UNOSOM II without change?
- Will you use this opportunity to force a reevaluation of the expansive nature of the mission statement?
- Will you use your Security Council veto to insure UNOSOM II complies with the President's criteria?

Answer. The U.S. Government supported an interim extension of UNOSOM II to November 18; no substantive changes were addressed in this exercise.

Now that Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has returned from Africa, the Security Council is engaging in an intensive discussion of UNOSOM II. The U.S. has advocated that the Resolution extending UNOSOM II take into account new realities and has encouraged the UN to focus its attention on a specific number of realistically attainable objectives.

We will work to ensure that UNOSOM's mandate meets the President's guidelines. I would not like to speculate at this point on vetoing the renewal of UNOSOM II's mandate.

HAITI SANCTIONS

Question. United Nations sanctions against Haiti have oscillated between positions of "on again" and "off again" over the last few years. United States businesses who have been attempting, in good faith, to comply with these United Nations sanctions, have been whiplashed between these differing policies. U.S./U.N. policy dictates that they not cooperate with the Haitian junta. However, U.S. policymakers have encouraged U.S. businesses to be prepared to support our policy of rebuilding the Haitian economy when the political tension abates. The situation is untenable for U.S. companies who are caught between U.S. policymakers on the one hand and the Treasury Department, specifically the Office of Foreign Assets Control, on the other.

—What are you doing to insure that the impact of U.N. sanctions on Haiti do not unfairly penalize U.S. companies that are attempting to comply with ever-changing U.S./U.N. policies?

—Have you and/or will you raise this issue with the Secretaries of State and Treasury?

Answer. UN sanctions on Haiti have contributed significantly to our foreign policy goals in Haiti. They apply to all U.N. member states and do not unfairly penalize U.S. companies.

The United Nations Security Council imposed limited economic sanctions on Haiti on June 16, 1993 to compel the *de facto* authorities of Haiti to negotiate in good faith to restore the legitimate government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The sanctions played a key role in convincing the Haitian parties to conclude the Governor's Island Agreement, in which they committed themselves to take the specific steps necessary to restore democracy to Haiti.

Broader Organization of American States sanctions on Haiti were in place long before the U.N. imposed sanctions on petroleum products and arms. U.N., OAS and U.S. sanctions on Haiti were temporarily suspended after progress in implementing the Governor's Island Agreement, then reimposed when that progress faltered. We

have consistently viewed Haitian sanctions—and supported them—not as an end in themselves, but as a means of promoting a political objective: the restoration of democracy to Haiti.

My staff and their colleagues at the State Department in Washington have worked with the Treasury Department to ensure that U.S. companies are aware of the U.N. sanctions regime and are able to comply with the least disruption possible. We look forward to the Haitian parties' compliance with the terms of the Governor's Island Agreement, and the subsequent suspension, then lifting, of the multilateral and bilateral sanctions on Haiti. We also look forward to the vital contribution the American business community can make to the reconstruction of Haiti once a political settlement there is consolidated.

PEACEKEEPING COST

Question. Ambassador Albright, for fiscal year 1994 peacekeeping operations, we owe $545 million (more) than has been appropriated by Congress. Projections are that, if the United Nations continues to spend money on peacekeeping operations that have already been approved, the United States government will owe ONE BILLION DOLLARS more than has been appropriated this fiscal year.

How does the Administration intend to pay the ONE BILLION DOLLAR U.N. bill for which Congress has not appropriated any money?

Could you provide the committee with a summary of your plan for paying this bill—do you intend to request a supplemental?—do you intend to submit a rescission request to offset funds from some other account?—do you intend to transfer funds appropriated for foreign assistance?

Answer. The President signed on October 27 the FY 1994 State Department Appropriations bill which provides $402 million for contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities. This means we will face major shortfalls in FY 1994, and significant funding obligations in the years ahead.

We share your concern about this issue. I can assure you that under the leadership of the White House interagency efforts are underway to address this funding shortfall, but we do not yet have a final plan.

Obviously we will need to work closely with the Congress on a variety of approaches to meeting these important obligations. We also are working with the UN on necessary reforms in how peacekeeping operations are conducted, managed and funded.

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR PRESSLER

REDUCING PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENTS

Question. Madame Ambassador, as you well know, the United States is obligated to pay approximately one-third of all costs associated with United Nations peacekeeping activities. The formula used to determine this extraordinary amount was established in the 1970s, when the United States was disproportionately wealthier than fellow UN member-nations. Times have changed. The United States remains an economic giant, but she does not stand alone. Our peacekeeping assessment needs reflect these changing times. So I was very pleased to hear President Clinton call for a re-evaluation of UN peacekeeping assessments. I stand ready to assist him in this effort.

What was the Secretary General's response to President Clinton's request for a re-evaluation of peacekeeping assessments?

How will the State Department and the U.S. mission pursue this mission?

Answer. The UN Secretary General does not, as a matter of course, respond to statements made by member states in the General Assembly. Moreover, a decision to change the peacekeeping assessment rates can only be made by UN member states, not by the Secretary General.

We face an enormous challenge in convincing other UN member states to take on higher assessments for peacekeeping in order to offset the reduction for the United States. We are working closely with other member states in the General Assembly (particularly with the Contact Group composed of other countries making a significant contribution) to identify possible modalities and formulas for effecting change as soon as possible.

SUPPLEMENTAL PEACEKEEPING BUDGET

Question. The U.N. Secretariat submitted to the 48th General Assembly a proposed peacekeeping support budget of $32 million. This budget is to finance, for the remainder of 1993, all administrative costs at the U.N. Headquarters in direct sup-

port of peacekeeping activities. It is my understanding that many of the expenditures in the proposed peacekeeping support budget are unrelated to peacekeeping. In other words, the U.N. may be attempting to inflate our nation's legal obligations to the U.N. In other words, we would be required to pay 31.7 percent of those expenditures of which we normally would pay 25 percent.

On September 27 of this year, I sent a letter to you, asking that you investigate this matter and take all steps to ensure that any proposed peacekeeping support budget fund only those activities that support peacekeeping operations. I have yet to receive a response.

Are you aware of this peacekeeping support budget?

Do you and your staff at the U.S. mission have reason to believe that there are non-peacekeeping activities that would be funded under this peacekeeping support budget?

Do you recall my September 27th letter? What actions have you taken to ensure that the support budget funds only peacekeeping-related activities?

Has the U.S. mission taken any position on this support budget?

Answer. The Department is aware that a proposal of this type was suggested within UN working committees. The Department has been calling for the UN provide proper support for peacekeeping operations but is, at the same time, insistent that only costs related to UN peacekeeping support be included in this account.

The proposal, when it is taken up by the relevant committees will receive close scrutiny. Since it has not yet been formally taken up, the Department has not taken a formal position on this item.

We have received your September 27th letter and are preparing a thorough response.

CHAIN OF COMMAND

Question. I am very concerned about the chain of command in UNOSOM II, and any other peacekeeping operations that utilize American forces. In the case of Somalia, U.N. forces and U.S. logistics forces are under the command of a Turkish General, General Bir ("Beer"). However, American combat forces are under the command of General Montgomery. This creates an interesting, if not perplexing, chain of command problem. General Montgomery must take orders from the Pentagon, and ultimately, the White House. However, he and his troops are part of a multinational unit that must also take orders from U.N. headquarters in New York.

What is the administrative relationship between General Bir and General Montgomery?

When the UN sends orders to General Bir to utilize U.N. peacekeeping forces, are U.S. forces obligated to participate in such activities?

If there is a disagreement between General Bir and General Montgomery on the use of U.N. peacekeeping forces, who ultimately has the final say on how U.S. troops are utilized?

Could you explain the succession of events that caused the command and control in New York not to authorize Pakistani and Malaysian peacekeeping forces to come to the aid of U.S. combat troops pinned down in Mogadishu for up to 12 hours on October 3?

Answer. General Montgomery has two jobs. He serves as both Commander of U.S. forces in Somalia and as Deputy Commander of UNOSOM II. In the former capacity, he reports directly to General Hoar, Commander-in-Chief of Central Command and through the latter to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President. In the latter role, General Montgomery reports to General Bir, the Commander of UNOSOM II.

The only U.S. military personnel that are normally under UN operational control are those in logistics units. Even these forces are also subject to separate, U.S.-only chain of command. All U.S. combat forces are under a strictly U.S. chain of command, answering to General Montgomery in his capacity as Commander of U.S. Forces in Somalia.

The UN does not command U.S. combat forces. U.S. combat forces may be placed under the operational control of a UN force commander on a case-by-case basis at the request of the UN, but only upon approval by the U.S. chain of command. General Bir's decisions result from directives from the UN Secretary General and the latter's representative in Somalia, Admiral Howe, and are discussed with national contingent commanders, including his deputy, General Montgomery. The UN commander, in consultation with the United States, may direct non-combatant U.S. logistic units in their mission of supporting UN units.

In all cases, the U.S. reserves the right to cease participation in UN peace operations.

The Rangers were returning after their mission had been completed when their helicopters were shot down. Within twenty minutes after the helicopters were grounded, the U.S. Quick Reaction Force responded. The Quick Reaction Force personnel were on the way to assist the Rangers when they, too, came under attack and had to withdraw.

General Montgomery then decided to request assistance from the Italian, Pakistani, and Malaysian troops serving in UNOSOM II. However, unlike the Quick Reaction Force (which has rapid response capability) it takes more time for these UNOSOM II troops to respond, assemble, and assist troops in distress. The situation was complicated by the fact that the UNOSOM II troops had to fight their way to the scene, at night, through a densely populated section of the city.

The decision was made by General Montgomery to authorize Pakistani and Malaysian forces to come to the aid of U.S. combat troops, and the Pakistani and Malaysian troops fully participated in that mission.

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